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SUCCESSFUL MACROECONOMIC  THEORIES  must explain  important  empirical 
regularities.  One  indisputable  regularity  is the highly  procyclic  nature  of 
quits: many more people voluntarily  leave their  jobs when unemploy- 
ment is low than when it is high. In this paper, we demonstrate  that 
theories  based on the assumption  that  unemployment  is involuntary  can 
easily explain  procyclic quits.  1 We construct  and empirically  validate  a 
simple  model  of labor  turnover;  the model  is Keynesian  in that  the labor 
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market  is nonclearing:  jobs are rationed.  Market-clearing  theories such 
as search  theory and real business cycle theory cannot account for the 
procyclic  behavior  of quits. 
Despite its  simplicity, our model has a rich set of  implications 
consistent with the U.S. labor market:  a large proportion  of quits are 
due to job switches that involve no spell of unemployment;  quits are 
procyclic  despite the fact that wages are acyclic; quits are concentrated 
in low-wage jobs; quit rates decline as tenure increases; there is an 
inverse relationship  between vacancies and  unemployment;  many  quits 
involve low or negative wage changes. The consistency of our model 
with observed features of the U.S.  labor market demonstrates the 
soundness  of models with nonclearing  labor  markets. 
Models with job rationing exhibit a significant  market failure: a 
characteristic  of equilibrium  in models with rigid wages is that some 
individuals  covet jobs held by others who are no better  qualified.  When 
wages are sticky, people cannot obtain  jobs they desire by offering  to 
work for lower pay. As  a result, the autonomous departure of an 
individual  from ajob creates a sequence of opportunities  that we call a 
vacancy chain.2  The vacancy chain concept provides the key to under- 
standing  why quits are  procyclic. 
Suppose,  for  example,  that  an  employee  (A)  autonomously  withdraws 
from the labor  force, creating  ajob vacancy. This vacancy provides an 
opportunity  for workers  who covet A's job. Suppose that B takes A's 
old position. If B is employed, B's quit creates a further  vacancy. Now 
suppose that C takes B's old position; if C is employed, the vacancy 
chain  continues. However, if C is unemployed  or out of the labor  force, 
the chain of vacancies, which began with A's departure  from his or her 
job, ends. The length of a vacancy chain can be defined  as the number 
of job  switches that occur, on average, per autonomous vacancy. 
The  vacancy chain consists  of  a  succession  of  "employment-to- 
employment"  job switches ("E-to-E" quits)  that  involve no intervening 
spell of unemployment. 
2.  Bruno  Contini  and Riccardo  Revelli have independently  employed  the concept of 
vacancy  chains  in modeling  the relation  between  net and  gross flows  in the labor  market. 
See "Job  Creation  and Labour  Mobility:  The Vacancy  Chain  Model  and  Some Empirical 
Findings"  (Universita  di Torino, March 1988).  The implications  of vacancy chains for 
mobility  in organizations  are  explored  in Harrison  White,  Chains of Opportunity (Harvard 
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Vacancy chains are triggered  by the creation  of autonomous  vacan- 
cies. The  latter  occur  because  of newjob creation,  withdrawal  of workers 
from  the labor  force, and voluntary  quits into unemployment.  Vacancy 
chains end only when a vacancy is filled  by an individual  who is either 
unemployed  or out of the labor  force. 
In our model, quits are procyclic because vacancy chains are longer 
when unemployment  is low. The expected length  of a vacancy chain in 
a simple  model  of turnover  varies  inversely  with  the unemployment  rate. 
Vacancy chains are short when unemployment  is high because the 
number  of jobseekers who are unemployed  or out of the labor  force is 
large relative to the number  of employed  jobseekers. In this case, the 
probability  of recruiting  an  unemployed  individual  to any  given  vacancy, 
thus ending the chain, is high. In a high-pressure,  low-unemployment 
economy, there are fewer unemployed or out-of-the-labor-force  job- 
seekers  relative  to employedjobseekers;  thus  vacancy  chains  are  longer. 
The logic of the vacancy chain explains why total quits (and  especially 
E-to-E quits)  are procyclic. Quits  increase  as opportunities  expand;  the 
opportunities  forjob switching  are significantly  greater  when unemploy- 
ment  is low than  when it is high.3 
Models  with clearing  labor  markets,  in contrast,  generate  predictions 
concerning  quits that are inconsistent  with observed  empirical  regulari- 
ties. Search  theory, for example, predicts-wrongly-a  positive corre- 
lation between quits and unemployment. According to this theory, 
workers  who (incorrectly)  perceive their  current  wages to be low quit  to 
search  for new  jobs, causing  unemployment  to rise. Real  business cycle 
models predict-also  wrongly-a  negative correlation  between aggre- 
gate employment  and the quit rate, at least in the short run. Negative 
productivity  shocks lower the reward to work. Quits should rise as 
individuals  withdraw  from  the  labor  force. Since such shocks  are  unlikely 
to be neutral, quits should also rise as workers voluntarily  reallocate 
themselves  across sectors. 
In addition to generating  positive  predictions consistent with ob- 
served patterns  of labor turnover,  models with involuntary  unemploy- 
ment  have  interesting  normative  implications.  We show that  a reduction 
in unemployment  raises welfare  by more than the output  gain captured 
3. For an alternative  non-market-clearing  model, see Robert  E. Hall and Edward  P. 
Lazear, "The Excess Sensitivity  of Layoffs and Quits to Demand,"  Journal of Labor 
Economics,  vol. 2 (April 1984), pp. 233-57. 't70  DruuKirlgs  rapers  on  mConomic  ActiVity,  -I  YOO 
in Okun's Law, since improved matching  between workers and jobs 
creates  an additional  welfare  benefit. 
The logic of the vacancy chain  relies on the idea that some employed 
workers are ready to switch jobs when openings become available. 
Workers  are ready  to switch  jobs, in our model, for either  higher  wages 
or higher nonpecuniary  rewards. We assume that the nonpecuniary 
reward  realized  by a worker  on any particular  job is match-dependent 
and varies over time. Workers  who grow to dislike the nonpecuniary 
aspects of theirjobs become anxious  to switch. When  unemployment  is 
high, workers who dislike their  jobs are likely to be stuck. When it is 
low,  and therefore vacancy chains are long, unhappy workers find 
opportunities  to move to jobs with preferred  nonpecuniary  characteris- 
tics more quickly. At low unemployment  rates, high turnover  enables 
workers  unhappy  with the nonpecuniary  aspects of their  jobs to trade 
places more easily, resulting  in higher  average  job satisfaction,  even if 
quitters  do not, on average,  experience  wage gains. The low-unemploy- 
ment  economy is an economy of opportunity,  in which  workers  who are 
dissatisfied  with their  jobs have a high degree of mobility. Heretofore, 
economists  have tended  to emphasize  the costs of turnover.  We empha- 
size the gains. The costs of mobility  are already  taken into account by 
Okun's Law, since they are reflected in the level of output. But the 
increase in nonpecuniary  rewards  resulting  from increased "liquidity" 
of the economy at lower rates  of unemployment  is outside  the bounds  of 
Okun's Law, which focuses on changes in real GNP. Logically, such 
nonpecuniary  rewards  should  be included  in a comprehensive  measure 
of total economic welfare, such as the "measure  of economic welfare" 
computed  by William  Nordhaus  and  James  Tobin.4 
Our assumptions concerning nonpecuniary  rewards are not only 
normatively  interesting,  but  empirically  reasonable.  Indeed,  any  realistic 
portrait  of labor  turnover  must include  a role for nonpecuniary  rewards 
(although  such rewards  are inessential to a theoretical explanation  of 
the procyclic nature of E-E quits). Our empirical work shows that 
nonpecuniary  rewards  are significant  relative to wages and that these 
4.  See William  Nordhaus  and  James  Tobin,  "Is Growth  Obsolete?"  in  National  Bureau 
of Economic Research, Fiftieth Anniversaty  Colloquium  (Columbia  University Press, 
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rewards  fluctuate  over time for a given worker  in a given job. In fact, 
nonpecuniary  considerations  motivate most  "job-related"  quits. That 
such rewards  exist and vary over time explains  why many  job changers 
realize  insignificant  or  negative  wage  changes,  and  yet achieve  significant 
gains  in overalljob  satisfaction.  In  addition,  fluctuations  in  these rewards 
help explain why total quits are so large, averaging  24 percent of the 
manufacturing  work force annually  in the United States since World 
War  II.s Nonpecuniary  rewards  are thus essential to an understanding 
of turnover  in the American  labor  market. 
In what follows, we first present a simple model of turnover in a 
rationed  labor market. Simulations  demonstrate  the close correspon- 
dence between the predictions  of this model and the features of labor 
turnover  in the U.S. economy. In addition,  the simulations  indicate  that 
the welfare gains associated with lower unemployment  may be 10-20 
percent in excess of the output  gains summarized  in Okun's Law. We 
also compare our vacancy chain model with alternative  real business 
cycle theories. 
Next,  we  assess  the empirical validity of  key  assumptions and 
implications  of the model. First, we present evidence about turnover 
patterns in the U.S.  economy. We demonstrate  that employment-to- 
employment  quits account  for at least 30 percent  of all quits, while quits 
from  employment  to unemployment  are  less than 18  percent  of all quits. 
We also present  rough  estimates  of the cyclic behavior  of E-E and E-U 
(employment-to-unemployment)  quits. We then  examine  the time series 
properties  of aggregate  quits, layoffs, and  unemployment.  A permanent 
decline in the unemployment  rate  is associated  with a permanent  rise in 
the quit rate (the elasticity is roughly one); the short-run  response is 
even more  pronounced.  In contrast,  we find  a strong  transitory  correla- 
tion  between  layoffs  and  unemployment,  but  no permanent  relationship. 
After  a brief  review  of empirical  evidence  in support  of the assumption 
that jobs  are rationed, we  establish empirically the importance of 
nonpecuniary  rewards in quit decisions. The National Longitudinal 
Survey (NLS) provides a monetary  measure of specific nonpecuniary 
rewards.  These rewards  are  typically  large,  averaging  over a third  of the 
5. The annual  quit rate in manufacturing  averaged  23.8 percent  from January  1948 
through  December  1981,  as reported  in Employment  and Earnings. 500  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1988 
wage rate, although  they vary substantially  both across individuals  and 
over time. Econometric  tests confirm  the hypotheses  that  proportionate 
changes  in pecuniary  and  nonpecuniary  rewards  are  of equal  importance 
in affecting  both the level of worker  satisfaction  and workers' propen- 
sities to quit. However, because nonpecuniary  rewards  are so variable, 
most  job-related  quits are motivated  by nonpecuniary  rewards.  These 
results  imply  that  the NLS measure  is a suitable  proxy  for the nonpecu- 
niary rewards in our theoretical model. The analysis also establishes 
that a significant  fraction  of quitters  suffer  wage cuts but achieve gains 
in overall  satisfaction,  consistent  with the theoretical  model. 
A Matching Model with Job Rationing 
In this section, we construct  a model of labor  turnover  based on the 
assumption  ofjob rationing.  The  model  illustrates  the interactions  among 
different  types of labor  turnover  through  the vacancy chain, as well as 
the cyclic features  of labor  turnover  in a rationed  labor  market. 
ASSUMPTIONS  OF  THE  MODEL 
The key assumptions  of the model  follow. 
Fixed Labor Force  and Number  of Jobs.  There is an exogenously 
determined  number  of jobs, N,  and a fixed labor force, L, although 
workers may enter and leave the labor force. N  is less than L,  so 
the unemployment  rate is u  =  (L  -  N)IL.  The unemployment  rate is 
treated  as a  parameter  in  this  model,  since  it is assumed  to be exogenously 
determined  by aggregate  demand. 
Workers do not leave the labor force as a direct consequence of 
unemployment;  that is, there is no "discouraged  worker"  effect in this 
model. Furthermore,  on entering the labor force, workers search for 
jobs and  therefore  must have at least a minimal  spell of unemployment. 
Rents. Jobs pay rents. The rudimentary  model  we initially  construct 
has  just one type of job. It pays a wage w, which is in excess of b, the 
reward from the worker's alternative, which is unemployment. We 
subsequently  modify the model to consider the more realistic case in 
which  there  exists a variety  ofjobs, each in fixed supply,  paying  differing 
wage premiums.  This accords with the finding  of others that different George  A. Akerlof,  Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen  501 
industries pay varying wage premiums to  workers with seemingly 
identical  personal  characteristics.6 
The Unemployment Benefit.  Individuals who are unemployed  earn 
benefits, b, that include transfer payments plus any value that the 
unemployed  attach to leisure. The benefit replacement  ratio, blw, is 
defined  as the ratio  of the unemployment  benefit  (including  the value of 
leisure) to the after-tax  wage; we assume that blw is significantly  less 
than one. For simplicity, we assume that the unemployment  benefit 
received by a worker is independent  of his wage on his previous  job, 
which implies that lower-paid  jobs have higher benefit replacement 
ratios.  In  benchmark  simulations  we assume  that  the benefit  replacement 
ratio  for the average  worker  is 0.6.7 
Nonpecuniary  Rewards  and Job Satisfaction.  The total reward to 
working,  which determines  the overall  level of satisfaction  achieved by 
a worker in any given job, consists of two components:  the wage, or 
pecuniary  reward,  and  a nonpecuniary  reward.  Our  empirical  work  later 
demonstrates  the importance  of nonpecuniary  elements in determining 
the total reward  from  work, or stated  differently,  in explaining  the level 
of a worker's  job satisfaction. 
Nonpecuniary  rewards  can be divided  into two parts-the  reward  to 
work "in general" and any additional  reward  to working  for a specific 
firm. Time-varying  specific rewards are important  in explaining  job 
switching  and are the focus of our model. General  rewards  to work are 
initially  ignored  in our simulations.  The consequences of this simplifi- 
cation  are discussed  below. The specific  nonpecuniary  reward,  denoted 
x, accruing  to a worker  can be defined  as the increase in wages that an 
individual  would require  to be willing  to switch from his or her current 
job to a similar  job, with a different  firm,  in the same local area  (thereby 
abstracting  from relocation costs).  Specific rewards exist when, for 
6. See Alan  B. Krueger  and  Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Efficiency  Wages  and  the Inter- 
Industry  Wage  Structure,"  Econometrica,  vol. 56 (March  1988),  pp. 259-93;  and  William 
T. Dickens and Lawrence F. Katz, "Industry  Wage Patterns  and Theories of Wage 
Determination"  (University  of California,  Berkeley, 1986). 
7. Martin  Feldstein  estimates  the average  (monetary)  benefit  replacement  ratio  for  the 
U.S. population  aged 25 to 55, excluding  government  employees, agricultural  workers, 
and  the self-employed,  to be 0.55. The benefit  replacement  ratio  is the proportion  of lost 
net-of-tax  earnings  that would be replaced by unemployment  insurance  benefits. See 
Martin  Feldstein, "The Effect of Unemployment  Insurance  on Temporary  Layoff Un- 
employment,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 68 (December  1978),  pp. 834-46. 502  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
example, workers  especially like (or dislike) their coworkers, supervi- 
sors, or company  policy. 
We assume  in the model  that  a worker's  total reward  is the sum  of the 
wage received, w, and  a specific  nonpecuniary  reward,  x. For simplicity, 
x is assumed  to have an initial  value of zero for all new  job incumbents.8 
Over  time, the worker's  nonpecuniary  reward,  x, is assumed  to follow a 
random  walk. Some workers  become happier  as a consequence of this 
diffusion  process, while  other  workers  become  less happy.  In  benchmark 
simulations  we assume  that  the annual  standard  deviation  of the change 
in x relative  to the mean  wage is 0.1. Empirical  evidence presented  later 
indicates  that  this is a conservative  choice. 
General  nonpecuniary  rewards  from work exist if (abstracting  from 
any specific reward)  the typical  jobholder  derives utility from working 
in excess of the utility from wage income. This occurs if, for example, 
people  find working intrinsically "interesting," "challenging," or 
"socially worthwhile." General  nonpecuniary  rewards  from work are 
independent  of the particular  characteristics  of the current  job. The 
existence of such  general  rewards  has little  impact  on the characteristics 
of turnover  in simulations  of the model;9  by ignoring  general  rewards, 
8. The assumption  that  x is initially  equal to zero for all individuals  is restrictive.  It 
implies  that  individuals  regard  the nonpecuniary  rewards  on all alternative  jobs as initially 
identical,  both  ex ante  and  ex post. 
The  model  could  be  generalized,  at  the  expense  of additional  computational  complexity, 
by assuming  that  the nonpecuniary  reward  earned  by a worker  on ajob has  a "permanent" 
component-the initial  value of x achieved by a given worker  in a new  job-and  also a 
stochastic  component,  which  follows an assumed  random  process. Our  simulations  take 
the permanent  component  of x to be equal  to zero for all individuals,  and  assume  that  the 
stochastic  component  follows a random  walk. 
One could, alternatively,  assume  that  the permanent  component  of x is observable  ex 
ante  by workers  and,  for  any  given  job, differs  across  individuals.  In this case, individuals 
would  be observed  quitting  jobs with  positive  specific  rewards  when  they receive  offers  of 
jobs with higher  expected nonpecuniary  rewards  at comparable  or lower wages. This 
phenomenon  is clearly  of empirical  relevance,  as discussed  later. 
One could also assume that the permanent  component  of x differs  across individuals 
for a given  job, is not observable  ex ante, but is observable  ex post through  experience. 
Such an addition  would  result  in a more steeply  declining  tenure-quit  relation  than  in the 
simulations  reported.  Additional  turnover  at low tenure  would  be generated  as individuals 
rapidly  discover that they dislike new jobs and apply  for other  jobs for which they are 
better  matched.  This  aspect  of matching  is undoubtedly  of relevance  in explaining  the high 
incidence  of quitting  among  young  people. 
9.  With  a positive  general  reward  to work,  g, the benefit  replacement  ratio  should  be 
defined  as bI(w + g). Inclusion  of general  rewards  in the model is accomplished,  other George  A. Akerlof,  Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen  503 
we do, however, underestimate  the cyclic sensitivity of nonpecuniary 
income and the relevant  adjustment  to Okun's Law. Later we present 
evidence that general  rewards  are an important  component  of the total 
reward  to work. 
Job-Related E-to-U Quits.  One source of the autonomous vacancies 
that trigger  vacancy chains is the flow of job-related  quits into unem- 
ployment by unhappy  employed individuals.  Workers  quit to become 
unemployed for job-related reasons if anticipated lifetime rewards, 
should they stay in their current  jobs, fall to equality with anticipated 
lifetime  rewards  should  they quit to become unemployed.  The number 
of such  job-related  quits  per period  is denoted  QjEu.  Anticipated  lifetime 
income  is the expected  present  value of the worker's  stream  of rewards: 
workers receive w +  x in periods of employment  and b in periods of 
unemployment. Workers are fully rational in our model and have 
complete  information  about  the structure  of the economy. 
In a model in which x is a continuous variable, the marginal  total 
reward  at which a rational  worker  quits into unemployment  is less than 
the unemployment  benefit. Since x may rise,  w  +  x  -  b may become 
positive before the worker  is offered a better  job; therefore  a job has a 
positive "option  value"  (relative  to unemployment).  Below some  thresh- 
old, w + x -  b is sufficiently  negative  that the current  losses that must 
be suffered  from  remaining  employed  rather  than  becoming  unemployed 
outweigh the option value of the job. When w +  x  -  b reaches this 
threshold,  the worker  quits into unemployment.  This assumes that the 
worker's chances of receiving a desirable  job are unaffected by his 
employment  status, so that  there  is no gain in search  effectiveness from 
becoming  unemployed. 
As noted, the optimality  of choosing a threshold  for quitting  from E 
to U with a negative value of w + x -  b relies on the assumption  that 
employed and unemployed  workers are equally effective in searching 
for  job offers. We relax  this assumption  in several simulations. 
Job  Creation and Exogenous  Quits.  According  to the logic  of the 
vacancy  chain,  employed  individuals  receive opportunities  to move that 
are proportional  to the number  of autonomous  vacancies in the labor 
market.  We shall  assume  that  the number  of autonomous  vacancies that 
things being equal, by lowering  the value of the benefit replacement  ratio chosen for 
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appear  each  period  is large,  even in a steady  state  with  a constant  number 
of jobs. Job-related  quits into unemployment  constitute one source of 
autonomous  vacancies. However, the bulk of autonomous  vacancies 
stems from the creation of new jobs and employee quits for non-job- 
related  reasons  into unemployment  or out of the labor  force; the flow of 
such vacancies  is assumed  to be a fraction 3  of total employment. 
One of the most important  sources of autonomous  vacancy creation 
is the ongoing  process of economic  change,  which  results  in the destruc- 
tion of some jobs (causing the permanent  involuntary  layoff of their 
incumbents),  coupled  with  the simultaneous  creation  of newjobs. When 
Jonathan  Leonard studied annual  files compiled from the March Un- 
employment  Compensation  Contribution  reports  in the state of Wiscon- 
sin during  1977-82,  he found that, on average, 11 percent of all  jobs in 
Wisconsin were destroyed each year, while a comparable  number  of 
jobs were created. 10 
Another important  source of autonomous vacancy creation is the 
departure  of individuals  from  the labor  force (E-to-O  quits),  because, for 
example,  of poor health  or retirement.  In a steady state, with a constant 
labor force, such exits from the labor  force are matched  by new entry 
and reentry. Finally, vacancies are created when workers quit from 
employment to unemployment  for non-job-related,  or "exogenous," 
reasons. For example, an individual  whose mate has geographically 
relocated  may be forced to quit his job in spite of the expectation that 
the move will result  in a loss in total labor  reward. 
E-to-E  Quits.  In our rudimentary  model with only one type of job, 
which pays a wage w,  any dissatisfied worker earning a  negative 
nonpecuniary  reward  (but  insufficiently  unhappy  to quit  into unemploy- 
ment)  can apply  for other  jobs. Jobs offer an initial  nonpecuniary  return 
of zero, and wage w. If an unhappy  worker receives a job offer, the 
worker  will quit (E to E), thus continuing  a vacancy chain initiated  by 
an autonomous vacancy.11  The number of such quits per period is 
denoted  QEE. 
10. See Jonathan  S. Leonard,  "In the Wrong  Place  at the Wrong  Time:  The Extent  of 
Frictional  and  Structural  Unemployment,"  in Kevin  Lang  and  Jonathan  S. Leonard,  eds., 
Unemployment and the Structure of Labor Markets (Basil Blackwell,  1987), pp. 141-63. 
11. Under the assumptions  of our model of costless search and the random  walk 
character  of x, it is optimal  for a worker  who is employed  and receives a job offer with 
higher  total  return  to accept  it. This  holds  as well in the multiple-job  model.  Similarly,  it is 
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When the model is expanded to include multiple  job types paying 
different  wages, the same general  principle  applies: workers will con- 
stantly be on the lookout for job offers paying higher total rewards 
(pecuniary  plus  nonpecuniary)  than  their  currentjobs;  E-to-E  quits  occur 
whenever  a worker  receives a better  job offer. In the expanded  model, 
with multiple  jobs, a job offer can be better either because it offers a 
higher  wage or because it affords  a higher  nonpecuniary  reward.  Thus 
some E-to-E quits will be motivated  by wage gains, and a fraction of 
these will involve nonpecuniary  losses, while other E-to-E quits will be 
motivated primarily  by the desire of the quitter to raise his or her 
nonpecuniary  reward.  Such quits may, but will not always, entail wage 
cuts. 
Flows  from U to E.  Any unemployed  jobseeker will accept any  job 
offer received, as is consistent with our assumption  that  jobs pay rents 
relative  to unemployment  and are ex ante identical. 
SUMMARY  OF  ASSUMPTIONS 
To summarize,  the rudimentary  model with one job is characterized 
by eleven assumptions. 
-Labor  force. There is a fixed labor  force L. Workers  do not leave 
the labor force as a consequence of unemployment.  On entering the 
labor force workers initially experience some spell of unemployment. 
All workers  are identical. 
-Jobs.  There is a fixed number ofjobs  N,  with N <  L. 
-Wages.  Jobs pay a wage w. The unemployment  benefit  is b and  the 
replacement  ratio, blw, is less than  one. 
-Nonpecuniary  returns  on  new jobs.  Nonpecuniary  returns  are 
denoted-x.  When  jobs are new, x = 0 for all individuals. 
-Movements  of nonpecuniary  returns. The nonpecuniary  return x 
subsequently follows a random walk; the standard  deviation of the 
change  of x is a constant  per unit  of time. 
-Creation  of autonomous  vacancies  due to job-related  quits from E 
to U. A worker  whose expected discounted  lifetime  income  if he remains 
employed is less than his expected discounted lifetime income if he 
becomes unemployed,  will quit to become unemployed.  This behavior 
is the source of job-related E-to-U (employment-to-unemployment) 
quits. 
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tion, E-to-O quits, and exogenous  E-to-U qu  its. A fraction  3  ofjobs  are 
randomly  terminated  in each period, because of job destruction,  depar- 
ture  of the incumbents  from  the labor  force, and  exogenously  motivated 
quits  into  unemployment.  A comparable  number  of vacancies  is created. 
Nature of E-to-E  quits. Search  is costless; therefore  workers  with 
x < 0 apply  forjobs. If ajob offer  is received, the worker  quits  and  takes 
the new job.  Such quits are the source of E-to-E (employment-to- 
employment)  quits. 
Nature of U-to-Eflows. Unemployed  workers  apply  for  jobs. If an 
unemployed  worker  receives ajob offer, the offer is accepted. 
-Equal  search  efficiency of unemployed and employed jobseekers. 
Unemployed and employed applicants  have equal probabilities  of re- 
ceiving any  job offer. 
-Constancy  of total employment and the size of the labor force  over 
time. The number  of jobs destroyed each period equals the number  of 
jobs created. Vacancies are filled immediately. Departures  from the 
labor force equal entries, so that the total number  of jobs, N, and the 
size of the labor  force, L, remain  unchanged  over time. 
PROPERTIES  OF  THE  MODEL 
The preceding  assumptions  yield a model  of turnover  that  offers both 
simplicity  and  many  interactions  of interest.  To understand  the  operation 
of the rudimentary  one-job model and the simulation results to be 
described, it is useful to derive an explicit formula  for the steady-state 
level of quits  from  E to E. 
To obtain  this  expression,  it is necessary  to make  use of two conditions 
that hold in a steady state with constant labor  force, employment,  and 
unemployment:  first, the flow of individuals  into unemployment  equals 
the flow of individuals  out of unemployment;  and, second, the flow of 
individuals  into the labor  force equals the flow of individuals  out of the 
labor  force. 
The flow of individuals  into unemployment  is the sum of the flow 
from E  to  U  (FEU)  plus the flow from "out of  the labor force" 
(0) to U (FOU).  The flow of individuals  out of unemployment  is equal  to 
the flow from U to E (FUE)  plus any flow from U to 0  (FUO). Thus, 
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a steady state. The flow of persons into the labor  force consists of the 
flow from 0  to U (FOU) and any flow from 0  to E (FOE). Because  we 
assume that all new entrants and reentrants  to the labor force must 
initially  pass through  unemployment,  FOE is zero. The flow of persons 
out of the labor  force consists of flows from E to 0 (FEO)  plus any flow 
from  U to 0 (FUo). Under  these assumptions,  FOU =  FEO  +  FU0. This, 
in turn,  implies  that  FUE  =  FEU  +  FEO. 
In our model, flows from E to U and E to 0 occur as a consequence 
of job-related quits into unemployment, layoffs,  E-to-O quits, and 
exogenous E-to-U quits. The sum  of these flows from  E to U and  E to 0 
equals QtEu  +  3N. 12Thus, 
(1)  FUE =  QEU +  fN. 
From the assumption that unhappy employed jobseekers and un- 
employed  jobseekers have equal probabilities  of receiving  job offers, 
it follows that the number  of E-to-E moves relative to the number  of 
U-to-E moves will be equal to the relative numbers  of employed and 
unemployed  job seekers. Thus, 
QEE 
_  N 
FUE  L  -  N' 
where QEE  denotes the total flow of E-to-E quits, a. denotes the fraction 
of employed workers  with x < 0-namely,  the proportion  of employed 
jobseekers-and  L  -  N  is the number of unemployed individuals. 
Combining  equations  1 and 2 yields 
(3)  QEE  =  N(QEu  +  fN). 
L  N 
Letting u -  (L -  N)/L denote the unemployment rate and substituting, 
one obtains 
(4)  QEE-  (;  (QtEu + N). 
The  flow of quits  from  E to E is a multiple  of the number  of autonomous 
12. From  our assumption  that people do not leave the labor  force just because they 
become  unemployed,  it follows that  layoffs  do not generate  flows  from  E to 0 and  that  all 
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vacancies. This mobility  multiplier  is simply the length of the vacancy 
chain, defined as the ratio of E-to-E moves per autonomous  vacancy 
created (QEEIFUE).  From equations 2 and 4 we obtain 
(5)  Length of vacancy chain  =  a. 
For example, with a. = 0.2 and u =  0.1 the length  of the vacancy chain 
is 1.8; if the unemployment  rate declines to u = 0.05, the length  of the 
vacancy chain  would increase  to 3.8, in the absence of any change  in (x. 
Consideration  of each of the terms  in equation  4 explains  why E-to-E 
quits are so highly  procyclic. The denominator  plays the key role in the 
formula. A decrease in u means that proportionately  more employed 
persons are randomly offered jobs before an unemployed person is 
randomly  found  to fill an autonomous  vacancy. The fraction  of workers 
who will accept an E-to-E offer varies somewhat  with u, as our simula- 
tions will reveal, but not by as much. Indeed, the only reason why the 
fraction  of employedjobseekers  falls  at all  during  expansions  is precisely 
that the flow of persons from E to E is larger, resulting  in a smaller 
fraction  of dissatisfied  employees in equilibrium. 
A third factor affecting the cyclic behavior of E-to-E quits is the 
behavior  of job-related  quits from E to U. The two reasons why such 
quits could change cyclically operate in opposite directions. In bad 
times, when there  are  few  job openings,  unhappy  workers  are less likely 
to find  other  jobs before they become so unhappy  that they will quit to 
become unemployed. This suggests that  job-related E-to-U quits may 
actually  rise when the unemployment  rate  increases. On  the other  hand, 
as unemployment  rises, unemployment  durations  rise, and so the cost 
of becoming  unemployed  increases. The net result is that quits from E 
to U vary ambiguously  with the unemployment  rate from a theoretical 
standpoint.  As we show when we discuss turnover  in the labor  market, 
it appears  that  in U.S. data, quits  from  employment  into unemployment 
actually  fall as the unemployment  rate  rises. 
SIMULATIONS 
To obtain solutions  for the steady-state  levels of labor  market  flows 
and  the equilibrium  distribution  of rents  (including  nonpecuniary  returns) 
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parameters  include the unemployment  rate, the replacement  ratio, the 
standard  deviation  of the shock to the nonpecuniary  reward,  the interest 
rate,  and  the rate  at whichjobs  terminate,  P. (The  interest  rate  is relevant 
to workers  in evaluating  the potential  gains  from  quitting  into unemploy- 
ment for job-related reasons, since in making  this decision, workers 
must  calculate  the present  value of the "stay" strategy  of keeping  their 
jobs, relative to the present value of the "quit" strategy  of becoming 
unemployed.) 
With  few difficulties  the continuous  model  described  above translates 
into a model where both time and x are discrete, which is amenable  to 
simulation.  The only technical  detail  worth  noting  is the method  used to 
approximate  a chosen value of the standard  deviation  of movement  in x. 
In the discrete model, we assume that the nonpecuniary  reward, x, 
remains unchanged with probability s,  that it rises one  step with 
probability  (1 -  s)12, and that it declines by one step with probability 
(1 -  s)12. Given the step size, appropriate  selection of s yields the 
chosen standard  deviation  of x. 
The  One-Job  Model. Table 1 reports  the results  of simulations  of the 
one-job model. Total E-to-E quits at a 10 percent unemployment  rate 
amount  to 3.5 percent of the work force a quarter,  which is a sensible 
order of  magnitude relative to  U.S.  data. Unemployment duration 
at this high unemployment  rate averages 10 months and job tenure 
is  44  months. Again, these  numbers seem  reasonable, given  the 
complexities-intrinsic  matching, worker heterogeneity, asymmetric 
information,  imperfect  labor  markets-that are left out of the model. 
A  decrease in the fraction of the labor force unemployed from 
10 percent to 5 percent has two noteworthy effects. First, a sizable 
(19.3 percent)  increase occurs in the number  of E-to-E quits. Second, 
the  5  percentage  point  decrease  in  the  unemployment  rate  has  a significant 
effect  on  job satisfaction,  shown  by a uniform  increase  in the cumulative 
frequency  distribution  of rents. 
The underlying  causes of the change in the E-to-E quit rate can be 
decomposed  using equation  4. From  equation  4, E-to-E quits should  be 
roughly  proportional  to a-,  the fraction  of the population  with a negative 
nonpecuniary  return.  As u goes from 10 percent to 5 percent, the first 
term  in equation  4, a., falls 48.7 percent (taking  the arc elasticity). The 
fall in ox  is itself the consequence of the higher  degree of job mobility  in 
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Table 1.  Turnover and Nonpecuniary Rewards in a One-Job Modela 
Unemployment  rate 
Item  u  =  0.05  u =  0.10 
Quits 
E to Eb  0.041  0.035 
E to  Ub  0.000  0.000 
Nonpecuniary  rewardc  0.143  0.128 
Fraction  of unhappy  employees  0.066  0.108 
Mean unemployment  duration  1.67  3.33 
(in quarters) 
Mean  job tenure  (in quarters)  13.87  14.56 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
a.  Simulations  assume  the following  parameters: benefit  replacement  ratio  =  0.6;  annual  standard deviation  of 
movement  in x relative to the mean wage  =  0.1; s  =  0.75;  B =  12 percent a year; interest rate =  18 percent a year. 
b.  Quarterly quits per employee. 
c.  Average  value of the nonpecuniary  return (x).  relative to the mean wage. 
has relatively  fewer dissatisfied  workers  (that  is, workers  with negative 
x) on average;  the second  term,  (1 -  u)/u  (again,  taking  the  arc  elasticity), 
has risen 71.4 percent because of the decline in u; and the third term 
(QJEu  +  3N) remains virtually  unchanged, because Q;E is small and 
layoffs  are  constant.  Note that  the actual  change  in E to E of 19.3  percent 
is approximately  the sum of the changes  in the three terms  (the discrep- 
ancy of 3.4 percent  is due to the discrete  nature  of the change). 
The information  reported  in table 1 can be used to assess the welfare 
effects of a reduction  in the aggregate  unemployment  rate. According  to 
table 1, the decrease in the unemployment  rate from 10 percent to 
5 percent  raises the specific  nonpecuniary  reward  earned  by the typical 
employed  person  by an amount  equivalent  to 1.5 percent  of the average 
wage. In addition,  a significant  fraction  of the labor  force obtains  jobs 
that  pay an average  specific  nonpecuniary  reward  of 13.5  percent  of the 
wage rate. 
These two figures can be combined to calculate the amount that 
additional  nonpecuniary  income would add to the cyclic output gains 
captured  in Okun's  Law. George  Perry  and  Arthur  Okun  have calculated 
that a 1 percentage  point change in the unemployment  rate leads to a 
2.1 percent change in labor hours.13  A 5 percentage  point decrease in 
13. See George  L. Perry, "Labor  Force Structure,  Potential  Output,  and Productiv- 
ity," BPEA, 3:1971, pp. 533-65; and Arthur  M. Okun, "Upward  Mobility  in a High- 
pressure  Economy,"  BPEA, 1:1973,  p. 211. George  A. Akerlof,  Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen  511 
unemployment  thus implies a 10.5 percent increase in labor hours. On 
average, each extra hour worked yields the typical worker specific 
nonpecuniary  income  amounting  to 0.135w  an  hour.  The  addition  to total 
specific nonpecuniary  rewards  due to the expansion in hours worked 
thus amounts to 1.4 percent (13.5 percent times 10.5 percent) of the 
aggregate  wage bill. Adding to this figure  the gain in average specific 
nonpecuniary  income of employed workers-equal  to 1.5 percent of 
wages-yields  a total increase in aggregate  nonpecuniary  income due 
to the 5 percentage  point drop  in the unemployment  rate of 2.9 percent 
of total wages. This amounts to 0.58 percent of the wage bill for 
each percentage point of unemployment.  If the wage bill constitutes 
two-thirds  of output, then a 1 percentage  point reduction  in unemploy- 
ment raises welfare by 0.37 percent of GNP because of increases in 
specific nonpecuniary  income. Inclusion of such nonpecuniary  gains 
would thus add 0.37 percent per 1 percentage point reduction in the 
unemployment  rate  to Okun's  Law. 
The preceding calculation ignores any extra general nonpecuniary 
rewards to work, as well as any disutility from reduced leisure as 
unemployment  falls. Later  we present  evidence suggesting  that  general 
rewards  exceed the value of leisure. Simulations  of the model generate 
a mean nonpecuniary  reward of  13.5 percent of the wage rate; the 
addition  to Okun's  Law is sensitive to this value. As we will show, the 
13.5 percent figure  is considerably  less than our estimate of the actual 
mean nonpecuniary  rewards. For both of these reasons, the above 
calculation  is likely to understate  the appropriate  adjustment  to Okun's 
Law. 
The  Multiple-Job  Model. The preceding  simulation  has the virtue  of 
demonstrating  the principles  whereby decreases in unemployment  in- 
crease total quits, especially E-to-E quits. However, the model has 
several  unrealistic  features  and  counterfactual  implications.  First, as we 
document  later, a significant  fraction of E-to-E quits, although  by no 
means  the majority,  involve wage increases. In the rudimentary  model, 
with only one type of job, such wage increases cannot occur. Second, 
the number  of E-to-U quits is quite small. In contrast,  we estimate that 
E-to-U quits are approximately  20 percent of all quits in the United 
States. Finally, as others have documented, the rewards  to otherwise 
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Table 2.  Turnover and Nonpecuniary Rewards in a Multiple-Job Model with 
Benchmark Parametersa 
Labor market flows and nonpecuniary rewards 
Unemployment  rate 
Item  u  =  0.05  u  =  0.10 
Quits 
E to Eb  0.0507  0.0423 
E to Ub  0.0012  0.0005 
Nonpecuniary  rewardc  0.0821  0.0756 
Mean unemployment  duration  2.15  3.80 
(in quarters) 
Mean  job tenure  (in quarters)  12.2  13.7 
Quits  per quarter  per employee  by job type:  u =  0.05 
Wage  in  job i relative  to mean wage of all jobs 
Quits  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.2  1.3 
E to Ed  0.161  0.085  0.047  0.029  0.017  0.010  0.005 
E to Ud  0.006  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
E-E quits per quarter per employee from job type i to job type j:d u  0.05 
Relative wage of job typej  Relative wage 
of job type i  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.2  1.3 
0.7  0.031  0.056  0.029  0.018  0.011  0.009  0.006 
0.8  0.007  0.015  0.022  0.016  0.011  0.008  0.006 
0.9  0.002  0.004  0.007  0.011  0.009  0.007  0.006 
1.0  0.001  0.002  0.003  0.004  0.007  0.006  0.006 
1.1  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.004  0.004  0.005 
1.2  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.003  0.004 
1.3  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002 
tially  and  cannot  be explained  by appeal  to compensating  differentials.  14 
These problems  are  jointly remediable  by the introduction  of multiple 
job types into the simulations. 
Accordingly,  we have performed  simulations  of a model identical  to 
that described above, except that it assumes a uniform  distribution  of 
jobs differing  in their wages. We assume that the various  job types are 
available  in  identical  numbers,  and  that  the differential  in  reward  between 
"adjacent"  job types is a constant-with  the rewards  to job i defined  as 
14. See Krueger  and Summers, "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry  Wage 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Quits per quarter per employee by nonpecuniary reward: u  =  0.05 
Nonpecuniary  reward 
Quits  -0.4  -0.3  -0.2  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4 
E to Eb  0.0006  0.0015  0.0041  0.0141  0.0225  0.0054  0.0015  0.0004  0.0001 
E to  Ub  0.0001  0.0002  0.0009  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Mean continued tenure projected by current tenure 
Current  tenure  (t)  Continued  tenure 
(years)  (years) 
0 :  t <  1  3.3 
1  tt<2  3.9 
2  t < 3  4.5 
3  t <4  4.8 
4  t<5  5.3 
5  t < 7  6.3 
10  t < 20  6.4 
t > 20  7.0 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
a.  Simulations  assume  the  following  parameters:  seven  job  types  available  in equal  numbers;  wage  differential 
between job  types equals  10 percent of the mean wage; mean wage (=  wage of job  type 4)  =  1; benefit replacement 
ratio =  0.6; annual standard deviation  of movement  in x relative to the mean wage  =  0. 1; s  =  0.75;  3 =  12 percent 
per year; interest  rate  =  18 percent  per year; probability of receiving  application  from employed  and unemployed 
persons=  1.0. 
b.  Quarterly quits per employee. 
c.  Average  value of the nonpecuniary  return, x, relative to the mean wage. 
d.  Quarterly quits per employee  in job  type i. 
the ratio  of job i's wage to the mean  wage in the economy. Simulations 
of the many-job  model  yield interesting  and realistic  results. 
Table 2 reports the results of simulations of a model with seven 
different  jobs, offering pecuniary rewards ranging  from 0.7iw  to 1.3iw 
(that  is, the worst  job,job 1,  pays 70  percent  of the economywide  average 
and  the best  job, job 7, pays 130  percent  of the mean  wage). We assume 
that the unemployment  benefit ratio is 0.6 of the average wage for all 
workers. This implies that the benefit replacement  ratio is higher for 
lower-paid  jobs. Finally we assume that there are equal proportions  of 
each  job type, independent  of the unemployment  rate. As Arthur  Okun 
has shown, a more realistic assumption  is that "good jobs" increase 
proportionately  more than bad ones  during expansions, leading to 
additional  upward  mobility  in the transition  between steady states.  '5 
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In the benchmark  simulation  of the multiple-job  model described  in 
table  2, the average  nonpecuniary  reward  with an unemployment  rate  of 
10  percent  is 7.56 percent of wages; when the unemployment  rate falls 
to 5 percent,  the nonpecuniary  reward  rises to 8.21 percent  of wages. In 
this simulation, as in simulations with other parameter  values, the 
introduction  of many  job types reduces  the  average  nonpecuniary  reward 
by approximately  50 percent  when compared  with the one-job  model. A 
calculation  identical  to that described  earlier  indicates that the change 
in welfare  due to higher  nonpecuniary  rewards  at lower unemployment 
rates would add 0.195 percent to Okun's Law. That is, a 1 percentage 
point change in the unemployment  rate in this benchmark  simulation 
raises nonpecuniary  rewards  by 0.30 percent of the wage bill or 0.195 
percent  of GNP. 
As the top panel of table 2 reports, the rate of job switching is 
somewhat  higher  in the multiple-job  model than  in the single-job  model, 
but still of a reasonable  order  of magnitude.  E-to-E quits remain  highly 
procyclic, increasing by 23.4 percent (taking the arc elasticity) as a 
consequence of a 5 percentage point cut in the unemployment  rate. 
However, the number  of E-to-U quits, although  higher, remains  negli- 
gible-an  outcome that, upon reflection, is not unrealistic  given the 
assumptions  of the model. When  all  jobs pay rents, as in the simulation 
model, it is rash  to quit  into unemployment.  The more sensible strategy 
for unhappy  agents  is to wait until  a better  job offer appears. 
Quits  into unemployment  are low because unemployment  confers no 
advantage  in terms of searching  for alternative  jobs in our simulation. 
In contrast, if unemployment  makes it easier to search, so that the 
"job application  rate" of employed  jobseekers is lower than that of the 
unemployed,  then there  is an advantage  to quitting  into unemployment. 
Simul-ations  assuming alternative application rates are reported in 
table 3. With a 50 percent application rate, for example, quits into 
unemployment  are higher in all phases of the business cycle. As the 
unemployment  rate  falls  from 10  percent  to 5 percent  in this case, E-to-U 
quits rise dramatically,  from 0.3 percent to 1.3 percent a quarter.  The 
latter  figure  constitutes  roughly  36 percent  of the E-to-E quits.  16 
16. A  special supplement  to the Current  Population  Survey (CPS) in May 1976 
investigated  the job search activities of employed workers. See Carl Rosenfeld, "The 
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Given the simplicity  of the model generating  turnover,  the simulated 
economy has a surprisingly  close correspondence  to actual labor mar- 
kets. For example,  as the second and  third  panels  of table  2 reveal, most 
quits  occur  among  the poorjobs for which  the benefit  replacement  ratios 
are high. Quits into both unemployment  and other  jobs are dispropor- 
tionately  high for individuals  in low-wage  jobs. Moreover, quitters  out 
of low-wage  jobs move in disproportionate  numbers  to other  jobs at the 
low-wage end of the quality spectrum, creating a disproportionate 
number  of vacancies in such low-wage  jobs. These findings  correspond 
to the usual  description  of turnover  in dual  labor  markets,  although,  in a 
well-defined  sense, our  model  is not a dual  labor  market,  since there  is a 
uniform  distribution  of jobs over a significant  range and all jobs are 
rationed.  The probability  that an applicant  will receive a job offer of a 
given type ranges  from  a 42 percent  chance  that  an applicant  will receive 
ajob that  pays 30 percent  below the average  wage in a given quarter,  to 
a 0.65 percent probability  that the applicant  will be offered a job that 
pays 30 percent above the average  wage. The easy availability  of low- 
wage  jobs in the real  world, as in our model, could create the erroneous 
impression  that  labor  markets  are clearing. 
Although nonpecuniary  and pecuniary considerations  are of equal 
importance  in motivating  turnover  in this model, only a small fraction 
of E-to-E moves involve wage cuts. In the simulations reported in 
table 2, 8.5 percent of E-to-E moves entail wage cuts; 18.7 percent 
involve no change, and  72.8 percent  involve wage increases. Neverthe- 
less, it is important  to note that in the model, as in reality, aggregate 
wages  are  acyclic. As the  fourth  panel  of table  2 shows, the  great  majority 
of E-to-E quitters  also achieve gains in nonpecuniary  rewards;  only a 
few E-to-E  movers-14.6 percent-accept a nonpecuniary  loss to achieve 
a pecuniary  gain. (Under  the assumption  that the nonpecuniary  reward 
Report  202 (GPO, 1977).  In this month,  3.3 million  employed  workers  searched  for ajob, 
compared  with 6.3 million  unemployed  persons (all of whom by definition  looked for 
work).  The ratio of employed  to unemployed  job applicants  was therefore  0.52. In our 
theoretical  model  with  an unemployment  rate  of 7 percent  (the closest integer  unemploy- 
ment rate to the May 1976  unemployment  rate of 7.4 percent), with half the unhappy 
employees  applying  for  jobs, the ratio  of applications  received  from  the employed  to those 
received  from  the unemployed,  was 0.63. The  two ratios  describe  a similar,  but  not  exactly 
identical,  concept. That  they are of the same order  of magnitude  and  are at least roughly 
equal  suggests  that  the employed  do in fact search  less intensively  than  the unemployed. Table 3.  Sensitivity of Quits and Average Nonpecuniary Rewards to Changes in 
Individual Parametersa 
Probability that applications are made by unhappy employees 
1.0  0.75  0.50 
Item  u  =  0.05  u  =  0.J0  u  =  0.05  u  =  0.J0  u  =  0.05  u  =  0.J0 
Quits 
E to Eb  0.0506  0.0423  0.0463  0.0367  0.0362  0.0298 
E to  Ub  0.0012  0.0005  0.0017  0.0027  0.0132  0.0032 
Ratio of nonpecuniary 
reward to wagec  0.0821  0.0756  0.0807  0.0723  0.0832  0.0723 
Variance in year-to-year change in nonpecuniary reward relative to mean wage 
0.02  0.01  0.005 
Item  u  =  0.05  u  =  0.10  u  =  0.05  u  =  0.10  u  =  0.05  u  =  0.10 
Quits 
E to Eb  0.0573  0.0450  0.0506  0.0423  0.0471  0.0392 
E to  Ub  0.0035  0.0016  0.0012  0.0005  0.0004  0.0009 
Ratio of nonpecuniary 
reward to wagec  0.1406  0.1252  0.0821  0.0756  0.0412  0.0369 
Probability of job loss per quarter 
0.02  0.03  0.04 
Item  u  =  0.05  u  =  0.10  u  =  0.05  u  =  0.10  u  =  0.05  u  =  0.10 
Quits 
E to Eb  0.0356  0.0287  0.0506  0.0423  0.0653  0.0544 
E to  Ub  0.0017  0.0026  0.0012  0.0005  0.0010  0.0019 
Ratio of nonpecuniary 
reward to wagec  0.1153  0.1093  0.0807  0.0756  0.0649  0.0592 
Average unemployment benefits relative to wage 
0.6a  0.7d  0.8e 
Item  u  =  0.05  u  =  0.J0  u  =  0.05  u  =  0.J0  u  =  0.05  u  =  0.J0 
Quits 
E to Eb  0.0507  0.0423  0.0489  0.0398  0.0657  0.0509 
E to  Ub  0.0012  0.0005  0.0016  0.0027  0.0026  0.0009 
Ratio of nonpecuniary 
reward to wagec  0.0821  0.0756  0.0994  0.0914  0.1131  0.0973 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
a.  Benchmark parameter values:  seven job  types  available in equal numbers; wage differential between job  types 
equals  10 percent of the mean wage; mean wage (=  wage of job type 4) =  1; benefit replacement ratio =  0.6; annual 
variance of movement  in x  =  0.01; s  =  0.75; c  =  12 percent per year; interest rate =  18 percent per year; probability 
of receiving  application from employed  and unemployed  persons  =  1.0. 
b.  Quarterly quits per employee. 
c.  Average  value of the nonpecuniary  return, x,  relative to the mean wage. 
d.  Calculations assume five jobs  available in equal numbers; wage differential between job types equals  10 percent 
of the mean wage; mean wage (=  wage of job type  3)  =  1. 
e.  Calculations  assume  seven jobs,  equally spaced,  with mean wage  =  1.0; s  =  0; wage differential between jobs 
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in the new  job is zero, all workers  with an initial  positive nonpecuniary 
reward  will suffer  a loss.) 
Another  realistic  feature of our model is declining  hazard  functions 
for job tenure:  the longer a worker  has been employed, the longer the 
worker  is expected to remain  at the same  job. 17  On average,  high-tenure 
workers  have high  nonpecuniary  rewards  and  are therefore  less likely to 
quit. The bottom panel of  table 2  shows the actuarially expected 
continued  job tenure  by length  of stay in  jobs. 
Finally, it is interesting  to note that our model generates a slightly 
negative  correlation  across  individuals  between  wages  and  nonpecuniary 
rewards-a  pattern  that could be mistaken  for compensating  differen- 
tials-without  any competitive behavior on the part of firms. In our 
model vacancies arise infrequently  in high-wage  jobs, and thus individ- 
uals find it hard to move to comparable  wage positions should their 
nonpecuniary  rewards  decline. In contrast,  individuals  in low-wage  jobs 
can move with relative ease to other low-wage jobs if they suffer a 
decline in nonpecuniary  rewards.  The result  is that high-wage  workers, 
on average,  earn  slightly  lower nonpecuniary  rewards. 
Table  3 presents  the results  of alternative  simulations  designed  to test 
the robustness  of the findings  reported  above. These simulations  reveal 
the sensitivity of the results to individual  parameter  variations. As in 
table 2, we run a benchmark  simulation  and then examine the conse- 
quences of varying  the parameters  one at a time. As a rule  of thumb,  the 
average  nonpecuniary  reward  is roughly  proportional  to the variance  of 
the movement  in  x. Changes  in the rate  of interest  have literally  no effect 
on any variable  since the interest rate affects only the lower bound on 
the total reward  at which workers optimally  quit from E to U. In our 
simulations,  the step size was too large  for  this  lower  bound  to be affected 
by changes in the rate of interest over the range from 6 percent to 18 
percent  a year. As noted  above, going  from  one  job to evenly distributed 
jobs  significantly increases E-to-U flows; it  decreases the average 
nonpecuniary  reward by roughly one-half. Reduction of the benefit 
replacement  ratio slightly lowers the average nonpecuniary  return  (al- 
though  the results in the bottom panel of table 3 should be interpreted 
carefully  because changes in the benefit replacement  ratio necessitate 
17. Additional  explanations  for this correlation  include the accumulation  of firm- 
specific  human  capital  and  intrinsic  matching,  as discussed  in footnote  8. 518  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
changes in the assumed distribution  of jobs). A decrease in  3, which 
lowers the autonomous  vacancy  creation  rate, increases  the value of the 
nonpecuniary  reward. 
So far we have discussed only the steady-state behavior of labor 
market flows and nonpecuniary  rewards with different values of the 
unemployment  rate;  we have not attempted  to characterize  the behavior 
of these variables  during  transitions  between different  unemployment 
rates. However, we have also performed  simulations  that  provide  insight 
into the dynamic behavior of the model. For example, we track the 
effects of a 2 percentage  point cut in the unemployment  rate over time. 
Initially  there is a 10 percent unemployment  rate and then, in a given 
quarter,  2 percent more  jobs are created, lowering the unemployment 
rate  from 10  percent  to 8 percent.  This causes a monotonic  change  in the 
average  nonpecuniary  reward  between  the two steady  states. The E-to-E 
quit rate rises dramatically  in the quarter  of the change, overshooting 
the new steady  state temporarily  before  declining  to its new, higher  long- 
run level. This result mirrors  the actual dynamic  behavior  of quits and 
unemployment. 
THE  BEVERIDGE  CURVE 
The Beveridge  curve summarizes  the relationship  between aggregate 
unemployment  and vacancies. It is frequently  approximated  by a rec- 
tangular  hyperbola  so that 
(6)  v  =  klu/, 
where v is the stock of vacancies per employee, u is the unemployment 
rate, and k is a constant that determines  the position of the Beveridge 
curve. The parameter  k is commonly  viewed as a measure  of the extent 
of mismatch  or structural  unemployment  in the labor  market.  According 
to the usual logic, a larger  k implies  that at a given unemployment  rate, 
u, there are fewer in the unemployment  pool who are willing  to accept 
jobs, or else fewer of the unemployed  are  eligible  for the available  jobs. 18 
In the preceding  model, all vacancies are filled  instantaneously.  As a 
result, the stock (but not the flow) of vacancies is zero, precluding  any 
18. See James L. Medoff, "U.S.  Labor Markets:  Imbalance,  Wage Growth, and 
Productivity  in the 1970s,"  BPEA, 1:1983, pp. 87-120. George A. Akerlof, Andrew K. Rose, Janet L.  Yellen  519 
relationship  between the stock of vacancies and unemployment.  Fur- 
thermore,  since vacancies  are  filled  instantaneously,  there  is no distinc- 
tion between  total  job slots and  the number  of filled  jobs. 
The model can be amended  to assume, realistically,  that the time to 
fill vacancies is not zero but a positive constant, d,.  In the model, 
qualified  labor  is readily  available;  therefore  it is natural  to assume that 
dv  is a constant  determined  by the  nature  of institutional  procedures,  inde- 
pendent  of short-term  features  of the labor  market.  The introduction  of 
a fixed time to fill vacancies into the model results in no change 
whatsoever in labor market  flows or nonpecuniary  returns  for a fixed 
number  of filled  jobs. 
This slight  generalization  of our  model  affords  an alternative  interpre- 
tation  of the Beveridge  curve.  19  A Beveridge-like  relation  arises in spite 
of the absence of any mismatch  between workers  and  jobs. With  time to 
fill  vacancies,  shifts  in  the Beveridge  curve  may  occur  because  of changes 
in the average  level or distribution  of rents  paid  by  jobs, a change  in the 
number  of exogenous quits to unemployment  or out of the labor  force, 
or a change  in the permanent  layoff rate. 
In a single-job model, the steady-state flow of new vacancies per 
period is the sum of E-to-E quits (QEE)  plus autonomous vacancies: 
QjEu  +  O3N,  where N is the number  of filled  jobs. Using equation  4 for 
E-to-E quits, the flow of new vacancies, V, is accordingly 
(7)  V =  t  u 
(QtEu +  ON) + (QjEu  +  N). 
u 
Since the stock of vacancies equals the flow of vacancies times the 
average  duration  of a vacancy, 
(8)  v =  Vd,,lN. 
Combining  equations  7 and 8, the stock of vacancies, v, is 
)  [x(1 
- 
u)  + 
u]  QjEU 
(9)  V=a 
Both  the old and  new interpretations  of shifts  in the Beveridge  curve are 
present  in equation  9. Consistent  with the usual  interpretation,  a shift in 
the Beveridge  curve can occur because of greater  balkanization  of the 
19.  We are grateful to Jonathan Leonard for bringing this point to our attention. 520  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2.1988 
labor market;  this will affect ax,  the proportion  of employed workers 
willing  to accept a given  job. In the longer  run  it will affect d,!,  because 
thin markets usually have rather time-consuming  methods for filling 
vacancies  (compare,  for example, the methods  involved  in filling  skilled 
and  unskilled  jobs). According  to the new interpretation,  changes  in the 
[(QjEu/N)  +  f]  term will also shift the Beveridge curve. Markets  that 
have more exogenous job destruction  and re-creation,  or more gross 
outflow from the labor force and more gross inflow into it, will have 
higher  quit  rates  per employee  and  therefore  higher  vacancy  rates. Both 
the demographic  mix of the labor force and the industrial  structure  of 
the  economy  affect  [(QjEu/N) +  3]. Shifts  in  either  will affect  the stability 
of the  quit-unemployment  relationship  over time  as well as the Beveridge 
curve. These considerations  are  also germane  to the quit-unemployment 
relationship  in cross sections (for  example, across cities). Estimation  of 
quit-unemployment  relationships  that fail to control for variations in 
gross flows may find  a weak or incorrectly  signed  relationship.20 
COMPARISON  WITH  EARLIER  MATCHING  MODELS 
The model that  we have presented  is a matching  model:  two types of 
agents, workers and employers  with available  jobs, are being paired.21 
One  important  difference  between  our  model  and  other  matching  models 
in the literature  is that our model has only negative externalities  from 
increased unemployment,  whereas others have positive externalities. 
The canonical  matching  market  is the marriage  market,  with two types 
of agents, male  and  female. Unemployment  corresponds  to being  single; 
an E-to-E quit is analogous  to divorce with subsequent  remarriage;  an 
20.  This point potentially explains the instability ofthe quit-unemployment relationship 
noted by Martin Baily, the significance of the demographic terms noted by James Medoff, 
and the weak cross-sectional  results on quits and unemployment found by Martin David 
using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and by Henry Farber using National Longitu- 
dinal Survey data. See Martin Neil Baily, "Labor Market Performance, Competition, and 
Inflation,"  in Baily, ed.,  Workers, Jobs,  and Inflation (Brookings,  1982); Medoff,  "U.S. 
Labor  Markets";  Martin David,  "The  Dynamics  of  Family  Labor  Supply  Decisions: 
Quitting and Relocating  as  Family  Unit  Decisions,"  in James  N.  Morgan,  ed.,  Five 
ThousandAmerican Families: Patterns ofEconomic  Progress,  vol. 2 (Ann Arbor: Institute 
for Social Research,  1974); and Henry S. Farber, "Unionism,  Labor Turnover, and Wages 
of Young Men," in Research  in Labor Economics,  vol. 3 (JAI Press,  1980), pp. 33-53. 
21.  A very clear synthesis  of work on matching models including a review of his own 
work is given by Dale T. Mortensen, "Matching: Finding a Partner for Life or Otherwise," 
American Journal of Sociology,  vol. 94 (Supplement  1988), pp. S215-S240. George A. Akerlof, Andrew K. Rose, Janet L.  Yellen  521 
E-to-U quit is analogous to divorce without remarriage.  The analogy 
with marriage  makes it clear why unemployment  is so bad  for workers. 
For workers, high unemployment  corresponds to a large number of 
single persons of the same sex.  For an unhappily married person 
ambitious  to do better, the existence of many single people of the same 
sex almost  surely  hurts  his or her own prospects. 
Peter  Diamond  has found  that  the level of unemployment  is typically 
not  optimal  in search  models.  The  reason  is that  each  worker  who accepts 
ajob ignores  the impact  of his or her  withdrawal  from  the unemployment 
pool on the ability of others to match. Whether  the equilibrium  unem- 
ployment  rate  is too high  or  too low depends  on the  details  of the matching 
process. In some of these models, workers match with each other, so 
that the incentive to withdraw  from  unemployment  is too great  and the 
equilibrium  unemployment  rate is consequently too low.22  Why does 
our model unambiguously  yield only positive benefits from decreased 
unemployment?  In our model, all matches are intrinsically  identical; 
thus there are no gains  in terms  of better  matches  between workers  and 
firms if there are more unemployed workers. However, unemployed 
workers do make it more difficult  for other workers to get jobs. The 
externalities  from  reduced  unemployment  are only positive. 
The detailed mechanics of matching  in our model differ in several 
respects from those of other matching  models. However, these differ- 
ences are inessential since the cyclic properties of our model would 
obtain  under  more  general  assumptions.  For example, matching  models 
like those of Boyan Jovanovic assume that some matches between 
workers and firms are intrinsically  good while others are intrinsically 
bad;  for simplicity,  we have assumed  that all matches are equally  good 
at the outset.23  As footnote 8 explains, we have assumed that the 
permanent  component  of match  quality,  defined  as the value of x at the 
22. See Peter A. Diamond, "Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment  and Effi- 
ciency," Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 89 (August  1981),  pp. 789-812;  Diamond  and 
Eric Maskin," An Equilibrium  Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract,  I: Steady 
States,"  Bell Journal  of Economics,  vol. 10  (Spring  1979),  pp. 282-316;  Diamond,  "Wage 
Determination  and Efficiency  in Search  Equilibrium,"  Review  of Economic  Studies, vol. 
49 (April  1982),  pp. 217-27; and Diamond,  "Aggregate  Demand  Management  in Search 
Equilibrium,"  Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 90 (October  1982),  pp. 881-94. In the 
latter  study,  employed  workers  (those  who  have  found  coconuts)  provide  trade  externalities 
to other  employed  workers.  As a result,  equilibrium  employment  is usually  too low. 
23.  See Boyan Jovanovic,  "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover,"  Journal  of 
Political Economy, vol. 87 (October 1979), pp. 972-90. Also, see Jovanovic, "Firm- 522  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
outset  of ajob, is the same  for  all matches.  The  more  realistic  assumption 
made  by Jovanovic  would complicate  our simulations  without  changing 
their  cyclic character  or welfare  implications.  In addition,  good and  bad 
matches  are typically  defined  to differ  in terms of measured  output  and 
associated wages; similarly,  in our model good matches raise welfare, 
although  the additional  returns  are nonpecuniary.  Incorporating  Jova- 
novic's assumptions about the matching process in our model with 
rationing  would  also yield  more  E-to-E  quits  in a high-pressure  economy, 
although  the social benefit  of these quits would take the form of higher 
physical  output.  In our  model, the benefits  from  better  matches  are non- 
pecuniary  and  thus not included  in Okun's  Law. Finally,  in Jovanovic's 
model, the true quality of a match is recognized by the partners  only 
after some period  of time; in our model, the true quality  of the match  is 
perceived immediately  but evolves stochastically over time. In both 
cases, separations  are endogenous, and matches that have worked out 
better  tend to last longer.  Thus our  model exhibits  the same bias toward 
good matches as the intrinsic  matching  models, with the advantage  of 
greater  simplicity. 
MARKET-CLEARING  THEORIES  AND  QUITS 
Whilejob-rationing,  vacancy-chain  theory  easily explains  the cyclical 
behavior  of quits, neither  of the two major  market-clearing  theories- 
real  business cycle theory  and  new classical theory  based on search  and 
imperfect  information-successfully accounts  for this covariation.24 
Search  theory  predicts,  wrongly,  that  individuals  quit  into unemploy- 
ment to search for better  jobs more frequently  at high unemployment 
specific Capital and Turnover,"  Journal of Political  Economy,  vol.  87 (December  1979), 
pp.  1247-60;  and Jovanovic,  "Matching,  Turnover,  and Unemployment,"  Journal  of 
Political Economy,  vol. 92 (February 1984), pp. 108-22. 
24.  For a description  of real business  cycle  theory,  see  Finn Kydland and Edward 
Prescott,  "Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations,"  Econometrica,  vol. 50 (November 
1982), pp.  1345-70; and John B.  Long and Charles I. Plosser,  "Real Business  Cycles," 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 91 (February 1983), pp. 39-69. On new classical theory, 
see Milton Friedman, "The Role of Monetary Policy,"  American Economic Review,  vol. 
58 (March 1968), pp. 1-17; Edmund S. Phelps,  "Introduction: The New  Microeconomics 
in Employment and Inflation Theory,"  in Edmund S. Phelps and others, Microeconomnic 
Foundations  of Employment and Inflation Theory (Norton,  1970); and Robert E. Lucas, 
"Some  International  Evidence  on  Output-Inflation  Tradeoffs,"  American  Economic 
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rates. According to search theory, unexpected deflation causes high 
unemployment  because unemployed workers become less willing to 
accept job offers. In addition, employed workers quit their jobs to 
become unemployed  more  frequently  because they are dissatisfied  with 
their current wages relative to  their (incorrect) perceptions of  the 
available  alternatives.  Thus  E-to-U quits  should  be  positively  correlated 
with unemployment,  a prediction  not supported  by the data.  There  is no 
particular  reason  for cyclic behavior  of E-to-E quits  in the search  model. 
There is some ambiguity  as to the exact predictions  of real business 
cycle models concerning turnover; nevertheless, it seems difficult  to 
explain  the cyclic behavior  of turnover  with real business cycle theory. 
According  to real business cycle theory, individuals  choose whether 
or not to work and, should they decide to work, the sector in which to 
be employed. The driving  force of the business cycle is productivity 
shocks. Positive productivity  shocks raise the average  reward  to work 
relative to nonwork, thus causing a boom as employment expands. 
Negative productivity  shocks lower the average reward  to work and 
induce departures  from the labor force. Because productivity  shocks 
are only coincidentally  sectorally neutral, such shocks typically alter 
the relative rewards to working among sectors, thus inducing some 
sectoral  reallocation  of employment. 
The short-run  and steady-state impacts of productivity shocks on 
quits can be derived only in the context of a well-specified model. 
Appendix A presents an explicit analysis of the relationship  between 
labor  market  flows and productivity  shocks in a simple two-sector real 
business cycle model. The results of this analysis  can be easily summa- 
rized. Under  plausible  assumptions,  negative productivity  shocks raise 
quits dramatically  in the short run. This occurs for two reasons: first, 
individuals  quit to withdraw  from the labor force; second, some em- 
ployed workers quit to switch sectors in response to changing  relative 
sectoral  rewards.  As Appendix  A explains,  negative  productivity  shocks 
are likely to have a positive or ambiguous  effect on quits once a new 
steady-state  allocation  of labor  is achieved. Both the short-run  and  long- 
run  predictions  of this theory are counterfactual.  In reality,  an increase 
in  the aggregate  unemployment  rate  (or, more  appropriately,  a reduction 
in the aggregate  employment  rate) reduces quits in both the short run 
and the long run. The short-run  response of quits to changes in either 
unemployment  or employment  exceeds the long-run  effect. 524  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Many  economists have argued  that no meaningful  economic distinc- 
tion exists between quits and layoffs. If this argument  is correct, any 
test of the predictions  of real business cycle theory should  make use of 
data  not on quits  but  rather  on total separations  including  layoffs. As we 
note in the following  section, however, the time series behavior  of total 
separations  is similar  to that  of quits  alone. Following  an increase  in the 
unemployment  rate (or a decline in the employment  rate), total separa- 
tions decline significantly  almost immediately.  An increase in the un- 
employment  rate also lowers steady-state  separations  but by a smaller 
amount. 
Simple versions of real business cycle theory incorporate  no mean- 
ingful  function  for unemployment.  However, David Lilien and Steven 
Davis have  argued  that  unemployment  should  be viewed  as an  investment 
that  workers  make  in order  to switch  employment  activities.25 According 
to this view,  a spell of unemployment  is necessary for search and 
"retooling"  to occur. An unemployment  spell is simply  the cost of labor 
mobility. This hypothesis leads to further empirical predictions. As 
Davis notes, labor  reallocation  should  be higher  when unemployment  is 
high  than when unemployment  is low. On the basis of careful  empirical 
work, Davis concludes that this is what actually occurs. He finds that 
increases  in unemployment  are associated  with increased  flows into and 
out of unemployment. Since temporary  layoff unemployment  is not 
large, Davis concludes that  labor  reallocation  is greater  at higher  unem- 
ployment  rates. 
While appreciating  the ingenuity of the preceding argument, we 
disagree with the conclusion for two reasons. First, as noted above, 
total  steady-state separations (due to layoffs and quits) decline as 
unemployment  rises, indicating  that labor reallocation  declines as un- 
employment  rises. Davis's focus on labor  reallocation  following  unem- 
ployment  is potentially  misleading,  since it ignores  the many  separations 
and accessions that involve no unemployment  (for example E-E job 
25. See David M. Lilien, "Sectoral  Shifts and Cyclical  Unemployment,"  Journal  of 
Political  Economy,  vol. 90 (August  1982),  pp. 777-93;  and  Steven  J. Davis, "Fluctuations 
in the  Pace  of  Labor Reallocation,"  Carnegie-Rochester  Conference  Series  on Public 
Policy, vol. 27 (1987), pp. 335-402; and Davis, "Allocative Disturbances  and Specific 
Capital  in Real Business Cycle Theories," American  Economic Review, vol. 77 (May 
1987,  Papers  and  Proceedings,  1986),  pp. 326-31.  Also of relevance  is James  D. Hamilton, 
"A Neoclassical  Model  of Unemployment  and  the Business Cycle," Journal  of Political 
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switches). Second, as will be discussed in the next section, Kevin 
Murphy  and Robert Topel find that the two-digit intersectoral  annual 
mobility  rate  of prime  age men  was strongly  procyclic  from 1970  to 1985, 
indicating  that reallocation  of labor varies positively, not negatively, 
with aggregate  activity.26 
THE  MODEL  AND  THE  LABOR  MARKET 
The  picture  of the labor  market  presented  by our  model  is not an exact 
copy of reality but a distortion, aimed at revealing some essential 
features. How close is the correspondence  between the key features  of 
the model and  those of the U.S. economy? 
The model  predicts  that  quits, and  especially E-E quits, are large  and 
cyclic. The model is premised  on the assumption  that  jobs pay wages in 
excess of market-clearing.  It also assumes that nonpecuniary  rewards 
are an important  element of total labor income, and that the level of 
nonpecuniary  rewards,  along with wages, influences  quit behavior.  Do 
these predictions and premises correspond to  data from the U.S. 
economy?  To answer  these questions,  the next  four  sections  will discuss 
respectively: the evidence concerning turnover patterns in the U.S. 
economy; the extent of job rationing;  the importance  of nonpecuniary 
rewards  in  labor  income;  and  the role  of wages  and  nonpecuniary  rewards 
in quit  decisions. 
Turnover in the Labor Market 
In this section we will examine the size and cyclic behavior  of labor 
market  flows. First, we will establish  the magnitude  of layoffs and quits, 
and  of the three components  of quits:  E-E, E-U, and E-O. Then we will 
26. See Kevin  M. Murphy  and  Robert  H. Topel, "The  Evolution  of Unemployment  in 
the United  States," in Stanley  Fischer, ed., NBER Macroeconomics  Annual,  1987 (MIT 
Press, 1987),  pp. 11-58, especially  pp. 48-49. Murphy  and Topel's results  coincide  with 
our  own calculations  using  data  from  two special  surveys  of  job changing,  one conducted 
in 1955  and  the other  in 1961.  These reveal  that  the rate  ofjob switching  between  one-digit 
industries  as a fraction  of total employment  was 22.7 percent in 1955,  a year with 4.4 
percent  unemployment,  in comparison  with 18 percent  in 1961,  a year with 6.7 percent 
unemployment.  See Gertrude  Bancroft  and  Stuart  Garfinkle,  "Job  Mobility  in 1961,  " U.S. 
Department  of Labor,  Special  Labor  Force  Report  35 (GPO,  August  1963);  and  Bureau  of 
the Census,  Current Population  Reports,  Series P-50, no. 70, "Job  Mobility  of Workers 
in 1955"  (GPO,  February  1957). 526  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
examine the cyclic behavior  of the aggregates  and of the E-E and E-U 
components,  respectively. 
SIZE  OF  TURNOVER  AND  THE  COMPONENTS  OF  QUITS 
The  data  most  commonly  used  to examine  labor  turnover  in  the United 
States are the series compiled  by the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (BLS). 
In  the  language  of the  form  filled  out monthly  by business  establishments, 
quits  are "terminations  of employment  initiated  by the  employee,  " while 
layoffs are separations  "initiated  by the employer  without  prejudice  to 
the worker," so long as the termination  is greater  than  one week; layoffs 
also include terminations  of temporary  or seasonal work. Discharges 
are terminations  "initiated by the employer" for cause. Reasons for 
"other separations" include military duty, retirement, health, and 
transfer  to another  establishment  of the same firm. 
The  BLS data  have  serious  limitations:  only manufacturing  is covered; 
not all states participated  in the survey at all times; there  are no data on 
the demographic  characteristics  of the employees, nor  on the character- 
istics ofthejobs in question;  the voluntary  nature  of the response  imparts 
a bias towards  larger,  older firms  with low turnover.  These limitations 
notwithstanding,  the BLS data  are useful, especially because the series 
is continuous  from 1919  through  1982,  when it was discontinued.27  BLS 
data show that both quits and layoffs are large. From January 1948 
through  December 1981,  total quits averaged 1.98 per 100  employees a 
month. Over the same period, layoffs averaged 1.63  per 100  employees 
a month. 
Unfortunately,  there  is no published  time series corresponding  either 
to QEE or to QEU  for the United States. Nevertheless, using  information 
from  a special  BLS report  onjob changers  for 1961,  it is possible to place 
a lower bound  of 29.6 percent  on E-E changes  as a fraction  of all quits  in 
that year.28  We have also estimated  that, for 1969-81, E-U quits were 
approximately  17.8  percent  of all quits. 
E-E Quits.  In this section we combine cross-section data from the 
1961  BLS survey of job changers  with the standard  BLS establishment- 
27. See Robert  E. Hall and David M. Lilien, "The Measurement  and Significance  of 
Labor Turnover," Background  Paper 27 (National Commission  on Employment  and 
Unemployment  Statistics, 1979),  for a discussion  of the characteristics  and  limitations  of 
the BLS series. 
28. See Bancroft  and  Garfinkle,  "Job  Mobility  in 1961." George A. Akerlof, Andrew K. Rose,  Janet L.  Yellen  527 
based  data  on quits  for the same year to provide  a lower-bound  estimate 
of E-E quits  as a fraction  of total quits. 
In February  1962  special questions  were asked of job changers  as an 
addition  to the annual  Income Supplement  of the Current  Population 
Survey.  According  to the survey, over the calendar  year 1961  there  were 
4.3 million  job changes whose primary  motive was "improvement  of 
(job) status." All of these changes were voluntary  and therefore  quits, 
but not all were E-E; some were followed by spells of unemployment. 
Since these job shifts were motivated by improvement  of job status, 
however, it would be illogical  to classify any of these as E-O shifts. By 
subtracting  the number  of shifts involving  unemployment  we obtain  the 
number  of E-E  job shifts to improve  status. For 1961,  data  are available 
on the fraction  of individuals  experiencing  unemployment  who changed 
jobs exactly once; 21.4 percent  of single  job changers  who switched "to 
improye  status" experienced  unemployment.  It is necessary  to estimate 
the fraction of shifts by multiple  job changers into unemployment.  A 
reasonable  assumption  is that the incidence of unemployment  for mul- 
tiple and single  job changers  was identical.29  Accordingly,  we estimate 
3.4 million  E-E shifts  forjob improvement  (78.6 percent  of 4.3 million). 
What  is the ratio of the status-improving  E-E quits to all quits?  The 
special study on job changers fails to report all job  separations; it 
tabulates  separations  only for individuals  with subsequent  employment 
during the survey year. Therefore another source must be used to 
calculate  total  job quits. 
We use the standard  BLS establishment  series on turnover, which 
reports  a quit rate of 1.2 percent  a month  for manufacturing  employees 
in 1961,  and adjust  this figure  upward  to offset the manufacturing  bias. 
No quit rate more comprehensive  than all manufacturing  is available; 
since quits are lower in manufacturing  than in the rest of the economy, 
an adjustment  must be made. For job changers, from the 1961 BLS 
survey, quits per employee are 22.5 percent  higher  in the economy as a 
whole than in manufacturing.30  Applying this fraction to  the BLS 
29. For all job changes, the fraction  of multiple  shifters with no unemployment  is 
roughly  the square  of the fraction  of single shifters  with no unemployment,  as would be 
expected  if both groups  had the same probability  of moving  from  E to U on any switch; 
Bancroft  and  Garfinkle,  "Job  Mobility  in 1961,"  table  B, p. A-6. 
30. In contrast,  however, John Baldwin, "Labor  Force Turnover  from Separations 
Data"  (Queens  University,  1988),  using  Canadian  data  on quit  rates  by industry,  finds  the 
quit  rate  in Canadian  manufacturing  to be 3.5 percent  higher  than  the economywide  quit 
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manufacturing  quit  rate  in 1961  yields an estimated  economywide  annual 
quit  rate  for 1961  of 17.6  percent. With  an average  work  force in 1961  of 
65.5 million,  quits  totaled  some 11.5  million.  E-E status-improving  quits 
were thus 29.6 percent  (3.4 million/i 1.5 million)  of all quits.31 
This estimate is a lower bound. For two reasons, the numerator 
is undoubtedly an underestimate  of total quits from E to E.  First, 
only quits "to improve status" were included in our estimate. In the 
BLS report on job changers, shifts for "other reasons" amounted  to 
55 percent of shifts for improvement  of job status. "Other reasons" 
exclude job loss and termination  of temporary  jobs, as well as status 
improvement.  While some other reasons, such as discharge  and retire- 
ment, are clearly  not part  of E-E quits, many  other-reason  shifts should 
be so classified.  In our own compilation  of data  on mature  men  from  the 
National Longitudinal  Survey, 79 percent of all exogenous or other- 
reason quits, excluding those for health and retirement,  were E-E in 
1969-71  (see table  4); exogenous  quits  were 30  percent  of all  mature  male 
quits  (again  excluding  those for health  and retirement). 
Second, in labor market  surveys, transitions  recalled  one year later 
are often forgotten by the respondent.32  In the Current  Population 
Survey, a single household  member  gives not only his or her own labor 
market experience, but also that of all other household members. 
Retrospectively  recalled  job changes can be expected to record  a much 
smaller  number  of quits  than  the BLS establishment  data, which rely on 
contemporaneous  records  of employers. 
E-U Quits. For E-U quits, it is possible to construct  a data  series for 
1968-82. Since 1968, the BLS has divided the unemployed  by cause. 
31. This  finding  on the importance  of E-E shifts  is also documented  by J. Peter  Mattila, 
"Job Quitting  and Frictional  Unemployment,"  American Economic Review, vol. 64 
(March 1974),  pp. 235-39, on the basis of his examination  of the BLS Survey of Job 
Changers  in 1955 and 1961  and  earlier  cross-section  studies.  Mattila  assumed  that  multiple 
and  single  job changers  to improve  status  would  have different  probabilities  of making  an 
E-U transition;  however,  the data  on the incidence  of unemployment  spells for single  and 
multiple  job changers  suggest  a common  constant  probability  of losing  time  between  jobs 
for  all shifts. 
32. See, for example, Richard  D. Morgenstern  and Nancy S. Barrett, "The Retro- 
spective  Bias  in  Unemployment  Reporting  by Sex, Race  and  Age,"  Journal  oftheAmerican 
Statistical  Association, vol. 69 (June 1974),  pp. 355-57;  George  A. Akerlof  and  Janet  L. 
Yellen,  "  Unemployment  through  the Filter  of Memory,  " Quarterly  Journal  ofEconomics, 
vol. 100  (August  1985),  pp. 748-73;  and  Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Why  Is the Unemploy- 
ment  Rate So Very High  near  Full Employment?"  BPEA,  2:1986,  pp. 339-96, especially 
pp. 358-59. George A. Akerlof, Andrew K. Rose,  Janet L.  Yellen  529 
Table 4.  Distribution of E-E, E-U, and E-O Moves by Reason for Separation in 
National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men,  1969-1971a 
Fractions  of moves  that are  Annual moves per 
Item  100 employees  E-Eb  E-Uc  E-Od 
All separations  9.4  0.47  0.39  0.14 
Total quits  3.5  0.77  0.15  0.07 
Quit-wagese  0.7  0.80  0.13  0.07 
Quit-nonpecuniaryl  1.7  0.76  0.21  0.03 
Quit-exogenousg  1.0  0.79  0.07  0.14 
Total job  losses  5.9  0.29  0.53  0.18 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using data from the National  Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men. 
a.  Separations  include  all  reporte-d  job  terminations  for  any  reason  excluding  within-firm (same-employer)  job 
switches,  terminations  of simultaneous  jobs,  and quits due  to health and retirement.  The  latter two  categories  are 
excluded  from  the  BLS  aggregate  quit  statistics.  In contrast  to  earlier surveys,  the  1971 NLS  survey  obtained  a 
complete  work history of an individual's  moves  since  the  1969 survey. 
b.  A move  is classified  as E-E  if the respondent  either had a new job  lined up before departure from the old job 
or reported no weeks  not working prior to the subsequent job. 
c.  A move  is classified  as E-U  if the respondent did not have a job  lined up before departure from the old job  and 
reports an unemployment  spell subsequent  to departure from the old job. 
d.  A move is classified as E-0  if the respondent left last job and is out of the labor force in 1971 or if the respondent 
had  no  unemployment  and  a  period  of  nonwork  between  jobs.  This  classification  method  is  biased  in  favor  of 
overreporting  of E-U  relative  to E-0  spells  because  it treats any transition between jobs  involving  a U spell as an 
E-U  transition,  whereas  in fact some  spells  couid  be E-0-U-E  sequences. 
e.  A quit is categorized  as Quit-wages if dissatisfaction  with wages  is reported as the major reason for leaving the 
job. 
f.  A quit is categorized  as Quit-nonpecuniary if the reported reason for leaving the job was: interpersonal reasons, 
disliked  hours or conditions,  or found better job. 
g.  A quit is categorized  as Quit-exogenous  if the reported reason for leaving the job was: family reasons,  location, 
moved,  transferred or promoted (with new employer),  and other. 
Those who were laid off are said to have "lost last job." Those who 
made  O-U transitions  are  classified  as "new entrants"  and "reentrants" 
to the labor  force. Those who made  E-U quits  are classified  as "left last 
job." The flow into this pool of unemployed  "job leavers" is the flow of 
E-U quits. In a steady state, division of the stock of unemployed  job 
leavers by their  average  spell of unemployment  gives the flow of E to U 
quits. Hal Sider has calculated  the average  unemployment  spell length 
from 1968  to 1982  for the whole population.  The assumption  that these 
spell  lengths  apply  tojob leavers  as well as to the whole population  yields 
an estimate of E-U flows.33  For this period, the average of the annual 
estimated  ratios  of E-U quits  to the economywide  quits  is 17.8  percent. 
33. See Hal Sider, "Unemployment  Duration  and Incidence: 1968-82," American 
Economic  Review,  vol. 75  (June  1985),  pp.  461-72.  Results  obtained  by Stephen  T. Marston 
in "Employment  Instability  and High Unemployment  Rates," BPEA, 1:1976,  pp. 169- 
203, justify this assumption. Marston (p.  191) found that the duration  of spells of 
unemployment  of  job leavers was slightly  longer  than  that  of job losers in March  1973  by 
comparing  the ratio  of the flows of leavers  to losers to the ratio  of the stocks of leavers  to 
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To obtain economywide quits, an upward  adjustment  of 22.5 percent 
was made  to the BLS quit  rates,  to compensate  for  the nonrepresentative 
nature  of quits  in manufacturing. 
So far it has been seen that E-E quits are a significant  fraction  of all 
quits, being  very conservatively  estimated  at 29.6 percent  of all quits  for 
1961. E-U quits account for a significant,  but by no means dominant 
share  of all quits, being  estimated  at 17.8  percent  for the period 1968-82. 
Corroborative  evidence on the distributions  of these E-E and E-U quits 
comes from data we have compiled for mature men in the National 
Longitudinal  Survey  for  the  period  1969-71,  a period  for  which  a virtually 
complete work history is available. For this period, 77 percent of all 
quits  were E-E; 15  percent,  E-U; and  only 7 percent,  E-O. These figures 
exclude quits related  to retirements  and health, to conform  to the BLS 
definition  of quits. This group is special, of course, particularly  in its 
high attachment  to the labor  force, so E-O quits would be expected to 
be unusually  small.  It is useful  to see that  this expectation  is realized  and 
also that  the E-U quits  are small  relative  to E-E. 
CYCLIC  BEHAVIOR  OF  AGGREGATE  QUITS  AND  LAYOFFS 
We now turn  to the cyclic behavior  of aggregate  quits  and layoffs. 
Quits. Figure 1 illustrates the procyclicality of quits. The simple 
correlation  between the log of the quit rate and the log of the civilian 
unemployment  rate  from  January  1948  through  December  1981  is - 0.74. 
The simple correlation  between the growth  of quits and the percentage 
change in the unemployment  rate over the same period is  -0.34  (the 
standard  error  of both statistics is approximately  0.05). These statistics 
are robust  with respect to choice of sample  period.34 
Our  theoretical  model  implies  the existence of a steady-state  relation- 
ship  between the quit  rate  and  the unemployment  rate;  if the unemploy- 
ment rate declines permanently,  the quit rate will rise. Consider  a time 
series on the natural  log of the quit  rate, qt, and  the log of the unemploy- 
ment rate, ut. Suppose that 
34. We  have  checked  the  robustness  ofthis  cyclic  behaviorin  many  ways-forinstance, 
allowing  for time  trends,  lags of the quit  rate, different  lags in unemployment,  changes  in 
sample  period  and  different  functional  form  (in  terms  of growth  rates  rather  than  levels)- 
and have used other  variables  besides unemployment  as indicators  of cyclic activity. We 
have also confirmed  that  quits  are  cyclic with  nonparametric  "sign" tests. There  seems to 
be no doubt that quits are extremely  cyclic. The procyclic behavior  of quits has been 
corroborated  in every previous  time  series investigation  of which  we are  aware. George A. Akerlof, Andrew K. Rose,  Janet L.  Yellen  531 
Figure  1. Quits  and Unemployment,  1948-81 
Percent  Monthly  quits  per 100 employees 
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(10)  qt  =  aqt-i  +  E  bjut-j  +  et, 
i=l  ~j=o 
where  et is a white-noise  error  term.  A test of the hypothesis  of a steady- 
state  relation  between  q and  u is that  the sum  of the bj  coefficients,  which 
will be denoted  B, is not zero while the sum of the ai coefficients,  which 
will be denoted A, is strictly less than 1. The steady-state  change in q 
associated  with a unit  change  in u is then  B!(1 -  A). 
Before attempting  to estimate the magnitude of B!(1  -  A)  it is 
important  to check  that  there  does exist some stable  long-run  relationship 
between  q and  its key determinants,  including  u. Technically,  one cannot 
reject  the hypothesis  that both the log of the quit rate and the log of the 
unemployment  rate have unit roots at the 5 percent level;35  loosely 
35.  See Wayne A. Fuller, Introduction to Statistical  Time Series (John Wiley,  1976), 
for  a description  of the tests and  critical  values.  Our  Dickey-Fuller  tests include  a constant 
and  are "augmented"  by 12  lags of the growth  rate.  These results  are robust  with  respect 
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speaking, they individually  move like random walks with additional 
dynamics. Although  each of the variables  may have a unit root, there 
may still be a stable relation  between them. If a linear  combination  of 
two variables, each of which has a unit root, is stationary, the two 
variables  are said to be cointegrated.  A steady-state  change  in the level 
of one variable  is then  associated  with  a steady-state  change  in the other. 
We applied the Engle-Granger  test for cointegration  to quits and 
unemployment.  We included  three  demographic  factors  frequently  used 
in calculations  of weighted  unemployment  rates: the fractions  of teens, 
women, and the elderly in the labor  force.36  These variables  are appro- 
priate  in our model, because they potentially  affect the rate of autono- 
mous vacancy creation. We find that the log of quits and the log of 
unemployment  are cointegrated  from 1948  to 1982.  The cointegrating  or 
steady-state  equation  linking  q and u is 
(11)  q =  6.70  -  1.26u -  20.25 Employed men aged over 55 
Labor  force 
-  9.34Women  in laborforce  1  Teens in laborforce 
Labor force  Labor force 
Number  of observations:  372;  sample  period:  January  1951-December  1981; 
Engle-Yoo  ADF statistic:  4.83 (significant  at the 5 percent  level).37 
The coefficients  of the cointegrating  equation  indicate  that the long-run 
elasticity  of the quit  rate  with  respect  to the  unemployment  rate  is -  1.26. 
Thus, a permanent  increase  in the unemployment  rate  from  5 percent  to 
6 percent would lead to a permanent  decline in the quit rate from, for 
example, 1.9 quits  a month  to 1.46  quits  a month.  Further,  when the quit 
rate  is modeled  in an error  correction  model, the dynamic  responses  also 
seem sensible. In particular,  the quit rate rises quickly in the short run 
in response  to a decrease  in the unemployment  rate,  before  settling  down 
to its new  higher  steady  state  .38 This  corresponds  to the  dynamic  behavior 
of the simulation  model. 
As discussed above, real business cycle models imply a negative 
36. See George  L. Perry, "Changing  Labor  Markets  and Inflation,"  BPEA, 3:1970, 
pp. 411-41. 
37. See Robert F. Engle and Byung Sam Yoo, "Forecasting  and Testing in Co- 
Integrated Systems,"  Journal of Econometrics,  vol. 35 (May 1987), pp. 143-59. 
38. The error  correction  model relates the change in the log of the quit rate to the 
cointegrating  vector estimated  in equation 11 above, the current  value and lags in the George  A. Akerlof,  Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen  533 
short-run  relationship  between  the quit  rate  and  employment  rather  than 
between the quit rate and unemployment. In actual fact quits are 
positively correlated  (and  cointegrated)  with the employment  rate. The 
log of the employment  rate is cointegrated  with the log of the quit rate; 
the relationship  is positive. When  the relationship  between the employ- 
ment  rate  and  the quit  rate  is modeled  in an error  correction  framework, 
the results are qualitatively identical to those described above. An 
increase  in the employment  rate leads to a short-run  surge in quits that 
temporarily  overshoots the higher  steady-state  rate. 
Quits  in Cities. Further  evidence on the cyclic behavior  of quits and 
unemployment  comes from  an examination  of the relationships  between 
quits and unemployment  rates by Standard  Metropolitan  Statistical 
Area. When  we estimate  the relationship  between  the log of the quit  rate 
and  the log of unemployment  over time, we find  overwhelming  evidence 
of a statistically  significant  relationship  for each of the 16  cities for which 
data  are available  from 1958  through  1980  (this relationship  is estimated 
using Zellner's SURE technique). As we noted above, our model does 
not predict any simple cross-section correlation between quits and 
unemployment across cities due to  the possibility of  variations in 
demographic  and industrial  mix factors that would affect the layoff and 
exogenous quit rates. Cross-section regressions for each year in our 
sample  reveal a negative  and significant  relation  between q and u across 
cities for only 6 out of 23 years. In 14 years, the relation  was negative 
and  insignificant;  in 3, positive and significant. 
Quits in War and Depression.  The extremes  of war and depression 
dramatize  the correlation  between quits  and  economic activity. Quits  in 
the 1920s  averaged  3.7 percent  monthly  and fell to 1.0 percent  monthly 
during  the depressed  decade of the 1930s.  At the height  of World  War  II 
(in 1943  and 1944)  quits  averaged  more  than  6.2 percent  monthly. 
Layoffs. As figure  2 shows, layoffs  display  kurtosis:  they rise to large 
spikes at, or shortly after, the beginning  of recessions.39  In contrast  to 
change  in the log of the unemployment  rate,  and  lags  in the dependent  variable  (the  change 
in q). See James E. H. Davidson, David F. Hendry, Frank Srba, and Steven Yeo, 
"Econometric  Modelling  of the  Aggregate  Time-Series  Relationship  Between  Consumers' 
Expenditure  and  Income  in the United  Kingdom,"  Economic  Journal,  vol. 88 (December 
1978),  pp. 661-92. 
39. The Jarque-Bera  test for kurtosis  of the residuals  of a regression  of the log of the 
layoff  rate  on the log of the unemployment  rate  is 4.62, which  is significant  at the 5 percent 
level. This statistic  is distributed  as chi-square  with 1 degree of freedom  under  the null 
hypothesis  of normality. 534  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Figure 2.  Layoffs and Unemployment, 1948-81 
Percent  Monthly layoffs  per 100 employees 
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quits, layoffs do not seem to have any strong  steady-state  relationship 
to unemployment.  The countercyclic  behavior  of layoffs appears  to be 
short-run  rather  than  steady-state.40 
Total Separations.  Our  model implies that, in response to a perma- 
nent reduction in the unemployment  rate, the separation rate rises 
dramatically,  temporarily  overshooting its new, higher steady-state 
value. It is especially important  to test this prediction  because some 
economists deny the existence of any meaningful  economic distinction 
40. For the sample  period  from  January  1949  through  December  1981  the hypothesis 
that  layoffs  have  a unit  root  can  be rejected  at the 1  percent  significance  level with  Dickey- 
Fuller tests. This precludes  the possibility  of a cointegrating  relationship  between the 
unemployment  rate and the layoff rate since the former  appears  to have a unit root. 
Alternatively,  a simple  F-test cannot  reject  the hypothesis  that  the coefficients  on the lags 
of the log of the unemployment  rate (in a regression  of the log of the layoff rate on the 
current  and lagged  values of the log of the unemployment  rate  and lags of the dependent 
variable)  sum  to zero. Nevertheless,  there  is a strong  positive  relation  between  innovations 
in the unemployment  rate  and  innovations  in the layoff  rate. George A. Akerlof, Andrew K. Rose, Janet L.  Yellen  535 
between  quits  and  layoffs. Despite  the  fact that  layoffs  are  countercyclic, 
the sum  of quits  and  layoffs  (almost  total  separations,  except for "other" 
separations  and discharges)  is still procyclic. For instance, a regression 
of the growth rate of the sum of quits plus layoffs on the current  and 
lagged values of the growth rate of the unemployment  rate yields a 
negative and significant  relationship,  with a steady-state elasticity of 
around -0.26.  This result stands up to a variety of changes in the 
specification  of the model.41 
CYCLIC  NATURE  OF  E-E  AND  E-U  QUITS 
Support  for the cyclic nature  of E-E quits comes from a comparison 
of data from the BLS special report on job changes for 1961 and an 
earlier,  less  complete,  survey  for  1955.42 Unemployment  was  signifi- 
cantly greater in 1961 than in  1955-4.3  percent as compared with 
6.7 percent-and the number  ofjob shifts  to improve  status  per  employee 
was significantly  greater  in 1955  than in 1961.  In 1955  this ratio  was 8.1 
per hundred  employees for the whole year, whereas in 1961  the same 
ratio was 6.5 per hundred  employees. This number  does not exactly 
correspond  to QEEIE  in our theoretical  model, but instead  corresponds 
to  the  sum  (QjEu  +  QEE)!E.  It represents  the  number of  changes  to 
improve  status irrespective  of whether  the quit  was into unemployment 
or directly  into a new  job. Ideally,  we would  like to know QEEIE,  but the 
composite  number  is perhaps  more interesting  empirically  than  the QEE 
component. The basis for our model is the hypothesis of more job 
mobility at low unemployment.  At lower unemployment  rates, more 
opportunities  for improved  job status occur because jobs are rationed 
and vacancy chains are longer. The change in (Q4Eu  +  QEE)IE  between 
these two years, which is the change in status-improving  moves per 
employee, does suggest that at high unemployment,  such mobility is 
lower.43 
41. Modeling  the separation  rate and the unemployment  rate in an error  correction 
model  allows one to trace out the dynamic  relationship  between the two variables.  An 
increase  in the unemployment  rate  raises  total  separations  contemporaneously  (due  to the 
spiky  nature  of layoffs);  this effect is quickly  offset and  total separations  decline  within  a 
quarter,  remaining  lower  in steady  state. 
42. See "Job  Mobility  of Workers  in 1955." 
43. It is interesting  to note that the rate of job shifting  to improve  status fell within 
every  individual  demographic  subgroup  between 1955  and 1961  with  the exception  of men 536  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
A further  indication  that opportunities,  and therefore  mobility, dry 
up when unemployment  rises has been given by Murphy  and Topel. 
Using CPS reports  for adult  males linked  between adjacent  years, they 
computed  the fraction  of workers  who report  a different  employer for 
the longest  job "last year," and a different  two-digit  industry  between 
the two jobs. Murphy  and Topel note that the periods of sharpest  de- 
cline in this measure  of mobility are coincident with the recessions of 
1975 and 1983, which represent  the peaks of cyclic unemployment  in 
the postwar period.44  For  1973, when the unemployment rate was 
4.9 percent, intersectoral  mobility  was 10.1 percent  of the adult  males. 
For 1983, with 9.6 percent unemployment,  mobility was 6.8 percent. 
This procyclic mobility  occurred  despite the fact that at higher  unem- 
ployment  rates there are more  unemployed  workers  seeking  job oppor- 
tunities.  It might  be expected that  many  of these workers  would  find  jobs 
in industries  different  from their  last. Murphy  and Topel interpret  their 
findings as rejecting an explanation of rising unemployment  due to 
structural  changes. 
The E-U series described  above reveals the procyclic nature  of quits 
into unemployment  quite clearly. For 1970, with a 4.8 percent unem- 
ployment  rate, the annual  rate  of E-to-U quits  was 4.6 percent. For 1982 
(when the unemployment  rate was 9.5 percent), the annual  E-to-U quit 
rate had declined to 3.4 percent. Regression  analysis shows significant 
negative correlation between unemployment and E-to-U quits; the 
correlation  between the annual  demeaned  growth  rates  of QEU and  u has 
a t-statistic  of 5.7 for the period 1969-82. In our theoretical  model the 
impact  of changing  unemployment  on the E-U quit rate is ambiguous: 
on the one hand,  as unemployment  rises, there  is decreased  incentive  to 
quit, because spells of unemployment  last longer; on the other hand, 
persons  who quit  because  ofjob dissatisfaction  or exogenous causes will 
and women over 65. For example, for men aged 45-64, the rate of quitting  to improve 
status fell from  4.1 percent  in 1955  to 2.1 percent  in 1961.  This suggests that changes in 
demographic  composition  of employment  are  not  wholly  responsible  for  the  cyclic  behavior 
of aggregate  quits, although  quit  rates  vary substantially  across demographic  groups  and 
employment  shares  of demographic  subgroups  vary  cyclically.  A simple  calculation  shows 
that  the contribution  of demographic  shifts to the change  in total quits  between 1955  and 
1961  was quite  minor:  between 1955  and 1961  the status-improving  quit  rate  fell from  6.7 
percent  to 5.3 percent.  If the composition  of the labor  force had  remained  unchanged,  the 
fall would  have instead  been from  6.7 percent  to 5.5 percent. 
44. See Murphy  and  Topel, "The Evolution  of Unemployment,"  pp. 48-49. George A. Akerlof, Andrew K. Rose,  Janet L.  Yellen  537 
be less likely to find alternative  jobs when unemployment  rates are 
higher.  It is apparent  empirically,  however, that the disincentive  effect 
dominates  the E-to-U quitting  decision.45 
Rents in Wage Payments 
Our  model  of turnover  depends  crucially  on the assumptions  thatjobs 
are rationed  and workers receive rents. The assumption  that  jobs pay 
rents has a long and venerable history in economics. Exploring its 
consequences, which is the purpose of this paper, is part of a long 
tradition. 
Twenty years ago, most macroeconomists  assumed  rationing  in labor 
markets.  Since that time, alternative  models with rational  expectations 
and market clearing  have been proposed; curiously, they retain their 
popularity,  despite the numerous  empirical  rejections  of such models. 
Such rejections,  of course, constitute  only weak evidence in  favor  ofjob 
rationing.  Still,  they offer  no reason  for abandoningjob  rationing  models, 
whose basis was not sophisticated  statistical  tests but  rather  a collection 
of empirical  evidence concerning  the operation  of labor  markets. 
The current  controversy  between Keynesian  and  new classical econ- 
omists marks  the continuation  of a debate in labor  economics between 
the  "institutionalists," who believed that a  variety of  institutions 
were important  in creating  wage dispersion in labor markets, and the 
"theorists," who believed that  labor  markets  cleared.46  Persistent  wage 
45. The size of turnover,  as revealed  by the BLS establishment  series, is so very large 
as to suggest that the data could be seriously in error,  although  there is also evidence 
indicating  that  these data  underestimate  total quits. (See State  of California  Employment 
Development  Department,  Employment Service Potential, September  1977.)  Surprisingly, 
a conservative  compilation  of data  from  the 1961  Work  Experience  Survey  and  from  the 
1961  survey on job changes yields a lower bound for employment  separations  only 20 
percent  lower  than  the separation  rate  reported  in  the standard  BLS series  after  adjustment 
for  exclusion  of nonmanufacturing  in  the establishment  series.  This  calculation  is available 
from  the authors  upon  request. 
46. We interpret  the term Keynesian broadly to include such new Keynesian ap- 
proaches  as those surveyed  by Bruce  C. Greenwald  and Joseph  E. Stiglitz, "Examining 
Alternative  Macroeconomic  Theories," BPEA,  1:1988, pp. 207-60. See Lloyd Ulman, 
"Labor Mobility and the Industrial  Wage Structure  in the Postwar United States," 
Quarterly Journal  of  Economics,  vol. 79 (February  1965), pp. 73-97, and references 
therein,  for  a summary  of the debate  between  the institutionalists  and  the theorists. 538  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
dispersion  in  excess of compensating  differentials  for  workers  of identical 
characteristics  is clearly inconsistent  with any market-clearing  theory, 
in which  only the highest-paying  firms  could succeed in hiring. 
The institutionalists  used as an important  bit of evidence in favor of 
their  non-market-clearing  view the negative  correlation  between wages 
and quits. According  to their argument,  if higher  wages result in lower 
quit  rates, high-wage  jobs must  be more  desirable.  This same argument 
has been made by Krueger  and Summers, who find significant  inter- 
industry  and occupational  wage differentials  for workers with similar 
characteristics.47  According to Krueger and Summers, the impact of 
industry  affiliation  on wages ranges  from  a high  of 38 percent  above the 
mean for the petroleum industry, to 37 percent below the mean for 
private  household  services. They  also show  that  when  individual  workers 
shift industries, their change in wage accords with the differences in 
industry  wage differentials.  Furthermore,  quits  fall as the industry  wage 
premiums  rise. Dickens  and  Katz have found  a high  correlation  between 
the pay of different occupations across industries.48  For example, in 
industries where the engineers secure high wages,  so  also do the 
secretaries. Finally, the considerable wage dispersion uncovered in 
national  samples  has also been found in numerous  studies  of local labor 
markets.49 
Our  model assumes that even the worst  jobs pay wages in excess of 
market  clearing  and thus unemployed  workers are quick to accept job 
offers. This assumption is consistent with several bits of empirical 
evidence. For  example,  in a study  of metalworking  plants  in New Haven, 
Lloyd Reynolds found that the lowest-paying plants had no trouble 
getting  labor, even in 1948,  when the labor  market  was very tight, with 
47. See Krueger  and Summers, "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry  Wage 
Structure."  We could view our multiple-job  model as having  seven different  industries, 
each of which  pays  a different  wage. A large  number  of earlier  studies,  using  cross-section 
industry  data, found negative  correlations  between industry  quit rates and wage levels. 
For a survey, see Donald  0. Parsons,  "Models  of Labor  Market  Turnover:  A Theoretical 
and Empirical  Survey," in Research in Labor  Economics, vol. 1 (JAI Press, 1978),  pp. 
185-223. 
48. See Dickens  and  Katz, "Industry  Wage  Patterns." 
49. For dramatic  examples see, John  T. Dunlop, "The Task of Contemporary  Wage 
Theory,"  in Dunlop, ed.,  The Theoty of Wage Determination  (St. Martin's Press,  1957), 
pp. 3-27; and Lloyd Reynolds,  The Structure ofLabor Markets: Wages andLabor Mobility 
in Theory and Practice  (Harper and Brothers,  1951). George  A. Akerlof,  Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen  539 
a 3 percent  local unemployment  rate, and starting  wages ranged  from a 
low of 69 cents an hour  to a high  of $1.19 an hour on average. The low- 
wage plants  seemed to have as many  applicants  as the high-wage  plants 
but fewer acceptances. Reynolds  concludes that  although  the low-wage 
firms  got lower-quality  labor,  they were "getting  a 'better  buy' i.e., labor 
was costing less per efficiency unit than it was costing the high-wage 
firms."'50 
Another study documents the ready availability  of labor in a local 
labor market. In 1978 a Fortune reporter  tracked down all the help- 
wanted ads in Middletown, New York, the commercial center for a 
county 65 miles north  of New York  City  with 273,000  people. Of the 228 
ads that appeared  in the main county paper for the week in question, 
only 42 offered full-time  nonskilled  positions. The employers offering 
these jobs were "swamped  by a tidal wave of applicants." The unem- 
ployment  rate at the time in Orange  County  was 7.4 percent, which was 
high  but not very high.51 
This evidence on the labor market  from Middletown  accords with a 
revealing  statistic for the U.S. labor market  as a whole. According  to 
the May 1976  special  study  ofjob search  methods,  only about  8.5 percent 
of those workers  unemployed  at  the time  of the interview  reported  having 
received and rejected  ajob offer.52  On the steady-state  assumption  that 
workers  are interviewed  with uniform  probability  throughout  their spell 
of unemployment,  this means that by the end of their spell, 17 percent 
will have rejected a job offer. Eighty-three  percent of all unemployed 
workers  accept the first  job offer received. 
The interesting and important  question of how firms decide what 
wages to pay is now the subject of a substantial  theoretical  literature. 
"Efficiency wage" theory attempts to explain why firms might pay 
wages in excess of market  clearing:  with low wages, equity norms  may 
induce  workers  to have low morale, resulting  in various subtle and not 
50.  Reynolds,  Structure of Labor Markets, pp. 10, 190. 218-19. 
51. See Herbert  E. Meyer,  "Jobs  and  Want  Ads:  A Look  Behind  the  Words,"  Fortune, 
vol. 98 (November  20, 1978),  pp. 88-96. 
52. See Carl  Rosenfeld,  "Job Search  of the Unemployed,  May 1976,"  Department  of 
Labor,  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics, Special Labor  Force Report  210 (GPO, 1978),  p. 41. 
This  same  statistic  was also quoted  by Kim  B. Clark  and  Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Labor 
Market  Dynamics  and Unemployment:  A Reconsideration,"  BPEA, 1:1979,  p. 55, in a 
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so subtle forms of sabotage;  quit rates are apt to be high; workers are 
apt to shirk;  the quality  of available  labor  will be low; and the threat  of 
unionization  will be high. All these motives for above-market-clearing 
wages have been studied  in some detail. Our  model assumes that wage 
differentials are exogenously rather than optimally determined, an 
assumption  that accords with the conclusions of Krueger  and Summers 
and Dickens and Katz, who find no patterns  in wage differentials  that 
could be easily explained by optimizing  theories.53 The most natural 
explanation  for such differentials  is that they are chosen to accord with 
customary  views of equity both between owners and employees of the 
firm  and  across occupational  groups  within  the firm.S4 
The Importance of Nonpecuniary  Rewards in Total 
Labor Income 
Our  model  assumes  that  nonpecuniary  rewards  constitute  a significant 
portion  of total labor  income, and change stochastically  over time, thus 
motivating  a significant  fraction  of quits. Here, we verify  these assump- 
tions. 
THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  NONPECUNIARY  REWARDS  IN 
MOTIVATING  WORK 
Psychologists and sociologists have long been interested in the 
motivations  of workers and the underlying  causes of job satisfaction. 
The  preponderance  of evidence  suggests  the  importance  of nonpecuniary 
factors  as a component  of total  rewards.  Robert  Quinn,  Graham  Staines, 
and Margaret  McCullough,  for example, describing  the results of the 
Quality  of Employment  Survey  (a national  panel),  concluded  that  having 
53. See Alan  B. Krueger  and  Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Reflections  on the  Interindustry 
Wage Structure," in Lang and Leonard, eds.,  Unemployment and the Structure of Labor 
Markets,  pp. 17-47; William  T. Dickens and Lawrence F. Katz, "Interindustry  Wage 
Differences  and Industry  Characteristics,"  in Lang and Leonard,  eds., Unemployment 
and the Structure of Labor Markets, pp. 48-89. 
54. See Ulman,  "Labor  Mobility  and  the Industrial  Wage  Structure";  and  George  A. 
Akerlof  and  Janet  L. Yellen,  "Fairness  and  Unemployment,"American  EconomicReview, 
vol. 78 (May  1988,  Papers  and  Proceedings,  1987),  pp. 44-49; and  "The  Fair  Wage/Effort 
Hypothesis  and  Unemployment"  (University  of California,  Berkeley,  July 1987). George A. Akerlof, Andrew K. Rose, Janet L.  Yellen  541 
the resources to do one's work, good financial  rewards, challenging 
work, and good relations with coworkers are each of approximately 
equal  importance  to workers.55 
The National  Longitudinal  Survey  of mature  men  provides  a rich  data 
set  for  studying  the  motivations  of American  workers.  This  panel  consists 
of 5,020 men aged between 45 and 59 in 1966.  The men were surveyed 
12  times  between 1966  and 1983.  Of  the four  original  cohorts  of the NLS, 
we have chosen the mature  men because this group had the greatest 
commitment  to the labor  force, thus simplifying  the analysis  by minimiz- 
ing the complications  involved in entry and reentry  into, and exit from, 
the labor  force. In comparison  with the other (younger)  cohorts of the 
NLS, turnover  due to "intrinisic"  matching  is likely to be small. 
For various subperiods, we classify respondents  by mover status. 
Our  analysis  distinguishes  five subgroups:  "stayers '-those  who stayed 
in the samejob  throughout  the period;  "wage-quitters"-those who quit 
their  base-yearjob  and  cited  wages  as the  primary  reason;  "  nonpecuniary 
quitters"-those  who quit  their  base-year  job for reasons related  to the 
job other  than  wages; "exogenous  quitters"  -those  who quit  for  reasons 
unrelated  to the job, such as health or family; and "job losers," who 
were laid off or discharged.56 
Table 5 presents a variety of indicators  of the importance  of nonpe- 
cuniary  factors  to the typical  mature  American  male,  classified  by mover 
status in 1966-67. In 1966, the NLS asked respondents  the question, 
"What  would you say is more important  about any  job; good wages or 
liking the work?" Seventy-three  percent of the population  responded 
that "liking  the work" was more important.  This view was shared  by 
the majority  of every mover  group.  The NLS also asked respondents  in 
1966, "If by  some chance you were to get enough money to live 
comfortably  without working,  do you think that you would work any- 
way?" On average, 77 percent of the men said that they would work 
55.  See Frank J. Landy and Don A. Trumbo, Psychology  of Work  Behavior,  rev. ed. 
(Dorsey Press, 1980),  for a survey of the evidence of the importance  of nonpecuniary 
rewards.  See also Robert  P. Quinn,  Graham  L. Staines, and Margaret  R. McCullough, 
Job Satisfaction: Is There a Trend?  Department of Labor, Manpower Research Monograph 
30 (GPO,  1974). 
56. To the maximum  extent possible, we have taken  account of multiple  transitions 
betweenjobs,  and  included  multiple  movers  in  the  analysis  only  when  the  motive  underlying 
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Table 5.  Attitudes toward Work in 1966 by 1966-1967  Mover Group 
Job quitters  by reasonb 
All  Job  Non-  Job 
Item  workers  stayersa  Wagesc  pecuniatyc  Exogenousc  losersb 
Fraction  reporting  that 
"liking  work is more 
important  than  wages"  0.73  0.74  0.85  0.66  0.67  0.56 
Fraction  "strongly 
committed"  to workd  0.77  0.76  0.88  0.87  0.78  0.81 
Fraction  who like their 
job "very much"  0.56  0.58  0.40  0.43  0.41  0.48 
Fraction  who dislike 
their  job "somewhat" 
or "very much"  0.08  0.06  0.12  0.22  0.20  0.08 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using data from the National  Longitudinal Survey  of Mature Men. 
a.  An individual is classified  as a stayer over  a given  subperiod if he is employed  in both the base- and terminal- 
year surveys  and never reports leaving his original employer  in any survey. 
b.  An individual is classified  as a wage-,  nonpecuniary-,  exogenous-quitter  or a job  loser  if he was  employed  in 
the base-year  and terminal-year surveys;  he reports leaving the base-year job  for the corresponding  reason and any 
reported departures from intervening jobs  are also for the corresponding  reason. 
c.  A quit is categorized  as Quit-wages if dissatisfaction  with wages  is reported as the major reason for leaving the 
job;  Quit-nonpecuniary  if the reported reason for leaving the job  was: type of work,  interpersonal reasons,  disliked 
hours or conditions,  or found better job;  Quit-exogenous  if the  reported reason for leaving  the job  was:  family or 
personal  reasons,  location,  moved,  health,  retirement, and other. 
d.  An  individual is classified  as  strongly committed  to work if he answers  that he would  work even  if by  some 
chance  he got enough money  to live comfortably  without working. 
even if they didn't  need the money.S7  When  asked why, 15.1  percent  of 
men indicated  that  they enjoyed  working,  liked  the specific  kind  of work 
they were currently  doing,  were "able" to work  or enjoyed  the compan- 
ionship; another  57.4 percent said they would be bored, suggesting a 
positive distaste  for leisure in large  amounts.58 
57. Comparable  results were obtained  from the Quality  of Employment  Survey. In 
1977,  for example,  71.5 percent  of 2,273 respondents  stated that  they would  continue  to 
work  if they were to get enough  money to live as comfortably  as they would  like for the 
rest of their  lives; 76.3 percent  disagreed  with the statement,  "I'd be happier  if I didn't 
have to work  at all." See Robert  P. Quinn  and Graham  L. Staines, The 1977  Quality  of 
Employment  Survey  (Ann  Arbor:  Institute  for Social  Research,  1979),  pp. 240-41. 
58. This preference  for work  over leisure  may  explain  why benefit  replacement  ratios 
can be very high  for a large  fraction  of the labor  force, yet institutional  forms have not 
developed  whereby  workers  collect  substantial  amounts  of unemployment  insurance  while 
enjoying  leisure.  In 1971,  30.4 percent  of the population  had  benefit  replacement  ratios  in 
excess of 70 percent  (see Feldstein,  "The Effect  of Unemployment  Insurance  on Tempo- 
rary  Layoff  Unemployment,"  p. 840),  while  unemployment  insurance  programs  paid  less 
than 1 percent of total wages and salaries (Economic  Report of the President,  1975, pp. 
266, 281). For the same reason, nonpecuniary  rewards  are likely to be relevant to an 
individual's  labor  force  participation  decision,  and  could  be incorporated  in equations  that 
estimate  the hours  of labor  that  individuals  choose to supply. George A. Akerlof, Andrew K. Rose, Janet L.  Yellen  543 
The NLS also attempted  to gauge  the level of total  job satisfaction  of 
employed respondents in most years, as well as the reasons for job 
satisfaction.  The following sequence of questions was used: "How do 
you feel about the job you have now? Do you like it very much?  fairly 
well? dislike it somewhat? or dislike it very much?" "What are the 
things  you like best about your  job? What  are the things  about your  job 
that  you don't  like?" In addition,  the survey  asked  respondents  to assess 
how their attitude toward their jobs had changed since the previous 
survey, with the questions "Would you say you like your present  job 
more, less, or about the same as (the  job you held) last year?" "What 
would you say is the main  reason that you like your present  job (more, 
less)?" 
Table 5 reports  the fractions of each mover group who were "very 
satisfied" and "somewhat or very dissatisfied" with their work. The 
primary  factors that account for the respondents'  level of satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction are reported, for the population as a whole, in 
table  6, which classifies  all of the factors  mentioned  by respondents  into 
two categories:  pecuniary  and  nonpecuniary.  Pecuniary  reasons  include 
earnings,  job security, steady work, and good fringe benefits. Nonpe- 
cuniary  factors  include,  for example,  kind  of work;  ability  or capacity  to 
do the work; feeling that work is important,  satisfying,  or challenging; 
interesting  work;  being  one's own  boss, having  responsibility;  not  having 
too much  pressure  or responsibility;  congenial  coworkers;  hours;  work- 
ing conditions; supervision; company policy; good union; meeting 
interesting  people. Table 5 reveals that the majority  of the population 
report  themselves to be "very satisfied." Nevertheless, a substantial 
number  of individuals  describe  themselves as dissatisfied.  The fraction 
of unhappy  workers  ranges  from  5.9 percent  of those who do not switch 
jobs, to 21.8 percent  for  those who later  did  switchjobs  for  nonpecuniary 
reasons. As is abundantly  apparent  from table 6, nonpecuniary  factors 
are mentioned  as the most important  features  of jobs, both positive and 
negative, across the entire range of the satisfaction spectrum. Over 
80 percent  of those who like theirjobs cite a nonpecuniary  reason  as the 
primary  cause of their  satisfaction.  Among  those who dislike  their  jobs, 
in over 80 percent  of the cases, the culprit  is nonpecuniary.9 
59. These  results  are  exactly  consistent  with  the  findings  of Lloyd  Reynolds  and  Joseph 
Shister  in their  study of 800 manual  workers  in New Haven in 1947.  Lloyd R. Reynolds 
and  Joseph  Shister,  Job Horizons:A  Stuldy  ofJob Satisfaction  and Labor Mobility (Harper 
and  Row, 1949);  see especially  table 1, p. 7. 544  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Table 6.  Fractions of Population Reporting Pecuniary and Nonpecuniary Factors in 
Job Satisfaction, 1966 
Workers  by level of job satisfaction 
All  Dislike  Dislike  Like  Like 
Item  workers  very much  somewhat  fairly well  very  much 
Factor liked most 
Nonpecuniarya  0.84  0.66  0.68  0.79  0.88 
Pecuniaryb  0.16  0.34  0.32  0.21  0.12 
Factor liked least 
Nonpecuniary  0.54  0.82  0.80  0.61  0.47 
Pecuniary  0.15  0.17  0.18  0.19  0.11 
'Nothing'c  0.31  0.01  0.02  0.20  0.42 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from the National  Longitudinal Survey  of Mature Men. 
a.  The following  categories  of response  to the factor liked best  were defined as nonpecuniary:  like kind of work; 
have ability or capacity to do work; work is important, satisfying,  challenging; type of work is interesting; own boss, 
independent; not much pressure or responsibility; work involves  responsibility;  seniority; hours; working conditions; 
supervision;  company  policy;  congenial  coworkers;  good union; keeps me busy; meet interesting people;  chance  for 
advancement.  The analogous  categories  were used in classifying  responses  to the factor liked least. 
b.  Pecuniary reasons  include earnings, job  security,  steady  work,  fringe benefits. 
c.  Respondent  could  not name anything disliked. 
According  to our model, the overall  level of job satisfaction  changes 
over time;  nonpecuniary  factors  contribute  in an important  way to shifts 
in  worker  satisfaction.  The  descriptive  statistics  reported  in  table  7 verify 
that these assumptions are reasonable. A significant  fraction of the 
population,  approximately  19  percent, experienced  a change  in attitude 
toward  their  job substantial  enough  for them to respond  that they liked 
their jobs either better or worse in 1967 than in 1966. As would be 
expected, the great majority  of job changers  experienced a change in 
attitude;  many stayers also experienced some change in satisfaction, 
including  a significant  number  whose level of satisfaction  declined. 
In the multiple-job  model  described  earlier,  two factors  determine  the 
level of overall  labor  reward:  wages and nonpecuniary  rewards.  Move- 
ments in both of these factors  potentially  contribute  to variations  in  job 
satisfaction  over time. Table 7 provides insight  into the relative  impor- 
tance of pecuniary  and  nonpecuniary  factors  as causes of changes  in  job 
satisfaction.  For  the  population  as a whole, 75.6 percent  of all  individuals 
who experienced  a change  in attitude  reported  that  the major  reason  for 
the change was nonpecuniary. Of those reporting  a more favorable 
attitude in 1967, 73.7 percent indicated a nonpecuniary  cause, while 
82.6  percent  of workers  with  lowerjob satisfaction  cited a nonpecuniary 
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Table 7.  Change in Attitude between 1966 and 1967 and Reasons for Change in Attitude 
by Mover Group 
Job quitters  by reason 
Non- 
Job stayers  Wages  pecuniary  Exogenous  Job losers 
Like  Like  Like  Like  Like  Like  Like  Like  Like  Like 
Item  more  less  more  less  more  less  more  less  more  less 
Fraction  of workers 
with change in 
attitude  0.11  0.06  0.81  0.00  0.66  0.09  0.47  0.16  0.36  0.18 
Reason  for change 
in attitude 
Nonpecuniary  0.76  0.87  0.24  n.a.  0.65  0.50  0.77  0.75  0.83  0.64 
Pecuniary  0.23  0.13  0.76  n.a.  0.35  0.50  0.23  0.25  0.17  0.36 
Source:  Authors' calculations  using data from the National  Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men. For a description 
of  group definitions,  see  notes  to  table 5.  For a description  of  pecuniary  and nonpecuniary  factors,  see  note  a to 
table 6. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
24 percent  believe that the major  reason  they like their  new  job more is 
nonpecuniary.  Clearly,  nonpecuniary  factors explain  much of the vari- 
ance in  job satisfaction  for individual  workers  over time. 
The attitudinal  patterns  that  characterize  mature  American  males are 
not atypical for the population as a whole. Herbert Parnes reports 
comparable  findings for young men.60  For example, 76.2 percent of 
young  men aged 16-24 state that  liking  the work is more  important  than 
good wages, and  a mere 12.9  (13.1)  percent  of young  men  cite pecuniary 
factors  as the thing  they like best (least)  about  theirjobs. The young  men 
are slightly less satisfied  with their  jobs overall than the mature  men: 
48.7 percent indicate that they like their current  job very much, while 
9.7 percent  report  that  they dislike  their  jobs somewhat  or very much. 
THE  SIZE  AND  VARIABILITY  OF  SPECIFIC  NONPECUNIARY 
REWARDS 
The previous section established the general importance  of nonpe- 
cuniary rewards as a determinant  of job satisfaction. However, our 
60. See Herbert  S. Parnes,  Robert  C. Miljus,  Ruth  S. Spitz, and Associates, Career 
Thresholds,  vol. 1,  Department  of Labor,  Manpower  Administration,  Manpower  Research 
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argument-that job switches enhance welfare, and that movements in 
nonpecuniary  rewards  generate  turnover-is  premised  on the assump- 
tion that there is an important  specific component to nonpecuniary 
rewards. More precisely, our variable x measures the difference in 
nonpecuniary  rewards  between the current  job and  otherjobs for which 
the worker  is qualified.  Nonpecuniary  rewards  to work could be large, 
but the  job-specific component  of these rewards  small, if, for example, 
the typical  worker  receives pleasure  from  working  because it makes  him 
or her feel socially useful, but all jobs for which a worker is qualified 
would  provide  this same psychic reward.  We thus need to establish  that 
there is an important  specific nonpecuniary  reward  to work-that  the 
typical worker  perceives qualitative  differences, either  positive or neg- 
ative, between his current  job and  others  for  which  he is qualified.  There 
are many possible reasons why a current  job might  not be regarded  as 
identical  to a similar  alternative  at another  firm:  feelings of appreciation 
or underappreciation  by colleagues or supervisors,  especially good or 
poor management,  personnel policies perceived as especially fair or 
unfair, and coworkers or bosses  regarded as especially amiable or 
disagreeable. 
An ideal measure  of the specific nonpecuniary  reward  realized  by a 
worker  would be the amount  that  the worker  would be willing  to pay to 
avoid a shift to another  job of the same generic type at a new  firm. A 
worker  who is willing  to pay to avoid switching  firms  is clearly  capturing 
surplus on his current  job. It turns out this ideal measure of specific 
nonpecuniary  rewards  is available  in the National  Longitudinal  Survey. 
In 1966  and 1971,  all employed  respondents  in the NLS were asked the 
following question: "Suppose someone IN THIS AREA offered you a 
job in the same line of work you're in now. What would the wage or 
salary  have to be for you to be willing  to take it?" If one subtracts  the 
current  wage from the respondent's answer, and then divides by the 
current wage (if multiplied by  100), the resulting number gives the 
percentage  increase in pay that the respondent  would require  to shift 
employment  to another  firm  in the same area in the same line of work. 
This can be used as a measure  of the individual's  specific  nonpecuniary 
reward, denoted NPR.  The question is specifically worded to avoid 
considerations  of geographical  mobility  or occupational  switches.61 
61. For a detailed  discussion  of this measure,  see Herbert  S. Parnes  and others, The 
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The Cross-Sectional  Distribution  of Nonpecuniary  Rewards.  How 
large are the specific nonpecuniary  rewards earned by mature male 
workers?  Of  the 4,012  mature  men answering  the question  in 1966,  1,854 
gave a precise numerical  response. For these individuals, the mean 
value of NPR was 36 percent, while the median  value was 25 percent. 
Ten percent  of these respondents  have negative  values of NPR, indicat- 
ing their willingness  to take pay cuts in order to switch  jobs. Another 
10  percent  of this group  required  a wage increase  in excess of 75 percent 
to switch  to a new firm.  An additional  2,158  men  were  unable  or unwilling 
to specify a precise figure. Their responses were grouped into the 
following  categories:  1,717  individuals  (42.8  percent  of total  respondents) 
said that they "would not take a job at any pay"; 181 respondents 
(4.5 percent)  said that  they "would take a steady  job at the same or less 
pay"; 47 respondents  (1.2 percent) said that they "would accept ajob 
offer"; and  213 responses were classified  as "other" or "don't know." 
Given the large group of individuals  expressing the sentiment that 
they "would not move at any pay" and the smaller  but still significant 
percentage  indicating  a willingness  to move at the same or less pay, it is 
clear  that  the characteristics  of the distribution  of NPR in the population 
would be distorted if one were to ignore respondents not giving a 
numerical  answer  to the question. 
One way of characterizing  the distribution  of NPR in the population 
as a whole is to use an arbitrary  but sensible method to convert the 
qualitative  responses given by so many respondents  into quantitative 
ones. We have done this in several ways. One simple scheme is as 
follows:  treat  individuals  who "would  not move at any  pay" as requiring 
a 100  percent  pay hike to move; treat individuals  who "would accept a 
steady  job at the same orless pay" and  also those who "would accept" 
as being  willing  to accept a 10  percent  pay cut; and  treat  other  responses 
as having  zero NPR on average.  This simple, but arbitrary,  aggregation 
scheme produces a distribution  of NPR in the population with the 
following characteristics:  the mean value of NPR is 54 percent; the 
median  value of NPR is 42.9 percent; 10 percent of the population  is 
1968),  pp. 147-68;  and Herbert  S. Parnes  and Ruth  S. Spitz, "A Conceptual  Framework 
for Studying  Labor  Mobility,"  Monthly  Labor  Review,  vol. 92 (November  1969),  pp. 55- 
58. Parnes  refers to this measure  as an index of "attachment"  and uses it to explain 
mobility  patterns.  A follow-up  question  asks  the  respondent  what  the  wage  or salary  would 
have to be for him to be willing to take a job in the same line of work in a different 
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willing  to accept a pay cut; and 1 percent would require  a pay increase 
in excess of 150  percent  to switchjobs. A more  conservative  aggregation 
scheme, for example assigning  a lower NPR value to those "unwilling 
to move at any wage," results in a reduction  in the mean of NPR.  It is 
noteworthy  that  the mean  value  of NPR exceeds the mean  nonpecuniary 
return generated by the simulation model, thus suggesting that the 
addition to  Okun's Law is  understated in the presentation of  our 
model.62 
The aggregation  scheme described  above is convenient  but arbitrary. 
Accordingly, in the statistical  analysis discussed below, we have also 
used a dummy  variable  approach,  in which qualitative  and quantitative 
answers are treated separately. It turns out, however, that all of the 
analysis is robust to the method used to measure NPR;  one cannot 
statistically  reject  the appropriateness  of the arbitrary  aggregation  scheme 
that we have chosen. 
Other  studies  provide  further  support  for the finding  that  a significant 
fraction  of workers  earn large positive specific nonpecuniary  rewards, 
but that a nonnegligible  number  of individuals  earn negative nonpecu- 
niary  rewards.  For example, Herbert  Parnes  and others found that the 
distribution  of nonpecuniary  rewards  for young men aged 16-24 in the 
NLS of 1966  was similar  to that of mature  men but with a lower mean, 
as would  be expected.63 In  a recent  survey  by the consulting  firm  Towers, 
Perrin,  Forster,  and  Crosby,  29 percent  of 10,000  employees sampled  in 
10  companies  said  that  they would  consider  taking  ajob elsewhere  at the 
same pay.64  A survey of middle managers  compiled by the National 
Institute  for Business Management  found  that  approximately  35 percent 
felt they "would  be happier  elsewhere," and  over three  quarters  of these 
62. The addition  to Okun's  Law is further  underestimated  in the section of our paper 
where  we present  our  model  if there  is a general,  as well  as a specific,  nonpecuniary  reward 
to work. 
63. Of young  men not in school, 22.4 percent  said  they "would  accept  at the same  or 
a lower wage"; 8.7 percent  indicated  a willingness  to move for a wage increase  less than 
10 percent;  43 percent  would accept for a wage increase of 10-50 percent;  9.9 percent 
indicated  a willingness  to move  for  a wage  increase  of more  than  50  percent;  and  16  percent 
said they would not accept at any conceivable wage; see Parnes, Miljus, Spitz, and 
Associates,  Career Thresholds, vol.  1, p. 151. 
64. See Towers,  Perrin,  Forster,  and  Crosby,  Inc., "The  National  Employee  Attitude 
Survey:  What  Employees  Think  About  Their  Jobs . . . Their  Supervisors  . . . And Their 
Employers"  (October  1987),  p. 7. George  A. Akerlof,  Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen  549 
gave a nonpecuniary  reason for their dissatisfaction.65  Twenty percent 
said  they would  be willing  to take a cut in pay to move.66 
The Variance of Nonpecuniary  Rewards  over  Time.  An important 
assumption  of our  model  is that  specific  nonpecuniary  rewards  vary  over 
time  for an individual  in a given  job. Our  benchmark  simulations  assume 
that  the standard  deviation  of the change  in the nonpecuniary  reward  (x) 
relative  to the mean  wage is 0.1. Is this assumption  realistic? 
In fact, statistics  from  the NLS show this assumption  to be conserva- 
tive. As mentioned above, data on NPR are available for employed 
individuals  for 1966 and 1971. For individuals  providing  a numerical 
answer  to the question in both years, the sample standard  deviation  of 
the change in NPR over the five-year period is 0.81. This implies an 
annual standard  deviation of NPR of 0.36 (0.81/Vs).  For individuals 
who stayed  in the samejob  over the five-year  period,  the annual  standard 
deviation  of the change  in NPR is 0.42. These figures  become substan- 
tially  larger  if one uses the aggregation  scheme  for converting  qualitative 
responses described above and somewhat smaller accounting  for the 
possibility  of white-noise  measurement  error.67 
65. National  Institute  for Business  Management,  "Personal  Report  for the Executive: 
Responses  to Survey  On  Middle  Managers,"  August  1, 1987,  p. 6. 
66. One  question  that  arises  in our  use of NPR as a measure  of nonpecuniary  rewards 
is the possibility  that  positive  values of NPR merely  indicate  the avoidance  of a one-time 
moving cost, rather  than a flow of nonpecuniary  returns  in the current  job. First and 
foremost,  the wording  of the question  was specifically  designed  to avoid such considera- 
tions. Further,  a number  of empirical  features  of NPR militate  against  this interpretation. 
First, the variance  of NPR over time would be zero if NPR reflected  a moving  cost; we 
show below that the variance  of NPR over time is large. Second, NPR would not be 
correlated  with satisfaction  in this event; in fact, as we show, NPR and wages are of 
comparable  importance  in explaining  satisfaction.  Third,  one would  not expect to observe 
negative values of NPR; in fact, the fraction of individuals  with negative NPR is in 
agreement  with our simulated  model. Fourth, one would not expect to see individuals 
switch  jobs for nonpecuniary  reasons, realizing  low or negative wage changes, if NPR 
merely  represents  an "exit fee"; in fact, there are many such individuals.  Finally, and 
most  important,  it is difficult  to rationalize  the enormous  size ofjob switching  by focusing 
solely on pecuniary  factors;  the existence of "exit fees" would  explain  why people  do not 
switch  jobs and  not why people  do switch  jobs so frequently. 
67. The calculation  of the annual standard  deviation is based on our theoretical 
assumption  that  increments  to  NPR  are  independent.  In  fact,  computation  of the  correlation 
between  the change  in NPR and its level in 1966  yields a statistically  significant  negative 
correlation  of 0.3. This implies  that  our calculation  overestimates  the standard  deviation 
of NPR. The negative  correlation  between NPR and the change in NPR could be due 
either  to measurement  error  in NPR or to a tendency  for NPR to behave in a slightly 550  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
The Causes and Consequences  of Quits 
Why do quits occur? Do quitters end up better off? What are the 
consequences of quitting  for wages and nonpecuniary  rewards? Our 
model  offers  predictions  concerning  all  of these questions.  The empirical 
analysis described in this section establishes the validity of  these 
predictions. 
Before turning to  this analysis, we  begin with a  review of  the 
antecedent  literature.  The next subsection  provides  an overview of our 
findings  concerning  the causes and consequences of quits for mature 
men in the National  Longitudinal  Survey. The final  subsection  presents 
our econometric  analysis  of quits  and subsequent  rewards.  Appendix  B 
analyzes the robustness  of these results. 
THE  PREVIOUS  LITERATURE 
The empirical  work that follows uses data  from the National Longi- 
tudinal  Survey  concerning  workers'  job satisfaction.  The very existence 
of the NLS is a consequence  of the work  of a generation  of labor  market 
scholars  whose studies of mobility  were based on interviews  primarily 
with  workers  and,  less commonly,  with  management  and  union  leaders.68 
autoregressive  fashion.  Assuming  that  the negative  correlation  is due solely to white-noise 
measurement  error  implies  that  the standard  deviation  of the change  in NPR for stayers  is 
0.29 instead  of 0.42 a year. 
68. See,  among others, Sumner H.  Slichter, The  Tlurnover of  Factoty  Labor 
(D. Appleton  and Company,  1919);  Clark  Kerr, "Migration  to the Seattle Labor  Market 
Area,  1940-1942,"  University of Washington Publications  in the Social Sciences  (August 
1942); Gladys  Louise  Palmer, Labor Mobility in Six Cities: A Report on the Slurvey of 
Patterns and Factors in Labor Mobility (Social Science Research Council, 1954);  Reynolds 
and Shister,  Job Horizons;  Margaret  Gordon,  "The Mobility  of San Francisco  Workers, 
1940-1949"  (University  of  California  Institute  of  Industrial  Relations,  Berkeley,  November 
1951);  Charles A. Myers and George P. Schultz, The Dynamics of  a Labor Market 
(Prentice-Hall,  1951);  Charles  A. Myers and W. Rupert  Maclaurin,  The Movement  of 
Factoty  Workers: A Study of a New  England Industrial Community,  1937-39 and 1942 
(Wiley & Sons, Inc.,  1943); Herbert S. Parnes, Research  on Labor Mobilitv: An Appraisal 
of  Research  Findings  in  the  United  States  (Social  Science  Research  Council,  1954); 
Reynolds,  The Structure of Labor Markets; E. Wight Bakke and others, Labor Mobility 
and Economic Opportunity  (Technology Press and John Wiley & Sons,  1954);  and 
W. S. Woytinsky,  Three  Aspects of Labor  Dynamics  (Social Science Research  Council, 
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There were two schools of thought  concerning  the causes of mobility: 
one was that workers pursue only pecuniary goals; the other, that 
workers' decisions were motivated by nonpecuniary  concerns. This 
work conclusively showed that a good fraction  of labor mobility, both 
voluntary  and  involuntary,  resulted  in wage losses. 
In his careful review of the literature, including five studies that 
specifically  involved  voluntary  shifts, Parnes  lists the  fraction  of workers 
taking  wage cuts.69  In a study  of New Haven  manual  workers,  52 percent 
of workers  quitting  their  jobs from 1945  to 1948  took a cut in their  gross 
weekly take-home pay.70  In a study of Fitchburg  workers voluntarily 
shifting  between  manufacturing  and  utilities  from  1937  to 1939,30  percent 
took a cut in hourly  earnings.7'  In a study  of Minneapolis  workers  mobile 
between 1947  and 1948,  32 percent  took a cut in hourly  wages;  from 1943 
to 1948, 11  percent  took a cut in hourly  wages.72  In a survey of workers 
in six different  cities, 19  percent  of voluntary  shifts  for "better  wages or 
advancement"  resulted  in wage cuts.73 
The common occurrence of  wage loss  in voluntary movements 
suggests that much  voluntary  movement  is for nonpecuniary  reasons, a 
conclusion supported also by Parnes's review of the literature. He 
tabulates  results  from  nine samples. Of these, the maximum  fraction  of 
workers reporting  voluntary separation  for wages or other economic 
reasons was 42 percent; the minimum  was 11 percent. Of the nine 
samples, the maximum fraction reporting voluntary separation for 
"intrinsic  nature  of job" or "human  relations  factors" was 61 percent 
and  the minimum  was 9 percent. (In the last sample  47 percent  reported 
leaving  for reasons  that  could not be classified  by Parnes  as either  wage 
or "nonpecuniary.")  Thus a significant  number  of extant studies have 
found  that  a sizable  fraction  of voluntary  separations  involves wage cuts 
and is motivated  by nonpecuniary  reasons. It is also important  to note 
that the questions we analyze from the National Longitudinal  Survey 
are not isolated curiosities  but are rather  the culmination  of 30 years of 
work  by scholars  who were, in two senses, in the field. 
69.  See Parnes, Research  on Labor Mobility, p. 176. 
70.  Reynolds,  The Structure of Labor Markets. 
71.  Myers and Maclaurin, Movement of Factoty  Workers. 
72. Herbert  G. Heneman,  Jr., Harland  Fox, and  Dale Yoder, "Patterns  of Manpower 
Mobility: Minneapolis, 1948," University of Minnesota Industrial  Relations Center 
Bulletin  No. 10,  pp. 1-28. 
73.  See Myers and Shultz, Dynamics  of a Labor Market. 552  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
The role of nonpecuniary  factors in explaining labor mobility has 
been emphasized  in more recent work using cross-sectional  data sets. 
Ann Bartel and George Borjas, using NLS data, have modeled the 
probability  that an individual  will quit his or her  job and have demon- 
strated  the significance  of job satisfaction  variables.74  Peter Gottschalk 
and Tim Maloney, Gregory  Duncan, and Martin  David have provided 
econometric  evidence of the role of nonpecuniary  factors in quit deci- 
sions using data  from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics.75  Richard 
Freeman  has estimated  quit  equations  in a variety  of cross sections and 
shown that the addition  of job satisfaction  measures  raises explanatory 
power.76  Finally, Bartel and Borjas  and Gottschalk  and Maloney have 
shown that quits lead to  significantly  greater improvements in job 
satisfaction than involuntary separations do, and Bartel and Borjas 
provide  evidence that  many  of these gains  are  nonpecuniary.77  Our  work 
is complementary  to that of these authors, although  our econometric 
methodology  differs  from  theirs. 
SUMMARY  OF  FINDINGS  FROM  THE  NLS  MATURE  MALE  SAMPLE 
Table 8 presents descriptive  statistics from the mature  male sample 
of the NLS concerning  the characteristics  of movers  and  stayers, as well 
as the gains they achieved in wages and total satisfaction  for various 
subperiods  between 1966  and 1971.  In certain  contexts, simple  descrip- 
74. See Ann P. Bartel,  "Wages,  Nonwage  Job Characteristics,  and  Labor  Mobility," 
Industrial and Labor Relations  Review,  vol.  35 (July 1982), pp. 578-89;  Ann Bartel and 
George  J. Borjas,  "Wage  Growth  and  Job  Turnover:  An Empirical  Analysis," in Sherwin 
Rosen, ed., Studies  in Labor  Markets  (University  of Chicago  Press, 1981),  pp. 65-90;  and 
Ann P. Bartel  and George  J. Borjas, "Middle-Age  Job Mobility:  Its Determinants  and 
Consequences,"  in Seymour  Wolfbein,  ed., Men in the Pre-Retirement  Years  (Temple 
University  Press, 1977),  pp. 39-97. 
75. See Peter  Gottschalk  and Tim  Maloney, "Involuntary  Terminations,  Unemploy- 
ment, and Job Matching:  A Test of Job Search  Theory," Journal  of Labor  Economics, 
vol. 3 (April 1985),  pp. 109-22;  Gregory  Duncan, "Nonpecuniary  Work  Rewards," in 
Morgan, ed., Five Thousand American Families:  Patterns of Economic Progress,  vol. 2; 
David, "The Dynamics  of Family Labor Supply  Decisions: Quitting  and Relocating  as 
Family  Unit  Decisions." 
76. See Richard  Freeman, "Job Satisfaction  as an Economic Variable,"  American 
Economic Review, vol. 68 (May 1978, Papers and Proceedings,  1977), pp. 135-42.. 
77. See Bartel  and  Borjas,  "Middle-Age  Job  Mobility";  and  Gottschalk  and  Maloney, 
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tive statistics  may  be misleading.  However, the econometric  analysis  of 
the next section shows that the picture of reality conveyed by these 
statistics is warranted.  In fact, the information  in table 8 provides an 
excellent summary  of our findings. 
Who  Quits and Why? As table 8 shows, 57 percent  of all quitters  in 
our sample reported  job-related motives for quitting. Approximately 
75 percent of this group were primarily  motivated by nonpecuniary 
reasons;  the remaining  25 percent  were primarily  concerned  with  wages. 
Individuals  with low base-year rewards, either pecuniary  or nonpecu- 
niary, have high propensities  to quit. In the econometric  model of the 
next section the probability  of ajob-related  quit  is seen to depend  on the 
sum of the individual's  wage (in excess of the mean of his alternatives) 
and his nonpecuniary  reward.  It is apparent  in table 8 that quitters  for 
nonpecuniary  reasons between 1966 and 1967 and between 1966 and 
1969  had significantly  lower nonpecuniary  income in 1966  than  a control 
group of  stayers.78  Similarly, wage-quitters had significantly lower 
base-period  wages than stayers in every subperiod. In several of the 
subperiods, wage-quitters  had below-average nonpecuniary  rewards, 
while nonpecuniary  quitters  also had below-average  wages. Indeed, as 
a group, the  job-related  quitters  had below-average  wage and nonpecu- 
niary  rewards,  as is consistent with our model. 
An individual's  expressed satisfaction  is a summary  statement  of his 
overall feelings about his job, and in principle  the level of satisfaction 
provides a measure  of an individual's  total reward  from work. Indeed, 
according  to the econometric  results of the next section, quit behavior 
depends  on the sum  of wage and  nonpecuniary  income;  and satisfaction 
is a monotonic, discrete function of this sum. In every year for which 
data  are available,  both subgroups  ofjob-related  quitters  (and  the group 
as a whole) described  themselves  as more  dissatisfied  with  theirjobs, on 
average, than the control group of  stayers. This correlation is not 
significant,  however, for every subgroup  in every subperiod. 
Do Quitters  Gain? According to table 8, job-related quits result in 
gains  in overall  labor  income. Two measures  of changes  in overall well- 
78. It is worthwhile  noting  that  while  the mean  NPR of nonpecuniary  job quitters  was 
significantly  below that of stayers, it is significantly  positive. This fact suggests  that this 
group  of quitters  most likely had ex ante information  that the nonpecuniary  rewards  in 
theirnewjobs  would  be higher.  In  contrast,  our  model  assumed  that  the  ex ante  expectation 
of the nonpecuniary  reward  on a new  job was zero forjobseekers. *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  * 
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being can be calculated  from data in the NLS; in most subperiods  only 
one of these measures is available, the 1969-71 period being the only 
exception. The first  measure  is the respondent's  answer  in the terminal 
year to a question asking whether he likes his current  job the same, 
more, or less than his job on the previous survey date. The second 
measure  is the difference  between the respondent's  satisfaction  level in 
his  terminal-year  interview  and  the  level of satisfaction  expressed  earlier, 
in the base-year  interview. The two measures  are not equally useful in 
assessing the gains from quitting: the first measure is conceptually 
superior  to the second. 
In answering the question that is the basis of the first measure (a 
question  asked in the terminal  year about  the respondent's  comparative 
well-being  in his current  and  previous  job), a mover  is likely to compare 
his current  feelings with those he had  immediately  prior  to his departure 
from his previous  job. In contrast,  the second measure  of gain takes as 
its base the mover's feelings about the base-year  job, not at the time of 
departure,  but at the time of the base-period  interview,  which may have 
occurred  well before departure.  In our model, opportunities  take time 
to appear;  therefore  on every survey  date some respondents  will already 
be dissatisfied  with their  jobs. These individuals  will be waiting for a 
chance to move. The dissatisfaction  of these respondents  would  accord- 
ingly  be registered  in their  base-year  answer  to the satisfaction  question. 
But if nonpecuniary  rewards are stochastic, as we assume, other re- 
spondents will become dissatisfied with their jobs subsequent to the 
base-year  survey; a fraction  of this latter  group  will succeed in moving 
prior  to the terminal-year  survey. During  the period  between  interviews, 
the first group quit  jobs considered unsatisfactory  at the time of their 
base-year  interview. In contrast, the second group  left  jobs with which 
they became unhappy  only after the base-period  interview  took place. 
In terms of our model, the first  group  already  had a low x at the time of 
their base-year interview, and this second measure of the change in 
satisfaction  should show an improvement;  however, the second group 
experienced negative shocks to x after their base-year interview, and 
thus they are likely to appear less  satisfied according to this same 
measure even if their job switch actually raised their nonpecuniary 
reward. 
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records  changes  in satisfaction  between interview  dates, is ambiguously 
signed;  at a minimum,  it gives an underestimate  of the gains  from  quits. 
This underestimate  increases with the length of the period between 
interviews. Indeed, for the long period, 1966-71, there is no significant 
difference in the 1966 level of NPR  between job-related quitters and 
stayers. 
Our  preferred  measure  of the gains  from  ajob-related  quit  is available 
for the periods 1966-67, 1967-69, and 1969-71. In each of these sub- 
periods, both wage-quitters  and nonpecuniary  quitters experienced a 
significantly  greater increase in satisfaction  than the control group of 
stayers did. The differences are, in all instances, significant  at the 1 
percent  level. Our  less preferred  index  of change  in  satisfaction  is available 
for 1966-69, 1969-71, and, for job switchers only, for 1966-67. The 
hypothesis that movers gain is also supported, albeit as we expect, 
with lower statistical  significance,  using this measure. For the periods 
1966-69 and 1969-71 both job-related quitter groups achieved larger 
gains in satisfaction than stayers. The differences for  1966-69 are 
significant  at the 1 percent significance  level; for the period 1969-71 
the gain for wage quitters is statistically  insignificant.  For the period 
1966-67  both  job-related  quitter  groups  register  improvements  in satis- 
faction. A comparable  figure  is unavailable  for stayers;  however, in all 
other periods for which data are available, stayers registered  a decline 
in satisfaction  according  to this measure. 
Why  Do Quitters Gain?  Table  8 provides  evidence that  higher  wages 
are neither the exclusive goal nor the inevitable consequence of job- 
related  quits.  No single  subperiod  has a statistically  significant  difference 
between the wage gains of nonpecuniary  quitters  and those of stayers. 
For three of the four subperiods,  the average  gain  in wages was slightly 
higher  for nonpecuniary  quitters than for stayers. However, in each 
subperiod,  a significant  fraction  of nonpecuniary  quitters  took nominal 
wage  cuts: 32.8  percent  in 1966-67;  16.5  percent  in 1966-69;  16.3  percent 
in 1967-69;  and  30.6  percent  in 1969-71.  In  contrast,  the  farless numerous 
wage-quitters  did  indeed  achieve  wage  gains;  this  group  had  significantly 
higher  wage gains than stayers in every subperiod.  These results are in 
close accord with the predictions of our multiple-job  model. In the 
baseline  simulations  of that model with a 5 percent  unemployment  rate, 
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same wage; and 72.8 percent  involved wage increases. Moreover,  job- 
related quits occurred more frequently among individuals receiving 
below-average  wages and nonpecuniary  rewards. 
Exogenous  Quitters  and  Job  Losers.  Our theoretical  model  and 
empirical  work  focus primarily  on the causes and consequences of job- 
related quits. Table 8, however, provides information  as well on the 
characteristics  of individuals  who quit  their  jobs for exogenous reasons 
or who experienced  involuntary  job loss. These findings  are worthy of 
brief  discussion. 
Exogenous quitters include all individuals employed in both the 
base and terminal  interviews who left their base-year  job because of 
family or personal reasons, location, moving, health, retirement,  and 
"other." These exogenous quitters  appear  remarkably  similar  in their 
characteristics  to the group  of nonpecuniary  quitters  although  the differ- 
ences between them and the stayers are considerably  less pronounced. 
Exogenous  quitters  report  insignificantly  lower  base-year  nonpecuniary 
rewards  but significantly  lower satisfaction  than  stayers.  In every period 
this group took a significant  cut in pay in comparison  with those who 
remained  in the same job and, like the job-related quitters, reported 
themselves  more  satisfied  on average  following  their  moves. This  finding 
is not surprising;  consider  the situation  of individuals  who cite health  as 
their reason for quitting  (a large  fraction  of this sample).  An individual 
in poor health, whose work requires  physical exertion, is likely to feel 
dissatisfied  with  hisjob. An improvement  in satisfaction  and,  most  likely, 
a cut in pay are  the expected consequences  of a switch  to less physically 
demanding  labor.  Because the individual's  dissatisfaction  is not with his 
firm  but rather  with his occupation, the individual  may report a base- 
year value of NPR-the  specific nonpecuniary  reward-close  to the 
population  average. 
The statistics in table 8 concerning  job losers are at first glance 
surprising:  they suggest that job losers suffer small losses.  In every 
period  summarized  in table  8,  job losers experienced  lower  wage growth 
than stayers, but the differences  are not statistically  significant.  When 
questioned  ex post, the job losers more frequently  report  being better 
off than the control group  of stayers. And before losing their  jobs, this 
group appears  dissatisfied, reporting  significantly  lower nonpecuniary 
rewards  and satisfaction  than  the control  group  of stayers. Upon reflec- 
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that are soon to be terminated  are unhappy, either because they are 
aware  that  they are soon to be laid  off or because their  firm's  ill fortunes 
affect work conditions. When workers  reflect on their feelings toward 
their  old and  new  jobs after  they have gained  employment,  they consider 
themselves lucky to be employed in a job that is less insecure. Our 
findings  concerning  nonpecuniary  rewards  and  job losers mirror  those 
of Christopher  Ruhm  concerning  wages.79  He found that  job losers with 
one to nineteen  years of tenure  in the Panel  Study of Income Dynamics 
did not lose earnings  following  permanent  layoff. 
BENCHMARK  ECONOMETRIC  RESULTS 
Our  model has emphasized  the importance  of nonpecuniary  rewards 
as a significant  component  ofjob satisfaction,  and  therefore  of a worker's 
propensity to quit. However, we have not yet rigorously tested the 
hypotheses that  both pecuniary  and nonpecuniary  returns  are relevant, 
and equally so, in determining  both quit decisions and worker  satisfac- 
tion. This section of the paper formally tests these hypotheses. The 
nonrejection  of these hypotheses suggests that NPR is a good measure 
of the flow  of nonpecuniary  rewards,  corresponding  to x in the theoretical 
model. 
We focus on the first  five years of data  from  the cohort  of mature  men 
of the NLS to minimize  the effects of "truncation  bias" due to dropouts 
from the sample  and due to permanent  departures  from the labor  force 
because of retirement  and  death. 
The Empirical Framework.  The two  preceding  hypotheses  can be 
tested  withjust  two  equations.  "  Separation"  equations  link  quit  behavior 
to the pecuniary  and  nonpecuniary  returns  to work  and  to the unemploy- 
ment  rate. "Satisfaction"  equations  relate  worker  satisfaction  to pecu- 
niary  and  nonpecuniary  rewards. 
The basic separation  equation  to be estimated  takes the form: 
(12)  P(Qi,)  = f[(NPRc  - 
NPRit),  (WC  -  Wit)  Uit]  +  Eit, 
where  P(Qit) is the probability  that  individual  i will quit  the  job he holds 
at time t over a  specified period thereafter; NPRc  represents the 
79. See Christopher  J. Ruhm, "Seniority,  Experience,  and Earnings"  (Boston Uni- 
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nonpecuniary  reward  in the currentjob;  NPRi, is the mean  nonpecuniary 
reward in alternative  jobs for which the individual is qualified; Wc 
denotes the pecuniary  reward  in the current  job; Wit  denotes the mean 
pecuniary  reward  in alternativejobs  for which  the individual  is qualified; 
uit is a measure of labor market slack; and E denotes a white-noise 
disturbance.80 
According to our theoretical model, individuals  are always on the 
lookout for superior  jobs and will accept any job with a higher total 
reward. The probability  of receiving such an offer during  a specified 
interval  depends  on the individual's  relative  position in the distribution 
of total  rewards  and  the degree  of slack  in the labor  market.  Accordingly, 
the separation  equation  lets the probability  of a job-related  quit depend 
negatively on the worker's current  reward  from work relative to the 
mean  reward  in  alternativejobs  and  the unemployment  rate.  In  principle, 
pecuniary and nonpecuniary  rewards are of equal importance  to the 
worker's  decision;  we shall  test this hypothesis. 
The satisfaction  equation  takes the form 
(13)  SAit =  g (WC, NPR  )  +  9 it, 
where  SA denotes the level of worker  satisfaction  and  -q  is a white-noise 
disturbance  representing  a composite of additional  factors  affecting  the 
individual's  level of well-being. Clearly, both pecuniary  and nonpecu- 
niary rewards should have a positive (and in our theoretical model, 
equal)  effect on worker  satisfaction. 
The regressands  of both the separation  and the gain equations are 
discrete variables.  Individuals  either quit their  jobs or do not; the NLS 
data on job  satisfaction classify workers as liking their jobs  very 
much or fairly well or disliking  their  jobs somewhat  or very much. In 
consequence, all equations  will be assumed to be linear  and estimated 
with  maximum  likelihood,  limited-dependent  variable  techniques  unless 
otherwise  noted. 
Benchmark  Results  on  Separations.  Estimation  of  the  separation 
equation  requires  measures  of the current  pecuniary  and nonpecuniary 
rewards  of the worker,  not in levels, but  as (percentage)  deviations  from 
the rewards  that  the worker  could  earn  in otherjobs. The variable  NPR, 
80. In addition  to the unemployment  rate,  the rate  of autonomous  vacancy  creation  in 
the individual's  labor  market  should  also be included  in equation  12. Unfortunately,  we 
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defined  above as the amount  that the worker  would be willing  to pay to 
avoid  having  to shift  to anotherjob  of the same  generic  type but at a new 
firm, provides the required measure of the "excess"  nonpecuniary 
reward  in the current  job. This measure  is available  for the years 1966 
and 1971. 
Estimation  of the separation  equation, equation 12, also requires  a 
measure of the average pecuniary  reward  potentially available to the 
worker in other jobs. To provide an observable counterpart  for this 
variable,  we initially  hypothesize  that average  earnings  are given by 
(14)  Wit=  h(HKit)  +  it, 
where  IlK denotes the human  capital  and  other  personal  characteristics 
of individual  i at time t, and F  denotes a white-noise disturbance  that 
affects the earnings,  of individual  i.8' 
Substitution of equation 14 into equation 12 yields an estimable 
equation: 
(15)  P(Qit)  = f'[NPRit,  W1c,  HKit, uit] +  E' 
Table  9 reports  estimations  of this  equation  over two sample  periods- 
1966-67 and 1966-69. The sample was restricted  to include only wage 
and salary workers who were employed in both the base year of 1966 
and  the terminal  year  of either 1967  or 1969;  only those who meaningfully 
answered  the relevant  questions in the base-year  and terminal  surveys 
were included.  The dependent  variable  is a binary  variable,  equal  to one 
if the individual  quit between the base- and terminal-year  surveys one 
or more times for any job-related  reason (whether  the primary  reason 
for  quitting  was dissatisfaction  with  wages or with  nonpecuniary  aspects 
of the  job),82  and  equal  to zero if the individual  remained  in the same  job 
81. Conceivably,  wages may be set as compensating  differentials  for specific  nonpe- 
cuniary  returns.  Firms,  noticing  that individuals  who receive high  nonpecuniary  returns 
are less liable  to quit, could exploit this fact by lowering  pecuniary  rewards.  In this case 
NPR would affect wages; our theoretical  assumption  that wages are exogenous with 
respect  to NPR would  be inappropriate.  We have tested for this possibility  and  find  that 
NPR does not significantly  affect  the individual's  wage  rate  (or  the difference  between  the 
individual's  current  and  mean  alternative  wage  controlling  for  human  capital  and  personal 
characteristics).  We thus  find  no evidence  of compensating  differentials  of this type. 
82. This group  includes  all individuals  previously  defined  as wage-quitters  and non- 
pecuniary  quitters,  as well as any individuals  with  multiple  quits, some of which  were  due 
to wage  and  some of which  were due to nonpecuniary  causes;  these individuals  could  not 
be classified  either  as wage  or nonpecuniary  quitters  for  the relevant  period. 562  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Table 9.  Probit Estimates of the Benchmark Separation Equation,  1966-67 
and 1966-69a 
Period 
1966-67  1966-69 
Independent  variable  Coefficientb  Semielasticity  Coefficientb  Semielasticity 
Constant  2.39  (1.25)  .  .  .  3.95  (1.14)  ... 
Current wage  -  0.43  (0.17)  -0.019  -  0.66  (0.15)  -0.060 
NPR  -  0.39  (0.16)  -0.017  -  0.39  (0.14)  -  0.035 
Local  unemployment  -  0.003  (0.004)  -  0.0001  -  0.002  (0.004)  -  0.0002 
Education  -  0.05  (0.03)  .  .  .  - 0.03  (0.03) 
Experience  -  0.02  (0.02)  .  .  .  -  0.04  (0.01) 
Race  -  0.48  (0.18)  .  .  .  -  0.42  (0.15)  ... 
Health  -  0.12  (0.46)  ..  .  0.10  (0.33)  ..  . 
House  -  0.25  (0.16)  .  .  .  -0.16  (0.13)  ... 
Married  -0.12  (0.21)  .  .  .  0.32  (0.24)  ... 
City  0.04  (0.16)  ...  -0.05  (0.13) 
South  -  0.22  (0.32)  . ..  -  0.34  (0.28) 
Summary statistic 
Number of observations  1766  1419 
McFadden's  R2  0.07  0.07 
Fraction correct  0.98  0.95 
Hypothesis  testc 
Slopes  (11)  28.32**  43.69** 
Rewards (2)  12. 10**  27.82** 
Equal (1)  0.04  1.98 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using data from the National  Longitudinal Survey  of Mature Men. 
a.  The dependent  variable is  I if the individual quit his job  one or more times during the period for a job-related 
reason and 0 otherwise. 
b.  Standard error in parentheses. 
c.  Slopes  tests the hypothesis  that all coefficients  are equal to zero; Rewards tests that the wage and nonpecuniary 
reward (NPR)  are equal to zero;  Equal tests  that the wage and NPR  coefficients  are identical.  Degrees  of freedom 
in parentheses. 
over the specified interval. Exogenous quitters and job losers were 
initially  excluded from the sample. In accord with the binary  nature  of 
the dependent  variable,  probit  analysis  is used for the estimation. 
The log of the 1966  hourly wage is used as a measure  of WC.83  The 
local area unemployment  rate in 1967  is used for u although,  as noted 
83. The regressors  in equation 12 measuring  pecuniary  rewards  in the current  and 
alternative  jobs should  reflect  permanent  wage income.  This  distinction  is unimportant  in 
our  data  set. Bartel  and  Borjas,  using  the mature  male  cohort  of the NLS, have shown  that 
a separation  changes  only the intercept  and not the slope of the wage profile.  That is to 
say, individuals  experience  a change  in the level of their  wage  following  a separation,  but 
not in the rate of growth  of their wage. See Bartel  and Borjas, "Wage  Growth  and Job 
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above, a proper  measure  would also control  for the exogenous vacancy 
creation  rate  in  the individual's  labor  market;  for  NPR, the nonpecuniary 
reward  as a fraction  of the wage, the measure  described  in the section 
on the importance  of nonpecuniary  income is used. This measure  con- 
verts qualitative  responses to quantitative  ones with the simple aggre- 
gation  scheme as previously  described.  A variety  of variables  was used 
to control  for differences  in human  capital  and  personal  characteristics: 
years  of education;  years  of labor-force  experience;  a race  dummy  (equal 
to unity for nonwhites);  a health dummy  (equal to unity if poor health 
limited  work);  a house ownership  dummy  (equal  to unity  if the individual 
owned his house); a marriage  dummy  (equal to unity if the individual 
was married);  a city dummy  (equal  to unity if the individual  lived in an 
SMSA  or suburbs);  and  a Southern  dummy  (equal  to unity  if  the  individual 
was a resident  in the East-South  Central  census district).  Values  for 1966 
are used throughout. 
Estimates  of equation  15  for the sample  periods 1966-67  and 1966-69 
are given in table 9; both coefficient estimates and semi-elasticities 
(for continuous variables), evaluated at sample means, are reported. 
The semi-elasticity  is the effect of a 1  percent  change  in the regressor  on 
the probability  that  the individual  quits  (thus, a 1  percent  increase  in the 
wage lowers the probability  of ajob-related  quit  between 1966  and 1967 
by 1.9 percent, for example, from 0.5 to 0.481). Standard  errors  of the 
coefficients  are reported  in parentheses. 
A variety of diagnostic statistics are reported: "McFadden's R2" 
is the percentage  increase in the log of the likelihood  function due to 
the inclusion of the regressors;  it is worth noting that this measure is 
very different  from the percentage of correct predictions ("Fraction 
Correct"),  which is also reported.84 
Three-  chi-squared likelihood-ratio  tests  are reported. The first, 
"Slopes," is a test of the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to 
84. McFadden's  R2  is defined  as 1 -  [1(3)/  I  ()],  where 1(t) is the log of the likelihood 
function  under the hypothesis that all the slopes are zero, and 1(,B)  is the log of the 
maximized  likelihood  when the coefficients are unrestricted.  The "Fraction  correct" 
measure  denotes the percentage  of matches  between  the prediction  of the model  and  the 
actual  outcome;  a match  occurs  when  the model  indicates  that  the  individual  was expected 
to and actually  did quit (or remained  in his job). See Takeshi Amemiya, "Qualitative 
Response  Models:  A Survey,"  Journal  of Economic  Literature,  vol. 19  (December  1981), 
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zero; the degrees of freedom  are reported  in parentheses.  The second, 
"Rewards,"  is a test of the hypothesis  that  the coefficients  on the NPR 
and W  variables  are both equal to zero. The third, "Equal," is a test of 
the hypothesis  that  the coefficients  on NPR and W  are equal. 
The nonpecuniary  reward  has a negative  and  significant  impact  on the 
probability  that an individual  quits his job; individuals  who state that 
their specific nonpecuniary  rewards are high evidently manifest their 
beliefs in subsequent  actions. The pecuniary  return  also has a negative 
and significant  effect on the probability  that an individual  will subse- 
quently quit. Our  model predicts  that the coefficients on the wage and 
NPR should  be equal.  The  coefficients  on the  pecuniary  return  are  similar 
to those on the nonpecuniary  reward,  and the hypothesis that the two 
are equal cannot be statistically rejected. Both reward variables are 
clearly relevant;  the hypothesis that both coefficients are zero can be 
rejected  easily. 
The local unemployment  rate has a negative  but insignificant  impact 
on the probability  that an individual  quits. It should be recalled that 
differences  in local unemployment  rates  provide  an  inadequate  indicator 
of the differences  in individuals'  chances of receiving  job offers because 
the rates of exogenous vacancy creation  are likely to differ  across cities 
as well as the unemployment  rates. It is therefore  not surprising  that  this 
effect is not significant.  In this context, it is worth  recalling  that  the data 
linking  quit and unemployment  rates by city are consistent with these 
results: the relation  between quits and unemployment  rates is weakly 
negative  and occasionally  positive in cross section, but unambiguously 
and strongly  negative  for all cities across time. 
The robustness  of the results  in table  9 has been extensively checked. 
For instance, we  have used different measures of the regressand, 
including  job losers and individuals  who quit for exogenous reasons in 
our nonmover  control  group. We have also used different  measures of 
the nonpecuniary  reward, including  a quantitative  measure for those 
who gave a numeric response and dummy variables for the various 
categories of qualitative  response. The results are insensitive to the 
measurement  of NPR: the hypothesis  that  the simple  aggregation  scheme 
used to construct the benchmark  NPR  measure  is consistent with the 
data  cannot  be rejected  with a likelihood  ratio  test.85  We have also used 
85. NPR is used as a measure  of the difference  between  the nonpecuniary  reward  on 
the current  job and on alternative  jobs. This ignores the possibility  of an occupation- George  A. Akerlof,  Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen  565 
a variety  of different  human  capital  controls, including,  for instance, the 
squares  of education  and  experience, and  controls  for nationality.  None 
of our  results  is sensitive to such perturbations  in technique. 
In summary,  nonpecuniary  and pecuniary  rewards  are relevant, and 
indeed  equally  relevant,  for quit  decisions. 
Benchmark Results  on Satisfaction.  Estimation  of equation  13 re- 
quires  an observable  counterpart  to the level of worker  satisfaction,  SA. 
We use the answers  previously  described  to the NLS question  "How do 
you feel about the job you have now? Do you like it very much, like it 
fairly well, dislike it somewhat, dislike it very much?" scaled from 1 
(most satisfied)  to 4 (most dissatisfied).  We use our single quantitative 
measure  of NPR as a measure  of the nonpecuniary  reward  and the log 
of the  hourly  wage  to measure  pecuniary  rewards.  Because  the  dependent 
variable has four possible discrete values, an appropriate  estimation 
technique  is multinomial  logit. 
Multinomial  logit estimates  of the satisfaction  equation,  equation 13, 
for the years 1966  and 1971  are presented  in table 10.  These are the only 
two years for which data on both the level of satisfaction and the 
nonpecuniary  reward  are  available.  Semi-elasticities  measure  the  change 
in the probability  that  an individual  reports  a particular  satisfaction  level 
instead of  "like job very much" due to a  1 percent change in the 
regressors.  For example, according  to table 10, a 1 percent  higher  wage 
rate  in 1966  reduces  the probability  that  a respondent  "likes hisjob fairly 
well" instead  of "very much"  by 0.0008. Likelihood  ratio  tests (distrib- 
uted as chi-squares  under  the null hypothesis with degrees of freedom 
listed in parentheses) are tabulated for four hypotheses: all of the 
coefficients are zero (Slopes); all of the nonpecuniary  coefficients are 
zero (NPR); all of the pecuniary  coefficients are zero (Wage);  and the 
coefficients on the pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards are equal 
(Equal). 
Both pecuniary  and nonpecuniary  factors are relevant  in explaining 
worker  satisfaction.  The hypothesis that both pecuniary  and nonpecu- 
niary  rewards  arejointly  insignificant  determinants  of worker  satisfaction 
can be easily rejected;  the same is true of pecuniary  and nonpecuniary 
specific  nonpecuniary  reward;  there is no reason  to expect such an occupation-specific 
reward  to be correlated  with NPR. We test for this possibility  by including  occupation 
dummies  in our  separation  equation;  the dummies  are  jointly insignificant  and  none of the 
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Table 10.  Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Benchmark Satisfaction Equation,  1966 
and 1971 
1966  1971 
Independent  variable  Coefficient  a  Semielasticity  Coefficient  a  Semielasticity 
Effect  on probability  of responding  "like fairly  well" 
rather than  "like very much" 
Constant  2.84  (0.54)  ...  4.98  (0.89)  . 
Current  wage  -0.53  (0.10)  - 0.0008  - 0.77  (0.15)  - 0.0024 
NPR  -0.63  (0.11)  - 0.0009  - 0.57  (0.14)  - 0.0018 
Effect  on probability  of responding  "dislike somewhat" 
rather than  "like very much" 
Constant  2.11  (1.14)  .  .  .  -  0.69  (1.70)  ... 
Current  wage  - 0.73  (0.21)  - 0.0010  -0.12  (0.28)  - 0.0004 
NPR  -1.05  (0.26)  -0.0015  -1.01  (0.27)  -0.0032 
Effect on probability of responding  "dislike very much" 
rather than  "like vety much" 
Constant  2.48  (1.80)  .  .  .  -  3.30  (3.68) 
Current  wage  - 0.99  (0.33)  - 0.0014  - 0.69  (0.61)  - 0.0022 
NPR  -0.95  (0.42)  -  0.0014  -1.58  (0.56)  -0.0050 
Summaiy  statistic 
Number  of observations  1882  912 
McFadden's  R2  0.03  0.04 
Fraction  correct  0.57  0.55 
Hypothesis  testb 
Slopes  (6)  87.25**  64.28** 
NPR (3)  46.4**  30.62** 
Wage (3)  43.00**  30.22** 
Equal (3)  1.4  11.08** 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  data  from  the  National  Longitudinal  Survey  of  Mature Men.  See  text  for 
description  of variables and test statistics. 
a.  Standard error in parentheses. 
b.  For definition of Slopes and Equal tests,  see table 9, note c. NPR test determines whether all of the nonpecuniary 
coefficients  are zero.  Wage tests  that all of the pecuniary coefficients  are zero.  Degrees  of freedom in parentheses. 
rewards  individually.  The coefficients on pecuniary  and nonpecuniary 
rewards  are strikingly  similar;  equality  of the effects cannot  be rejected 
for 1966.  The hypothesis of equality  can, however, be rejected in 1971 
because the nonpecuniary  rewards  have larger  effects on worker  satis- 
faction than do the pecuniary  effects. These results are insensitive to 
our use of the aggregate  measure  of NPR.86 
86. We have also used deviations  of the actual  wage  from  the mean  wage  in estimating 
this equation  with identical  results. Inclusion  of occupation  dummies  in the satisfaction 
equation does not affect any substantive  conclusion of our analysis. However, the 
occupation  dummies  are  jointly significant  in the satisfaction  equation, suggesting  that 
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In summary, the benchmark results suggest unambiguously  that 
specific nonpecuniary  rewards  are highly  relevant in determining  both 
worker  satisfaction  and  quit  probabilities. 
While the benchmark  results on both separations  and satisfaction 
support  the theoretical  model, several problems  potentially  affect the 
results. Appendix B focuses on a variety of such issues: most impor- 
tantly, individual-specific  intercepts ("fixed effects"); cross-equation 
correlations  between the disturbances  in the separation  and satisfaction 
equations;  heteroskedasticity;  and truncation  bias. None of these con- 
siderations  alters the central conclusions drawn from the benchmark 
results. 
Conclusions 
This paper  has presented  a simple  model  of the labor  market  with  job 
rationing.  The analysis  emphasizes  the role of nonpecuniary  rewards  to 
work. The model easily reproduces  the most important  stylized facts of 
the American labor market:  most quits are from one job to another 
without  an intervening  spell of unemployment;  quits are cyclic because 
vacancy  chains  are  longer  and  thus  job opportunities  are  more  abundant 
in a high-pressure  economy; most job quits do not involve large wage 
increases;  most  job quits  do result  in significant  nonpecuniary  gains;  quit 
rates  vary inversely  with wage rates;  workers'  quit  probabilities  decline 
with  job tenure;  there exists an inverse relationship  between vacancies 
and unemployment.  According  to the model, Okun's Law understates 
the benefits  of running  a high-pressure  economy. 
Empirically,  we have shown that  the assumptions  and  predictions  of 
the model  -regarding  the nature  of turnover,  the existence of rents, and 
the causes and consequences of quits are realistic. In this last regard, 
we have verified  the importance  of nonpecuniary  returns  for quits. As 
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APPENDIX  A 
Labor Turnover  in a Real Business  Cycle Model 
THIS APPENDIX derives the short-run  and long-run  implications  of a two- 
sector  real  business  cycle model  for  labor  market  turnover  and  discusses 
why such models do not possess vacancy chains. The geometry  of the 
model is presented  in figure  A-  1. 
There are two employment  activities, denoted A and B; there is a 
fixed cost of working in each sector, denoted [LA and  LB.  A given 
individual  i can produce  either  EA  in sector  A or EB  in sector  B; thus, each 
individual  can be represented  by a point in figure  A- 1. Finally, let there 
be any arbitrary  joint distribution  of Ei  and EB  in the population. 
Each  individual  chooses whether  to work  in sector  A or  B or to remain 
out of the labor force. The individual's  net reward from working in 
sector  A is EA -  [LA;  the net reward  from  working  in sector  B is EB -  [LB. 
Individual  i works in A (B) if the net reward  from working  in sector 
A (B) is positive and in excess of the reward  from working  in B (A). 
Individuals  whose productivities  in both sectors are  lower  than  the fixed 
costs of working  choose to remain  out of the labor  force. Graphically, 
individuals  with (EA,  EB) in the area labeled A (to the right of the line 
through  [LACD) work in sector A; those in the area labeled B (above 
IIBCD) work in sector B; those in the area labeled OL (the rectangle 
O[LAC[LB) remain  out of the labor  force. 
We now use our model to examine both the steady-state  and short- 
run implications  of a permanent  negative productivity  shock. In our 
model, a negative  productivity  shock corresponds  to an increase in the 
cost of working (either [LA or [LB, or both, increase); this leads to a 
decrease in total employment. By way of illustration,  dashed lines in 
figure A-1 illustrate  the impact of a negative shock that affects only 
sector  A, increasing  [LA  to WLA* 
In the short  run, a negative  productivity  shock causes an immediate 
surge in quits in a real business cycle model for two reasons. First, 
individuals  voluntarily  leave the labor  force (those in area  ACC'  A in 
figure  A-1);  second, if the shock affects sectors  A and  B unequally,  quits 
rise as workers  reallocate  themselves across sectors in response to the 
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Figure A-1.  A Two-Sector Real Business Cycle Model 
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area  DCC'D' switch out of sector  A and into sector  B.) This implication 
of the real  business cycle model  is counterfactual;  in reality, as we have 
shown, an increase in the aggregate  unemployment  rate or a reduction 
in the aggregate  employment  rate reduces both quits and total separa- 
tions. Positive productivity shocks (a decrease in [LA or [B  or both) 
similarly  cause a short-run  surge  in  E-E  quits  due  to sectoral  reallocations 
of labor;  however, the first  effect (E-O quits) is absent subsequent  to a 
positive  shock. 
Next, consider the impact of a negative productivity  shock on the 
steady-state  quit  rate  after  a new equilibrium  allocation  of labor  has been 
attained.  The shock turns  out to have an ambiguous  impact  on the total 
steady-state  quit rate. We assume that steady-state quits occur as a 
consequence  of small  random  individual  taste or productivity  shocks. 
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be close to the margin  of indifference  between working  in sector A or 
dropping  out of the labor  force; similarly,  individuals  on or near  the line 
AIBC  are close to indifferent  between working  in sector  B or being  out of 
the labor  force. We denote the number of agents on these margins  MAO 
and MBO.  Random  changes in preferences or productivities  of agents 
near these margins  will result both in quits out of the labor  force and in 
accessions as agents withdraw  from or enter employment. We assume 
that  quits  and  accessions are  equal  in a steady  state. The  number  of these 
quits  is proportional  to MAO  and  MBO. 
Some individuals  (those on or near  the line CD) could receive almost 
identical rewards  from work in either of the two sectors and are thus 
almost indifferent  about the sector in which they work. Small changes 
in preferences or productivities  of these agents result in steady-state 
E-E quits  as agents  switch sectors. We assume the number  of such quits 
is proportional  to the number  of workers  on the margin  between the two 
sectors, denoted  MA. In a steady state, switches from  A to B and  B to 
A balance. 
In a steady state then, total quits as a fraction of total employment 
depend  on (MAO  +  MBO)I(A +  B)  and MABI(A  +  B),  where A and B 
denote total employment  in sectors A and  B, respectively. 
In "good" states, when the costs of working  (QA or [iB  or both) are 
low, total  employment  is high.  MAB  tends  therefore  to be correspondingly 
large, resulting  in relatively  numerous  intersectoral  quits. This conclu- 
sion depends critically  on the underlying  joint distribution  of individual 
productivities  and is unambiguously  true only in the case of a neutral 
shock that lowers g-1A and [iB  by equal amounts. Negative productivity 
shocks, which raise LA or  LB or both, lower total employment  (A + B) 
and also tend to reduce the size of the margin  (MAB).  The steady-state 
impact of a productivity shock on the rate  of intersectoral quits is 
therefore  ambiguous. 
Next, consider the impact of a negative productivity  shock on the 
steady-state rate of E-O quits; this is proportional  to (MAO  +  MBO)/ 
(A  +  B).  The E-O quit rate rises if one assumes, as seems natural, 
that the labor supply function is convex, so that the total number  of 
people near  the margin  of indifference  between  working  and  not working 
(MAO  +  MBO)  increases as employment falls. Geometrically,  then, a 
negative productivity  shock raises MAO  +  MBO while lowering  A + B. 
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The aggregate  quit  rate is the sum of the intersectoral  (E-E) quit rate 
and the E-O quit rate. Since the steady-state intersectoral  quit rate 
changes ambiguously  while the E-O quit rate rises when total employ- 
ment  falls, the model  implies  an ambiguous  (and  quite  possibly  negative) 
correlation  between the aggregate  quit rate and the aggregate  employ- 
ment  rate.  In reality,  as we have shown, there  is a strong  positive steady- 
state relation  between employment  and either  the aggregate  quit  rate  or 
the aggregate  separation  rate. The model clearly  fails to rationalize  this 
finding. 
Our explanation of the procyclic behavior of quits relies on the 
concept of the vacancy chain. It is worthwhile  to explain  why there are 
no vacancy chains  in real  business cycle models. 
Vacancy chains occur only in models with job rationing.  Consider 
our one-job model. In equilibrium  any two individuals  with negative 
nonpecuniary  rewards  would like to trade  jobs. This is clearly  a Pareto 
inefficient  situation;  both agents are willing  to take small wage cuts to 
exchange jobs.  A  Walrasian auctioneer would switch the workers 
between  jobs. Flexible wages in any market-clearing  model accomplish 
the same end. Consequently,  in a market-clearing  equilibrium  no two 
equally  qualified  workers  covet one another'sjobs.  In contrast,  workers 
have no way of swapping  jobs in a world  with  job rationing. 
In a market-clearing  system, when one worker retires from the 
labor force and an identical new entrant appears, the new entrant 
merely takes the place of the retiree. No other workers could gain 
from changing places; consequently, no  vacancy chain arises.  In 
contrast, in our model with rationing,  the retirement  of one incumb- 
ent creates a chance for unhappy  workers to switch places since they 
can apply  for the retiree's  job and, with some probability,  gain  a chance 
to leave a job with poor rewards. An employed worker's chance of 
moving depends on the number  of unemployed  individuals  relative to 
the number of unhappy employed workers. In a similar model with 
market-clearing  wages, the fraction of employed workers who switch 
jobs each period is totally unaffected by a change in the number of 
retirements  with equal numbers  of reentries;  the fraction  of employed 
workers  who would switch  jobs in our one-job  model, but with market- 
clearing  wages, equals the number  of individuals  whose x falls below 
zero during  the period. In a steady state, this is proportional  to the size 
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APPENDIX  B 
Robustness  Tests for Econometric Results 
THIS APPENDIX  analyzes  the sensitivity  of the  benchmark  results  presented 
in the section on the causes and consequences of quits to a variety of 
econometric  issues:  individual-specific  intercepts  ("fixed  effects");  cross- 
equation correlations  between the disturbances  in the separation  and 
satisfaction  equations;  heteroskedasticity;  and  truncation  bias. 
Correcting for the "Talent Effect" in the Separation Equation 
The most serious problem  potentially  affecting  our estimates comes 
from what we will call the talent effect.87  Such an effect occurs when 
individuals  differ in native ability, which is unobservable,  and receive 
high  wages  in recognition  of their  talents.  In  this  event, the human  capital 
earnings function, equation 14, used to predict the mean alternative 
wage underestimates  the alternative  wage of talented individuals  (and 
overestimates the alternative  wage of lemons). Native ability leads to 
high wages in the current and alternative  jobs; the econometrician 
concludes  that  talented  persons  are  overpaid,  can  expect only low wages 
in alternative  jobs, and are, consequently, rarely  expected voluntarily 
to quit their  jobs. In reality, of course, the alternative  wages of such 
people are quite  high, and  these individuals  are not abnormally  unlikely 
to quit. If this effect is important,  the wage coefficient  in the separation 
equation  is biased  toward  zero.88 
If the talent  effect is important  and ability  is unobservable,  inclusion 
of the wage in a separation  equation  leads to biased  estimates. We have 
87. See Farber,  "  Unionism,  Labor  Turnover,  and  Wages  of Young  Men.  " 
88. Formally,  the econometric  problem  is that  there  is an individual-specific  intercept 
in the separation  equation (unobserved  ability that determines earnings capacity in 
alternative  jobs) and  this intercept  is correlated  with  the current  wage. The consequence 
is biased  coefficient  estimates.  This problem  adversely  affects many  of the papers  in the 
literature  including,  for example, Bartel  and Borjas, "Middle-Age  Job Mobility," and 
Gottschalk  and Maloney, "Involuntary  Terminations,  Unemployment,  and Job Match- 
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devised two solutions to this problem. The first involves the use of 
instrumental  variables;  the second  employs  a panel  approach  to eliminate 
individual-specific  fixed  effects. 
Instrumental  Variables 
One  way of purging  the bias from  the talent  effect is by discarding  the 
individual-specific  component  of the current  wage. The current  wage in 
the quit equation, equation 12, can be replaced  with a predicted  wage 
based on observable  characteristics,  including  features of the  job such 
as occupation  or industry,  while the alternative  wage is still estimated 
as a function of human capital and personal characteristics.  Krueger 
and Summers have provided persuasive evidence of  industry- and 
occupation-specific  wage differentials  for persons with identical char- 
acteristics.89  Thus, occupation  and  industry  affiliation  provides  system- 
atic information  concerning  an individual's  current  wage relative  to the 
wage in possible alternative  jobs. This approach  has the disadvantage  of 
discarding  information  contained  in the current  wage. 
To implement  this approach  we estimate  an augmented  version  of the 
human capital equation, equation 14, which includes industry and 
occupation  dummies  in addition  to human  capital  and personal  charac- 
teristics: 
(B.  1)  Wit  =  h' (HKit, Iit,  Oit)  +  [Lit, 
where I denotes the individual's  (one-digit)  industry  and 0 denotes his 
occupation  (divided  into 12 categories).  The fitted  values of the regres- 
sand are used in place of Wic.  To estimate Wit,  the mean alternative 
wage, we generate  the fitted  values from  this equation  with industry  and 
occupation  dummies  set equal  to zero. 
This procedure  assumes  that  individuals  are mobile  across industries 
and occupations. The mean wage earned by individuals with given 
characteristics  is assumed to be the average wage earned by such 
individuals  across all occupations and industries. The actual wage is 
assumed to embody an industry and occupation differential. Fixed 
89. See Krueger  and Summers, "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry  Wage 
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effects, due  to unobservable  differences  in talent,  bias  both  our  estimates 
of Wic  and Wit,  but the bias for both is the same, and, consequently,  the 
difference between the two (Wc -  Wit)  is unbiased. This approach 
substitutes  the wage premium  attributable  to the individual's  industry 
and occupation  into the separation  equation,  equation  12, as an observ- 
able measure  of (Wc -  Wit) 
The list of HK regressors  included  in the estimation  uses the rich set 
of variables  available  in the NLS. It includes:  education  and its square, 
experience  and  its square,  expected years  of labor  remaining  in the work 
force, size of local labor  market,  spouse's wage, number  of dependents, 
father's  education,  and  controls  for marital  status,  working  spouse, poor 
health, homeownership,  race, army  experience, nationality,  birthplace 
of father, birthplace  of mother, occupation of father, health of wife, 
residence  in SMSA, and  region. 
Estimates  of equation  12  for the sample  periods 1966-67  and 1966-69 
using this methodology are presented in table B-1. The results are 
consistent with the benchmark results; the difference between the 
current  and alternative  pecuniary  reward  has a negative effect on the 
probability  that the individual  quits his job, although, for the period 
1966-67, the coefficient is not significant  at the 5 percent level. The 
nonpecuniary  reward.  NPR,  has a significant  negative  effect on the quit 
probability  in  both  time  periods.  The  test for  equality  of the nonpecuniary 
and pecuniary  effects does not reject  the hypothesis  that the effects are 
equal in either period. The equations fit approximately  as well as the 
benchmark  equations,  and  the semi-elasticities  are similar.  It is interest- 
ing  to note that  the unemployment  rate  has a significantly  negative  effect 
on quits  for the longer  sample. 
To test for robustness, the difference Wit  -  Wit  was computed in 
several  alternative  ways. Our  first  method  generated  the  mean  alternative 
wage from the augmented  human capital equation, equation B. 1, by 
setting  only the industry  but  not the occupational  effects in that  equation 
equal  to zero. This method  is more  appropriate  if individuals  are mobile 
across industries  but  not occupations,  in which  case the measure  of their 
wage premium  should take into account their industry, but not their 
occupational  wage  differential.  Second, we estimated  two separate  wage 
equations  rather  than one to generate Wict  and Wit.  To generate Wic,  we 
estimated  a wage equation  that  includes  human  capital  variables  as well 
as industry  and occupation  dummies.  To generate Wit,  we estimated  a George A. Akerlof, Andrew K. Rose, Janet L.  Yellen  575 
Table  B-1. Estimates  of the Separation  Equation  Accounting  for Fixed  Effects 
Probit  estimates  of equation  12 using  an estimated  wage  differential  from equation  16 
Period 
1966-67  1966-69 
Independent  variable  Coefficienta Semielasticity  Coefficienta Semielasticity 
Constant  -  1.61  (0.19)  ..  .  -0.95  (0.18)  ... 
Estimated  wage 
differential  -0.50  (0.31)  -0.0260  -0.87  (0.26)  -0.0860 
NPR  -0.38  (0.16)  -0.0197  -0.39  (0.13)  -0.3860 
Local unemployment  -0.004  (0.004)  - 0.0002  - 0.010 (0.004)  -0.0010 
Summary  statistic 
Number  of observations  1746  1412 
McFadden's  R2  0.02  0.04 
Fraction  correct  0.98  0.94 
Hypothesis  testb 
Slopes (3)  9.21  *c  26.61**c 
Equal  (1)  0.14  2.76 
Panel  logit estimates  of equation  B.3, sample  periods,  1966-69 and 1969-71 
Independent  variable  Coefficienta 
Satisfaction  0.72  (0.31) 
Local unemployment  -0.03  (0.02) 
Summaty  statistic 
Number  of observations  1306 
McFadden's  R2  0.06 
Slopes (2)  7.44*c 
Source:  Authors  calculations  using  data from  the  National  Longitudinal  Survey  of  Mature Men.  See  text  for 
description of variables and test statistics. 
a.  Standard error in parentheses. 
b.  For definition of Slopes  and Equal tests,  see  table 9, note c.  Degrees  of freedom  in parentheses. 
c.  One asterisk indicates  significance at the 5 percent level.  Two  asterisks  indicate  1 percent level. 
wage equation  including  only human  capital  variables.  The estimate of 
Wic -  Wit  was created  by differencing  the fitted values from these two 
separate  equations. This method generates different  estimates of the 
industry  and occupational  wage differentials  if the industry  and occu- 
pational  dummies  and the HK  variables  are correlated.  Third,  we have 
used nine combinations  of the industry and occupation differentials 
estimated  by Krueger  and Summers  to compute Wc  -  Wi.  We use 
Krueger  and Summers's  baseline  estimates  of the industry  and occupa- 
tional  differences  based on the 1974  Current  Population  Survey as well 
as their variants  that control for differences in benefits and working 576  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1988 
conditions  across industries.  None of these perturbations  greatly  affects 
our results.90 
The substitution  of an estimate  for Wc into equation 12  in place of its 
actual value reflects a conscious decision to discard information.  The 
cost of this decision can be gauged by use of the Newey specification 
test.91  Unfortunately,  the test sometimes indicates a significant  loss of 
information  from using our proxies for Wic -  Wit  with the significance 
of the specification  tests depending  on the particular  proxy. 
USE  OF  PANEL  DATA 
A second  technique  to correct  for the talent  effect uses the availability 
of data on separations  for a cross section of individuals  over more than 
one period, to, in effect, estimate the first difference  of the separation 
equation,  equation  12.  We  use Chamberlain's  multinomial  logit  estimator 
to  account for the panel nature of  our limited-dependent  variable 
equations  .92 
An estimable  equation  is derived  by taking  the first  difference  of the 
separation  equation, equation 12. Assuming  that the mean alternative 
wage remains  unchanged  for an individual  and that the probability  of 
quitting depends only on the sum of the nonpecuniary  and excess 
pecuniary  rewards  yields 
(B.2)  P(Qit)  -  P(Qit  l1) = f"(NPRi,  -  NPRit  -l 
+  WC  -  Wc-I  Uit  -  uit1)  +  Eit  -  Eit-  . 
Unfortunately,  the nonpecuniary  reward  variable,  NPR,  is available 
only in 1966  and 1971.  However, satisfaction  (SA) variables  are  available 
from  each survey  and  can  be used to control  for  the level of nonpecuniary 
rewards.93  Under the empirically  appropriate  assumption  that satisfac- 
90. Ibid. The robustness of our results using Krueger and Summers's industry 
differentials  taking  account  of fringe  benefits  is reassuring  since the NLS wage variables 
include  no information  on fringe  benefits  that  could  be used to construct  a comprehensive 
measure  of pecuniary  rewards. Further,  Krueger  and Summers  also control for union 
membership  (the NLS does not provide  information  on this variable  in the relevant  years) 
and  various  interactions  between  human  capital  variables. 
91. See Whitney  K. Newey, "Maximum  Likelihood  Specification  Testing  and Con- 
ditional  Moment  Tests," Econometrica,  vol. 53 (September  1985),  pp. 1047-70. 
92. See Gary  Chamberlain,  "Analysis  of Covariance  with Qualitative  Data," Review 
of Economic  Studies,  vol. 47 (January  1980),  pp. 225-38. 
93. Use of this variable  is subject  to the caveat  discussed  above:  reported  satisfaction George  A. Akerlof,  Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen  577 
tion (SA) depends on the sum of the wage and nonpecuniary  reward, 
one obtains 
(B.3)  P(Qit)  -  P(Qit  ,)  =  f"'(SAi,  -  SAit  I, nIi -  ri,  U  I  Uit  -  uj,- I) 
+  Eit  -  Eit-  I, 
where nit is the disturbance  in the satisfaction  equation, equation 13. 
Note that  the individual-specific  fixed  effects have been swept out of the 
error  term. 
Estimates of equation B.3 are presented in the bottom panel of 
table B-1. Since the most satisfied workers gave the lowest possible 
answers to SA, the sign on SA is expected to be positive; increases in 
SA,  the level of worker dissatisfaction, should lead to increased quit 
rates. The results  are consistent  with the model:  an increase  in satisfac- 
tion lowers the probability  that  a worker  will subsequently  quit.94 
"Garbarino's Law" and the Satisfaction Equation 
According  to the wisdom of Joseph Garbarino,  "the most important 
decision that individuals  make, early in their  lives, is whether  or not to 
be happy." Natural differences in satisfaction, whose existence is 
implied  by Garbarino's  Law, potentially  bias our estimates  of the wage 
and nonpecuniary  coefficients  in the satisfaction  equation,  equation  13. 
The most direct way to handle this problem of individual-specific 
fixed effects is to first  difference  the satisfaction  equation: 
in any base period overestimates  the satisfaction, prior to their moves, of those job 
switchers  who received  negative  nonpecuniary  shocks  during  the period  in question. 
94. Once SA is included  in this equation,  there should be no further  role for either 
pecuniary  or nonpecuniary  returns.  In fact, when  the log of the wage rate  is added  to this 
equation,  the hypothesis  that  it is insignificant  can be rejected  at the  0.05 (but  not the 0.01) 
significance  level. There  are  three  possible  explanations  for this  finding.  First,  for reasons 
discussed  earlier,  the change  in the level of satisfaction  understates  the gains  achieved  by 
a possibly substantial  fraction  of movers who suffered  negative nonpecuniary  shocks 
subsequent  to the base-period  measurement  of their satisfaction.  Second, the discrete 
nature of the SA variable necessarily implies that adding a continuously measured 
subcomponent  of the level of satisfaction  to the discretely  observed  level of satisfaction 
will result  in an increase  in explanatory  power. Finally, since the available  satisfaction 
index is an imperfect  gauge of true satisfaction, it should be expected that both the 
satisfaction  index and the wage-both  of which are correlated  with true satisfaction- 
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(B.4)  SAit -  SAit-  =  g(NPRit  -  NPRit  I  ,  WC -  Wic  I) 
+  nit-  it-  I 
Our  preferred  measure  of the change  in satisfaction,  based  on a terminal- 
year question  concerning  the change  in the worker's  attitude  toward  his 
job, is available  for use as the dependent  variable. However, data on 
NPR are unavailable  for most subperiods.  If the movement  in NPR is a 
white-noise process that discretely changes as a consequence of a job 
separation,  as in our model, one can instead  estimate 
(B.5)  SAit -  SAit- I =  g'(Wc  -  Wic 1, Groups)  + mit  -  qit- I, 
where  Groups denotes a set of dummies  indicating  whether  and  why the 
individual  in question separated  from his base-period  job during  the 
interval  in question. We use four dummies  to isolate the consequences 
of: quits for pecuniary  reasons, quits for nonpecuniary  motives, quits 
for exogenous reasons, and involuntary  job losses. A significant  coeffi- 
cient on the dummy  variable  would indicate  that members  of the group 
experienced gains in nonpecuniary  rewards  as a consequence of their 
moves. 
Multinomial  logit estimates of equation  B.5 are presented  in the top 
panel  of table  B-2  for  the 1966-67  sample  period  (results  for  other  sample 
periods  have been computed  and  are quite  comparable).  The regressand 
measuring  the change  in satisfaction  is the answer  to the question  in the 
1967  survey: "Would  you say you like your present  job more, less, or 
about  the same as (the  job you held) last year?";  we present  the results 
as deviations  from  the answer "more." 
The estimates indicate  that wage gains lead to greater  worker  satis- 
faction (but at relatively weak levels of statistical significance).  The 
group  dummies  also have intuitive  effects on satisfaction.  In particular, 
job-related quitters, either pecuniary or nonpecuniary, have higher 
probabilities  of attaining  an improvement  in worker  satisfaction;  these 
effects are statistically significant.  Interestingly,  the effects are quite 
comparable  for individuals  who quit for pecuniary  and nonpecuniary 
reasons. The effect is smaller  for individuals  who quit for exogenous 
reasons, as seems reasonable,  and smaller still, although  positive, for 
individuals  who lost their  jobs. The hypothesis  that the group  dummies 
are  jointly irrelevant  in the equation  can be easily rejected.95 
95. These results  are insensitive  to the inclusion  of dummies  controlling  for changes 
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Table B-2.  Estimates of the Impact of Wage Changes and Job Switches on Worker 
Satisfaction 
Multinomial logit estimates of equation B.5,  1966-67 
Independent  variable  Coefficienta 
Effect on probability  of responding  "unchanged" 
satisfaction  rather  than "more  satisfied" 
Constant  1.89  (0.07) 
Change in (log) wage  -0.18  (0.23) 
Wage-quitter  dummy  - 2.75  (0.84) 
Nonpecuniary-quitter  dummy  - 2.71  (0.39) 
Exogenous-quitter  dummy  -2.28  (0.38) 
Job-loser dummy  -  1.55  (0.28) 
Effect on probability  of responding  "lower" satisfaction 
rather  than "more satisfied" 
Constant  -0.90  (0.13) 
Change  in (log) wage  -0.75  (0.34) 
Wage-quitter  dummy  -  15.28  (1632) 
Nonpecuniary-quitter  dummy  -  1.17  (0.63) 
Exogenous-quitter  dummy  -0.36  (0.52) 
Job-loser  dummy  0.67  (0.34) 
Summaty  statistic 
Number  of observations  1882 
McFadden's  R2  0.06 
Fraction  correct  0.80 
Slopes (10)b  156.51** 
Groups  (8)b  151.00** 
Panel binomial logit estimates of equation B.5,  1966-67,  1967-69,  and 1969-71 
Independent  variable  Coefficienta 
Effect on probability  that individual  likes terminal-year 
job more than base-year  job 
Change  in (log) wage  0.23  (0.12) 
Wage-quitter  dummy  2.17  (0.49) 
Nonpecuniary-quitter  dummy  2.31  (0.31) 
Exogenous-quitter  dummy  1.90  (0.34) 
Job-loser  dummy  0.99  (0.22) 
Summary  statistic 
Number  of observations  2097 
McFadden's  R2  0.09 
Slopes  (5)b  145.15** 
Groups (4)b  141.66** 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  data  from  the  National  Longitudinal  Survey  of  Mature Men.  See  text  for 
description of variables and test  statistics. 
a.  Standard error in parentheses. 
b.  For definition of Slopes  test,  see  table 9, note c. Groups tests  the hypothesis  that all of the groups coefficients 
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The estimates in table B-2 do not exploit the variation  across both 
time and individuals  available in the NLS. To make full use of the 
available  information  in the data  set, we have also estimated  the change 
in equation  B.5 using Chamberlain's  multinomial  logit panel estimator. 
The estimates are presented in the bottom panel of table B-2. For the 
purposes  of the estimation,  we have grouped  the three  possible answers 
to the question (like current  job: more/same/less)  into a simple binary 
variable:  one if the individual  liked his current  job better  than  the  job at 
the last survey date, and zero otherwise. 
The results indicate  that wage growth  between the previous and the 
current  survey  date  raises  the probability  that  an individual  will consider 
himself  better  off at marginal  levels of statistical  significance.  However, 
a job-related  quit strongly  raises the probability  that an individual  will 
gain worker satisfaction; the effects are quite comparable  for quits 
motivated by pecuniary and nonpecuniary considerations, and the 
hypothesis  that  the effect is identical  for  the two subgroups  ofjob-related 
quitters cannot be rejected (the chi-square  statistic is 0.06, and has a 
single  degree  of freedom  under  the null  hypothesis  of equal  coefficients). 
Both exogenous and  involuntary  quits  also raise  the probability  that  the 
worker will gain satisfaction. The effect of  an exogenous quit on 
satisfaction  is comparable  to that of a job-related  quit. The impact  of a 
job loss on satisfaction, however, is lower than that of a quit at the 1 
percent  level of significance. 
CROSS-EQUATION  CONSIDERATIONS 
It is natural  to expect the disturbances  in equations  12, 13, and B.5 to 
be correlated.  There  are two reasons  why. 
First, the error in equation 12, the separation equation, may be 
correlated  with  the disturbance  of equation  13,  the satisfaction  equation. 
This could happen  if individuals  with average  measured  rewards,  both 
pecuniary  and nonpecuniary,  become dissatisfied  with the character  of 
their  jobs (for example, the kind of work may become too stressful or 
physically  demanding),  rather  than  the working  conditions  at their  firms. 
Occupation-related  dissatisfaction  is not measured  in NPR,  since this 
variable  is the individual's  surplus  from working  in the current,  rather 
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becomes dissatisfied  in his line of work  is likely  to be more  unhappy  than 
equation  13  predicts,  and  also more  likely to quit  for ajob-related  reason 
than  equation  12  predicts.96 
Alternatively,  the error  in the separation  equation  may be correlated 
with the disturbance  of the change-in-satisfaction  equation, equation 
B.5. This would occur if an opportunity  offering an extremely high 
nonpecuniary  benefit  at another  firm  becomes  available  to the individual, 
but is unobservable  by the econometrician.  Good breaks lead both to 
unexpected quits and to unexpected  gains in total satisfaction.  In both 
of these cases, estimating  the two equations (that is, equation 12 and 
either equation 13 or equation B.5) jointly leads to more efficient 
estimates. 
We estimated  the satisfaction  and separation  equations  jointly with a 
bivariate  probit  estimator.  This estimator  takes into account the poten- 
tially nontrivial  correlation  between the disturbances  to the separation 
and  satisfaction  equations;  it is the limited-dependent  variable  estimator 
comparable  to Zellner's  SURE (GLS)  technique  in the linear  case (as in 
the linear  case, use of the single equation  technique  leads to inefficient 
but not inconsistent estimates). The bivariate  probit results on equa- 
tions 12  and 13  indicate  that  the residuals  of the separation  and satisfac- 
tion equation tend to be negatively correlated;  individuals  who unex- 
pectedly quit are somewhat more likely to  be  dissatisfied people. 
However, the correlation  is small  (usually  statistically  insignificant)  and 
somewhat  sensitive to the sample  chosen. 
We also estimated the separation equation, equation 12, and the 
change-in-satisfaction  equation, equation B.5, jointly with bivariate 
probit.  The estimates  indicate  that  the disturbances  of the two equations 
are  highly  positively correlated;  individuals  who unexpectedly  separate 
are  also likely to have unexpectedly  high  gains  in satisfaction,  even after 
controlling  for the growth of wages. Thus the "hidden opportunity" 
scenario seems to be of empirical  relevance. However, none of our 
previous conclusions is affected by these results; for example, the 
96. Although  individuals  who  mention  health  as the primary  reason  for  quitting  are  not 
classified  as job-related  quitters, it seems quite likely that some individuals  who quit 
because their work is too physically  demanding  would report  as a reason for quitting: 
dislike  type  of work  or  conditions  of work  or  found  betterjob.  They  would  thus  be  classified 
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hypothesis that the coefficients on the nonpecuniary  and pecuniary 
rewards  are equal still cannot  be rejected.97 
HETEROSKEDASTICITY  AND  TRUNCATION  BIAS 
The NLS does not randomly  sample  mature  males;  rather,  blacks  are 
consciously oversampled,  potentially  leading  to heteroskedasticity.  (In 
limited dependent  variable  models, heteroskedasticity  leads to biased 
estimates.) Further,  attrition  rates  from  the sample  are not equal  for all 
individuals;  individuals  who separate  from  their  jobs and, for example, 
change residence drop out of the sample with higher probability  than 
random  individuals.  This is known  as the truncated  regression  problem. 
These issues merit  consideration. 
The truncated  regression  problem  does not seem to be serious  in this 
context. By 1971,  850  of the original  5,020 sample  were nonrespondents. 
Of these, a maximum  of 7 percent  could have been nonrespondents  for 
separation-related  reasons (and some of these were probably  retirees 
who had  moved and were therefore  untraceable);  most nonrespondents 
either had died or refused  to be interviewed.  Naturally,  these problems 
are of even less relevance  for the earlier  surveys. 
To check  for  heteroskedasticity,  we used the sample  weights  provided 
by the NLS as weights  for equation  estimates. These are of remarkably 
little relevance;  for example, none of the point  estimates  of the 1966-67 
separation equation analogous to that reported in the top panel of 
table B-  I changes  by as much  as a tenth  of its standard  error. 
97. We  have  also  estimated  equation  B.5 with  atwo-stage  probit  technique,  substituting 
fitted values derived from separation  equations  like equation 12, for the actual group 
dummy  variables  that appear  as regressors  in equation  B.5. Although  precision  is poor 
(the covariance matrix must be constructed  by the method described in L. F.  Lee, 
G. S. Maddala,  and R. P. Frost, "Asymptotic  Covariance  Matrices  of Two-Stage  Probit 
and Two-Stage  Tobit Methods for Simultaneous  Equations  Models with Selectivity," 
Econometrica,  vol. 48, pp. 491-503), the point estimates are consistent with the more 
straightforward  estimation  of equation  B.5. Comments 
and Discussion 
Laurence  Ball: The paper  by George  Akerlof,  Andrew  Rose, and  Janet 
Yellen is a valuable contribution  to the literature  on labor turnover. 
Perhaps  its best feature  is that  in several  ways it rectifies  the unbalanced 
focus of previous work. First, most previous papers emphasize  transi- 
tions between employment  and unemployment,  while Akerlof, Rose, 
and Yellen document  the importance  of job changes without  an unem- 
ployment spell. Second, while previous work assumes that workers 
search for higher wages, the current  paper shows that nonpecuniary 
aspects of jobs are important.  Finally, previous work emphasizes the 
costs of turnover, while the current  paper points out the gains from 
workers' ability to move to better  jobs. All of these innovations can 
potentially  change  the ways that we think  about  turnover. 
In my remaining  comments, I will first discuss the authors' basic 
explanation  for procyclical  employment-to-employment  quits and then 
turn  to their  findings  concerning  nonpecuniary  aspects ofjobs. 
The  theoretical  model  in  the  first  part  of the  paper  is a  useful  framework 
for discussing labor turnover.  The central  result is an equation  for the 
steady-state  rate of employment-to-employment  quits. Slightly simpli- 
fied, this equation  is: 
QEE  =  (u)(13N). 
QEE is the flow of quits, a is the proportion  of workers  looking  for new 
jobs, u is the unemployment  rate, l  is the rate at which workers are 
exogenously separated  from  jobs, and N is the labor force. 1N  is the 
flow  of exogenous  job openings,  and  as the authors  explain,  the variable 
o[(1 -  u)/u] is the length of a vacancy chain-the  total number  of job 
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switches resulting  from  each exogenous opening.  Given this setup, it is 
easy to see the result  that  a decrease  in steady-state  unemployment  leads 
to greater  turnover.  The intuition  is that  low unemployment  implies  long 
vacancy chains. An exogenous job opening is likely to be filled by an 
employed  worker,  who creates  a new opening  by leaving  his oldjob; this 
opening  is likely  to be filled  by another  employed  worker,  and  so on until 
the chain is finally  ended when one of the rare  unemployed  workers  is 
hired. 
I have several  comments  about  this model. First, the authors  perform 
simulations to  show that the model produces a negative effect of 
unemployment  on quits. But the size of the effect is much  smaller  in the 
simulations  than in the empirical  results discussed later in the paper. 
While  a typical  simulation  produces  an elasticity  of quits  with  respect to 
unemployment  of -0.2,  the empirical  estimates imply an elasticity of 
-  1.3-so  the model  explains  less than  one-sixth  of the effect in the data. 
The quit  equation  suggests  two possible sources of this understatement. 
First, the authors  assume that the flow of exogenous openings, 3N, is 
constant, while in fact it probably  decreases with increasing  unemploy- 
ment-with  high unemployment,  workers  hold onto their current  jobs. 
Second, in the simulations  a, the proportion  of workers who want to 
move is strongly increasing  in u, and this largely offsets the negative 
effect of u on (1 -  u)/u. Again, in actual  economies high  unemployment 
may make workers less  likely to leave current  jobs for less certain 
prospects. In future  work, the authors  might  modify the behavior  of a 
and 1N to make  the model's quantitative  predictions  more  accurate. 
My second point about the model is a caution about  interpreting  the 
results. The authors'  references to "procyclical" quits are misleading 
because the results  mainly  concern  the steady-state  rather  than  cyclical 
relation between quits and unemployment.  The few non-steady-state 
results show a strong  cyclical relation.  But this probably  arises mainly 
from the creation of new jobs-and  hence new vacancy chains-in 
upturns,  not from the changes in the lengths of chains that the authors 
emphasize. Also, it does not make sense to recalculate  Okun's Law, 
which is a cyclical relationship,  by adding  a steady-state  effect. 
One important  issue concerning  the model is its welfare and policy 
implications.  The authors  make some tantalizing  remarks  about a "se- 
rious market  failure"  that arises because, given their  assumption  of job 
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wages. And the authors claim that reductions  in unemployment  have 
''positive  externalities.  " These suggestions  imply  a role  for government 
intervention  in the labor  market.  Since the authors  do not develop their 
ideas about  welfare,  I thought  about  them. It does appear  that  the model 
contains externalities.  In particular,  it appears  that inefficiencies  arise 
because each individual ignores the effects of his behavior on the 
aggregate quit rate, which influences the prospects of all workers. 
Behavior  that  raises  QEE,  and  hence allows  more  workers  to switch  jobs, 
has positive externalities  and should  be encouraged.  Thus, the equation 
for QEE  suggests positive externalities  from behavior  that raises a or a 
or that  reduces  u. 
Are these results  sensible?  Reducing  u means  creating  a newjob, and 
it makes sense that  a firm  deciding  whether  to do so ignores  the benefits 
to workers  of the resulting  vacancy chain. So the model  provides  a new 
reason that the equilibrium  unemployment  rate exceeds what a social 
planner  would choose. It also seems plausible that there are positive 
externalities  from  an increase  in a-that  is, from  a greater  willingness  of 
workers  to take new  jobs. When  the president  of a corporation  decides 
whether to move, he ignores the benefits from the resulting  vacancy 
chain-the  promotion  of the vice president  to president,  the replacement 
of the vice president  with the assistant  vice president,  and  so on. On the 
other  hand,  the finding  that  there  are  positive externalities  from  a higher 
1-more  exogenous  separations-seems suspicious.  The  problem  is that 
the model assumes that the unemployment  rate is exogenous, and thus 
fails to capture  the undesirable  rise in unemployment  that would result 
from  a higher  separation  rate  in actual  economies. 
In asserting that job  rationing leads to market failure involving 
mobility, the authors raise an important  issue that goes beyond their 
specific model. Lucas and Prescott's 1974 paper shows that, with 
competitive labor markets, there is no clear reason for individuals' 
mobility decisions-for  example, choices  about whether to  switch 
industries  or geographic  regions-to  produce  inefficiency.  ' Is this result 
altered  if the assumption  of competitive  labor  markets  is replaced  with 
some kind  of rationing?  Perhaps  Akerlof,  Rose, and  Yellen are  right  that 
inefficiencies  arise because wages no longer provide the right signals 
1. Robert  E. Lucas, Jr., and Edward  C. Prescott, "Equilibrium  Search and Unem- 
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about when to move. Working  out this idea would be very useful for 
evaluating  public policies that affect mobility, such as unemployment 
insurance  and  trade  adjustment  assistance. 
My remaining  comments concern the authors' evidence on the im- 
portance  for quit  decisions of nonpecuniary  aspects ofjobs. The results 
are striking  in two ways. First, nonpecuniary  factors  appear  to be much 
more  important  than  I would  have  guessed. Of  the National  Longitudinal 
Sample  of older  men, 73 percent  say that "liking  work  is more  important 
than  wages." Second, most workers  are quite  satisfied  with theirjobs- 
56 percent say they like their  jobs "very much," and fewer than 10 
percent  dislike  theirjobs "somewhat"  or "very much." The stereotype 
that most workers find their jobs boring but keep them to pay the 
mortgage  is not supported.  Finally, in line with these findings,  positive 
nonwage  aspects ofjobs create  tremendous  disincentives  for workers  to 
quit. Forty-three  percent  of the sample say that they would not switch 
to a similar job in the same geographical areafor  any  wage.  And many 
more  would  demand  a raise of 50 percent  or more. 
These results are so strong  that it is difficult  to accept them fully. Is 
economists' emphasis  on pecuniary  rewards  so misplaced?  Would  most 
workers  earning  $20  an hour  on the General  Motors  assembly  line refuse 
a $30  an hour  job next door at Ford? 
There  are several  reasons  to believe that the importance  of nonpecu- 
niary  rewards  is overstated.  First, survey  results  may  be unreliable  when 
some answers sound better than others-people  may understate the 
degree to which they are money grubbers  and overstate their love for 
challenging  and  useful  work. Second, even if people are  honest, some of 
the questions cited by the authors do not seem to be fair tests of the 
importance  of pecuniary and nonpecuniary  variables. For example, 
when  people are  asked  whether  they like theirjobs and  what  they like or 
dislike, they may ignore  wages and focus on the  jobs themselves, even 
if wages have more  important  effects on their  behavior. 
The authors  test the reliability  of their  main  measure  of nonpecuniary 
benefits-the  raise that workers would demand to switch jobs-by 
estimating  its effect on actual quits and comparing  this to the effect of 
wages. Their  results are somewhat  convincing, but their  claim that the 
effect  of nonpecuniary  variables  is as large  as that  of pecuniary  variables 
is an  overstatement.  When  they control  for the important  "talent  effect" 
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than  twice as large  as the estimate  for the nonpecuniary  variable  for the 
1966-69 sample. And when the authors modify their procedure by 
assuming  that only industry  wage differentials,  not occupational  differ- 
entials, are uncorrelated  with talent, the wage coefficient is more than 
twice as large  for both time periods. (These results  were reported  to me 
by the authors.) 
Finally,  and  perhaps  most important,  even if we accept  the result  that 
workers  require  large  wage  increases  to quit,  the  interpretation  is unclear. 
The  authors  cite the result  as evidence  that  workers  greatly  value  feelings 
of appreciation, good management, and amiable coworkers on the 
current  job. But an alternative  is that workers are reluctant  to switch 
jobs because  they  would  lose security.  Recall  that  the  workers  in  question 
are  men in their  fifties.  Many  have long tenures  with  their  employers  and 
are confident  that  they can continue  working  at a predictable  wage, pay 
the college tuition,  and retire  on a good pension. If they take a new  job, 
it might  not work  out, and  they may  eventually  earn  lower  wages or even 
become unemployed,  which could be disastrous.  So they do not switch 
unless tempted  by a very large  raise. 
In the survey by Clifford  Jurgensen  cited by the authors  in an earlier 
draft,  job security  is listed as the most important  characteristic  of jobs, 
ahead of both pay and the factors like coworkers stressed by Akerlof, 
Rose, and Yellen.2  And security should be interpreted  as a pecuniary 
variable-concern for security means fear of losing future income. In 
other words, the fact that workers turn down jobs that offer higher 
current  earnings  might  simply  mean that  they fear lower earnings  in the 
future. 
In conclusion,  let me emphasize  that  the authors'  evidence is impres- 
sive despite its problems. While I do not think that nonpecuniary 
variables are as  important as they do,  I think these variables are 
considerably  more  important  than  I did before I read  the paper. 
Robert E.  Hall: One of the most interesting new developments in 
economics  is thick-market  theory.  Peter  Diamond  and  others  have shown 
that  a market  may have more than one equilibrium.  It is advantageous 
for a market  to be thick. High rates of output  and trade  lower the costs 
2. Clifford  E. Jurgensen,  "Job  Preferences  (What  Makes  a Job  Good  or  Bad),  "  Journal 
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of each seller.  In Diamond's  famous  parable,  the inhabitants  of a tropical 
island harvest coconuts and then trade them with each other. In the 
thick-market  equilibrium,  it pays to climb  far  up the palm  because many 
other people are doing the same thing, and it is likely that the coconut 
can be traded quickly so consumption  can occur. In the thin-market 
equilibrium,  only the easiest coconuts are harvested. Few people are 
trading  coconuts, and  it does not  pay to climb  far  up  the tree. Multiplicity 
of equilibriums  is the  expected  situation  when  there  are  technical  external 
complementarities,  as in Diamond's  model. 
Applications  of thick-market  theory come to mind  easily. There is a 
remarkably  thick  market  for cameras  in midtown  Manhattan,  where the 
cost of buying a camera  is much lower than elsewhere and where the 
cost of selling cameras is much lower because of the high density of 
customers.  Thick-market  forces operate  over time  as well. For  example, 
the selling  of certain  kinds  of consumer  goods is concentrated  in the six- 
week Christmas  shopping  season. During  that time, thick-market  bene- 
fits accrue  to buyers  and sellers. 
Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen, in this interesting  and challenging  paper, 
apply a version of thick-market  theory to  the labor market. They 
concentrate  on thick-market  benefits to workers. The central point is 
that  a thick  labor  market,  where  jobs are  easy to find  and  unemployment 
is low, results  in improved  matches  dofjobs  and  workers.  A thick  market 
makes it possible for a worker to achieve the optimal  combination  of 
earnings  and  nonpecuniaryjob  characteristics.  In  a high-unemployment, 
thin  labor  market,  the same  worker  would  not want  to quit  ajob that  was 
a poor match  because the cost of finding  a new  job is high. 
The choice between a thin and  a thick market  exists only in a market 
with multiple  equilibriums.  Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen assume a setup 
with a continuum  of equilibriums.  Firms  do not adjust  wages to provide 
the optimal flow of jobseekers. Instead, they simply ration  jobs. The 
authors  assume that the job-finding  rate for workers  is proportional  to 
the ratio  of the number  of jobs to the number  of unemployed.  Then it is 
easy to see that  the labor  market  can be in equilibrium  at any unemploy- 
ment rate. By contrast,  in a natural  rate model (as in Appendix  A of the 
paper), the thickness of  the market is  determined uniquely by  its 
equilibrium  conditions. The questions considered in the paper are 
meaningless  if there is only a single unemployment  rate possible in the 
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how changing  one of the determinants-say, the  job-matching  efforts  of 
the public  employment  service-affected  the equilibrium.  The costs of 
the change in the determinants  would have to be reckoned  against  the 
benefits  of the improved  equilibrium.  With  indeterminancy,  there is no 
cost side. 
The authors refer repeatedly to something they call the "vacancy 
chain." The explanation  given for a vacancy chain-that  the sequence 
ofjob changes  is longer  when  there  are  fewer unemployed  ready  to move 
into a vacancy-is  defective because it does not recognize stochastic 
equilibrium.  As long as the unemployment  rate is not changing  over 
time, the chain  does not end when someone moves from  unemployment 
to employment:  that move has to be counterbalanced  by another  move 
from employment to unemployment, which keeps the chain going. 
However, although  the idea of a vacancy chain  is incorrect,  the point is 
right that thick markets have higher  job-matching  flows. The model 
assumes that the flow of workers  into  jobs occurs at a rate high enough 
to offset an exogenous flow from employment  to out of the labor  force 
and from employment to unemployment.  The flow into employment 
comes only from  job-finding  by the unemployed.  When  the labor  market 
is thick and unemployment  is low, the weekly job-finding  rate is high. 
By assumption,  the  job-finding  rate  for workers  who are badly  matched 
and who want to move to another  job is the same as the rate for the 
unemployed. Hence they share in the benefit of the thick market. 
Although  this conclusion follows purely from the assumption  of equal 
job-finding rates, that assumption seems perfectly reasonable. The 
"vacancy  chain"  is not a new insight,  butjust  a confusing  way to express 
the idea that  employed  jobseekers benefit  from  a thick  labor  market. 
The authors look only at the jobseeker's side of the labor market. 
Lower unemployment, higher vacancies, and faster job-finding are 
obviously benefits to the jobseeker. The paper does not go into the 
interesting companion issue,  namely the benefits and costs  to  the 
employer. The authors  rig their model so that there are no benefits or 
costs, but  surely  in reality  employers  care  about  the selection  of workers 
available  in the market  and  the time needed to fill vacant  jobs. Although 
the traditional  view has been that workers gain and employers suffer 
when unemployment  falls, this view should not be taken for granted. 
Employers  are not deserting  the drum-tight  labor  markets  of the North- 
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market,  as expressed in Diamond's model, for example, there is a net 
benefit  in a thick  market  to those on both sides. The thick  camera  market 
in Manhattan  is one where it is cheaper for customers to shop and 
cheaper for merchants  to sell. An interesting  question raised by the 
Akerlof-Rose-Yellen  paper  is whether  a tight, low-unemployment  labor 
market is a thick market in the same way. And if a particular  labor 
market,  such as the Northeast, is truly  a thick market,  can the national 
economy achieve the benefits  of a thick labor  market  by expanding  the 
overall  economy with monetary  and  fiscal  policy? 
The authors'  main purpose in the paper is to describe thick market 
benefits accruing  to workers.  They focus in particular  on workers  who 
quit one  job after  finding  a better  one. In some cases, the benefit  shows 
up in GNP-the  new job pays a higher  wage and the worker is corre- 
spondingly more productive. Economists have long emphasized this 
type of benefit. The authors  emphasize  the type of benefit  that escapes 
measurement  in GNP. Workers  frequently  change  jobs without wage 
improvement,  but obtain  a benefit  in the form  of higherjob  satisfaction. 
Okun's  Law, which  looks  only  at  GNP,  understates  thick-market  benefits 
to the extent that improvements  in  job satisfaction  are widespread  in a 
tightening  labor  market.  However, even the skeptic  about  nonpecuniary 
job characteristics  should be interested in this paper. Standard  job- 
matching  benefits  that  are recorded  in GNP are  also in the domain  of the 
authors'  view of the labor  market. 
The paper  devotes excessive attention  to the side issue of rationing  in 
the labor  market.  Rationing  is a side issue because thick-market  effects 
are important  in models where employers use wage adjustments  opti- 
mally  as part  of their  recruitment  strategies.  It goes without  saying  that 
the labor market  is not a perfect auction market.  The essential contri- 
bution of Diamond's work and related research is to drop an auction 
market view and replace it with one where individuals  face realistic 
problems  and use all of the instruments  at their disposal to solve those 
problems.  Akerlof,  Rose, and  Yellen's view that  employers  never think 
about  the possibility  of wage adjustments  is retrograde  in comparison  to 
current  research, not to mention common sense. All of the empirical 
findings  they cite in favor  of rationing  really  amount  to support  for some 
kind of middle  ground  between the extremes of the auction market  on 
one hand  and strict  wage rigidity  on the other. The authors  diminish  the 
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Much of the paper is devoted to evidence on the importance of 
nonpecuniary  job characteristics.  I find the overall framework  for this 
material  puzzling. When workers care about different  types of work, 
they will have  preference  orderings  about  work  similar  to their  orderings 
over different  goods for consumption. Reducing these orderings  to a 
single  monetary  equivalent  is not  something  we would  ever  do in standard 
demand  theory, and  I see no reason  why we should  try to do it for labor 
supply  theory. On the other hand, the paper  does give some validation 
to the idea of a monetary equivalent by showing that the monetary 
equivalent  has about  the same coefficient  as earnings  in the satisfaction 
equation. 
The single most persuasive piece of evidence on the importance  of 
nonpecuniary  job characteristics,  in my view, is the finding  that wage 
reductions  are common  in voluntary  job changes. Note that this finding 
does not rely on any form of reported  job satisfaction.  Even the hard- 
headed  economist  who rejects  all survey  questions  that  appear  sociolog- 
ical or psychological  has to respect this piece of evidence. 
The Akerlof-Rose-Yellen  paper is an important  milestone in the 
development  of thick-market  theory, in my view. All future  discussions 
of thick-market  benefits  in the labor  market  will have to include  consid- 
eration  of the nonpecuniary  benefits documented  in the paper. But the 
paper  would be even more of a milestone  if it were a little less dogmatic 
on wage rigidity  and  rationing.  As thick-market  theory  develops, I doubt 
that the extreme view of wage determination  adopted here will prove 
viable. 
General  Discussion 
There  was considerable  discussion  of labor  market  rationing,  both its 
role  in  the  theoretical  model  of Akerlof,  Rose, and  Yellen  and  its  empirical 
importance.  Akerlof  argued  that  a  thick-market  model  such  as Diamond's 
relies  fundamentally  on a lack of information,  whereas  the authors'  own 
model  assumes  perfect  information,  but  labor  market  rationing  prevents 
unhappy  workers  from changing  places. The emphasis  on job rationing 
also explains why the unemployment  rate is treated as exogenous, 
actually  parameterizing  the degree of job rationing.  Alan Blinder  found 
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Hall had gone too far in his characterization  of the other extreme of 
perfect competition. If there are heterogeneous agents under perfect 
competition, only individuals on the margin will be indifferent  to a 
transaction;  all the others will receive rents. Thomas  Juster  agreed  that 
rationing  is an important  feature  of labor  markets,  citing  the automobile 
industry  as an important  example. He noted that the high  wage paid by 
General  Motors  may be rational  because it increases  the productivity  of 
its workers,  but  saw no evidence  in  that  market  of productivity  matching. 
William  Nordhaus  observed that the market  for college admissions is 
nonclearing  and analogous to the authors' view of the labor market. 
Tuition  is set at too low a level for the market  to clear: many students 
would like to attend  at that  price but are not admitted.  Presumably,  like 
firms,  colleges want to be able to choose students  from a larger  pool of 
applicants  than  would  be forthcoming  at a higher  tuition  level. 
Juster  pointed  out some measurement  problems  in the NLS data  used 
by Akerlof,  Rose, and  Yellen to determine  the nonpecuniary  rewards  of 
working.  First,  he mentioned  the  problem  of determining  how  individuals 
who actually receive zero nonpecuniary  rewards would answer the 
question, "How do you  feel about  thejob you have now?" Under  certain 
survey environments, such individuals might reply, "I like it fairly 
much,  " but  under  alternative  environments  they  might  answer,  "I dislike 
it somewhat." A second problem  arises when individuals  are asked to 
compare their current and previous jobs.  Respondents may tend to 
justify their  own decision  to changejobs  by answering  that  they get more 
nonpecuniary  benefits  from their new  job. A third  problem  comes with 
interpreting  responses to hypothetical  questions such as, "What  would 
the wage or salary have to be for you to be willing to change  jobs?" 
According  to Juster,  economists  arejustifiably  suspicious  of interpreting 
answers  to these hypothetical  questions  as indicators  of the behavior  of 
individuals  faced with the actual  alternatives. 
Juster suggested benchmarking  responses based on actual behavior 
whenever possible. Though this is not possible for the NLS data, he 
reported  on his own results  from  another  data  set that  asked  individuals, 
on a scale of 1 to 10, how much satisfaction  they derived  from  engaging 
in each of 25 different activities such as housework, market work 
(employment),  child care, and watching  television. The benchmarking 
comes from  being  able to compare  the satisfaction  respondents  claim  to 
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vision. Juster's  results  are strikingly  consistent  with Akerlof,  Rose, and 
Yellen's results  from  the NLS. The average  nonpecuniary  benefits  from 
employment  actually  exceed those of leisure  activities  such as watching 
television. But Juster  warned  that the results do not prove that respon- 
dents work  too little since the marginal  nonpecuniary  benefit  of an hour 
of work may be far less than the average. In fact, low marginal  nonpe- 
cuniary benefits of work, when evaluated at 40 hours a week, are 
consistent  with  the evidence  that  observed  labor  supply  is quite  inelastic. 
Unfortunately,  the data  set contains  very few respondents  who move to 
new  jobs, so it would be difficult  to study the effect of changing  jobs on 
the nonpecuniary  benefits  of work. 
The results of the Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen model are driven by 
fluctuations  over time in individuals'  nonpecuniary  benefits of work. 
Juster  argued  that the empirical  evidence of these fluctuations  could be 
reinterpreted  as evidence of respondents  randomly  saying at one time, 
"I love my  job" and at another  time, "I sort of like it," noting  that his 
own benchmarked  measures  of nonpecuniary  benefits are quite stable 
through  time. Nordhaus agreed that fluctuations  in nonpecuniary  re- 
wards are unlikely to be important. He observed that, in practice, 
nonpecuniary  rewards are closely tied to pecuniary  rewards. For ex- 
ample,  workers  who receive smaller  pay increases  than  their  co-workers 
will generally  have a low opinion  of their  work place. Therefore,  it may 
be that nonpecuniary  rewards are as sticky as real wages over the 
business cycle.  Juster tried to  determine the relationship between 
nonpecuniary  benefits  of work and  wages. He found  that  high  nonpecu- 
niary  benefits  are not associated with high wages but rather  with social 
aspects of the work, although  low nonpecuniary  benefits  are associated 
with  low wages. Juster  suspects that  low wages indicate  to a worker  that 
his work is not being valued and thus reduce the job's nonpecuniary 
benefits. 
Alan Blinder  suggested that the authors  incorporate  a fixed cost of 
changing  jobs into their  model. The fixed cost could represent  the costs 
of moving, decisionmaking  costs, and the costs associated with uncer- 
tainty  about  the nonpecuniary  benefits  of a new  job. This addition  to the 
model could explain why many individuals  say they would require  an 
implausibly  large  premium  to change  jobs. Furthermore,  the fixed cost 
of changing  ajob can  be viewed as an  investment  in futurejob  happiness. 
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effects in the model, with a high interest rate reducing  quits. Thomas 
Juster  objected  to the assumption  that every quit creates a vacancy. In 
particular,  for servicejobs  there  may  be a nonlinear  relationship  between 
quits and vacancies because a small number  of quits may not cause a 
firm  to hire replacements  immediately.  Andrew  Rose doubted  whether 
the nonlinearity  would  matter  in the aggregate  since employment  is fixed 
by assumption. 
Wayne Vroman argued that the estimate of a benefit replacement 
ratio of 0.6 used in the simulations  is too high. Feldstein's estimate of 
0.55 applies to periods when unemployed individuals are receiving 
unemployment  benefits. Actually, benefits begin a week after the start 
of an  unemployment  spell  and  are  often  exhausted  before  the termination 
of a spell. Furthermore,  in many states, workers  who have not worked 
long enough between unemployment spells do not qualify for any 
unemployment  insurance.  Vroman  believed a more  reasonable  estimate 
of the benefit  replacement  ratio is 0.4 to 0.45. He went on to note that 
1966-69 is  an unusual period of  a high-pressure  economy,  so  the 
parameter  estimates of the separation  equations (table 9) may not be 
representative.  He recommended  that the authors  estimate the separa- 
tion equation over periods with higher unemployment  to determine 
whether  the motivations  for separations  are  the same. 
Matthew  Shapiro  suggested  that because there is much more cross- 
sectional variation  in nonpecuniary  benefits  of jobs than in wages, it is 
not surprising  that nonpecuniary  factors have more explanatory  power 
than wages in determining  the choice of employment. He went on to 
stress the potential benefit of employment-to-employment  quits for 
improving  productivity.  He noted, however, that these nonpecuniary 
benefits arising from changes in employment and unemployment  are 
likely to be small relative to other costs and benefits. Moreover, he 
cautioned  against  nonsystematic  additions  to the output  side of Okun's 
Law. For example, if these benefits of job dynamics are counted as 
welfare  gains, forgone leisure of employed workers  should be counted 
as a cost. 